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Abstract 
The Body Claim states that a transcendental condition of self-consciousness is that 
one experience oneself as embodied. The contention of this thesis is that popular 
arguments in support of the Body Claim are unconvincing. Understanding the Body 
Claim requires us to have a clear understanding of both self-consciousness and 
embodied experience. In the first chapter I lay out two different conceptions of self- 
consciousness, arguing that the proponent of the Body Claim should think of self- 
consciousness as first-person thought. I point out that since arguments for the Body 
Claim tend to proceed by stating putative transcendental conditions on self-reference, 
the proponent of the Body Claim must maintain that there is a conceptual connection 
between self-consciousness and self-reference. In the second chapter I argue against 
views, originating from Wittgenstein and Anscombe, which reject this connection 
between self-consciousness and self-reference. In chapter three I show that a well 
known principle governing the ascription of content, that which Evans calls `Russell's 
Principle', occupies an ambiguous position with regards to the Body Claim. I argue 
that Russell's Principle should be rejected. Chapter four distinguishes between two 
conceptions of embodied experience: bodily-awareness and bodily self-awareness. I 
argue that there is no such thing as bodily self-awareness and so it cannot be a 
transcendental condition of self-consciousness. Chapter five looks at, and finds 
wanting, arguments for the Body Claim that can be found in the work of Strawson. 
Chapter six argues that it is a transcendental condition of self-consciousness that one 
enjoy spatial experience. Chapters seven and eight assess two influential arguments 
that attempt to complete a defence of the Body Claim: the solidity argument and the 
action argument. I argue that neither argument is convincing. Although the 
conclusions are primarily negative, much is learned along the way about the nature of 
both self-consciousness and embodied experience. 
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0. Introduction 
Mature human beings are self-conscious. This is beyond doubt. Our ability to think of 
ourselves as ourselves is, say some, what separates us from mere beasts. But if self- 
consciousness is an aspect of our experience which sets us apart from other animals, 
embodied experience is one which brings us together. Both human beings and other 
animals experience themselves as embodied. Human beings have bodies and we 
experience ourselves as such. 
Embodied experience is to be distinguished from embodiment. In saying that 
human beings are embodied, I am saying that human beings have bodies. This is a 
claim about the way the world is. In saying that human beings have embodied 
experience, I am saying that human beings experience themselves as embodied. This 
is claim about the way the world appears to us. To see the distinction, consider the 
brain-in-a-vat fantasy, in which a subject enjoys embodied experience without being 
embodied. Conversely, assuming that they lack experience, slugs are embodied 
without enjoying embodied experience. 
What is the relationship between self-consciousness and embodied 
experience? An appealing answer to this question is that embodied experience is a 
transcendental condition of self-consciousness. That is, a self-conscious subject must 
enjoy embodied experience. Or, in other words, it is not possible that a self-conscious 
subject fail to enjoy embodied experience. I shall refer to this claim as the Body 
Claim. To repeat, the Body Claim does not state that a self-conscious subject must be 
embodied, but rather than a self-conscious subject must experience itself as embodied. 
This thesis is a critical examination of the Body Claim. I assess arguments that 
have been put forward in support of that claim. But my aim is limited. I look at only 
those arguments which proceed via the notion of self-reference. That is, it is claimed 
by some that self-reference is a transcendental condition of self-consciousness, and 
that embodied experience is a transcendental condition of self-reference. I claim that 
the various arguments of this form that have been put forward all fail. Whilst it is true 
that self-consciousness necessarily involves self-reference, it has not been shown that 
embodied experience is a transcendental condition of self-reference. Therefore, the 
Body Claim has not been established. 
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I do not claim that the Body Claim is false. My position with regards to the 
Body Claim is agnostic. Neither do I claim that there are no successful arguments that 
proceed in a more direct fashion, bypassing the notion of self-reference (although I 
have yet to see one). It may seem that the scope of the thesis is, as a result, overly 
narrow. I hope that this is not the case. First, the arguments that I will be discussing 
have been enormously influential and are by far the most popular ways of defending 
the Body Claim. Second, the arguments are broad, in the sense that they range 
through a great many topics within the philosophy of mind and language. 
The Body Claim is a transcendental claim. Transcendental claims are naturally 
characterised as claims to the effect that x is a necessary condition of y, where y is a 
feature of our experience that is beyond sceptical doubt. The Body Claim fits the bill 
nicely: self-consciousness is a feature of our experience the existence of which is 
beyond sceptical doubt, and embodied experience is claimed to be a necessary 
condition of it. But as natural as this characterisation is, there are reasons to think that 
it should be amended. The Body Claim denies the possibility of a self-conscious 
subject without embodied experience. But the methodology employed in traditional 
arguments for the Body Claim involve conceivability. It is argued that it is not 
conceivable that a self-conscious subject lack embodied experience. The legitimacy of 
this clearly relies on the existence of a strong link between conceivability and 
possibility. Specifically, it relies on the principle which states that that which is not 
conceivable is not possible. And this principle is highly controversial'. We do not 
want the Body Claim, and transcendental claims in general, to be hostage to the 
fortunes of this principle. 
A better way to characterise transcendental claims is explicitly as claims of 
conceivability. Transcendental claims should not be thought of as of the form `x is a 
necessary condition of y', but rather as of the form `y without x is inconceivable'. 
Discovering that x and y are linked in this way is still philosophically interesting, for it 
tells us something maybe not about modal reality, but about the relations between our 
concepts; about our conceptual scheme. This is, I suggest, in line with the way in 
which proponents of transcendental claims have often seen their own activity. 
Particularly so since Kripke, 1980. These issues are discussed in fascinating detail in Gendler and 
Hawthorne, 2002. 
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Transcendental claims do not claim to describe the world but "to describe the actual 
structure of our thought about the world" (Strawson, 1959, p. 9). 
We should, then, reformulate the Body Claim as the claim that it is 
inconceivable that a self-conscious subject lack embodied experience. This falls short 
of making an explicit claim about modal reality. Such a claim would need 
supplementation by a principle linking conceivability and possibility. I shall mark this 
point by speaking not of necessary conditions but of transcendental conditions. That 
is, as I use it, x is a transcendental condition of y if and only if y is not conceivable 
without x. Understood in this way, the Body Claim maintains that embodied 
experience is a transcendental condition of self-consciousness. 
The two central concepts with which this thesis is concerned are self- 
consciousness and embodied experience. Getting clear about these notions is vital to 
any examination of the Body Claim. Throughout the following chapters a picture will 
emerge as to the different ways both self-consciousness and embodied experience 
might be understood. Roughly speaking, there are two ways to understand self- 
consciousness. The first is that self-consciousness is an introspective awareness of the 
self. This might be an awareness of the self as either a mental or a bodily thing. On 
the other hand, self-consciousness can be understood as a property of certain thoughts. 
In a similar way, embodied experience can be understood in two ways. The first is 
simply as the awareness that each of us has of his or her own body; bodily-awareness. 
The second is as a form of bodily introspection, or self-awareness. This can be 
represented as follows: 
Body Claim 
Self-Consciousness Embodiment 
First-Person Thought Self-Awareness Bodily Self- Bodily-Awareness 
Awareness J 
Mental Self-Awareness Bodily Self-Awareness 
fig. I 
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The first thing to notice concerning this representation is that the phrase `bodily self- 
awareness' occurs twice. This is no mistake. As will be seen, those who believe in 
bodily self-awareness think of it both as a form of self-consciousness and as a form of 
embodied experience. 
Looking ahead, in the first chapter I distinguish the different ways in which 
self-consciousness can be understood. I begin by saying more about the distinction 
between self-awareness and first-person thought. I argue that any interesting version 
of the Body Claim must look to the second of these construals of self-consciousness. I 
then move on to the relationship between self-consciousness, understood as first- 
person thought, and the notion of self-reference. I distinguish between different 
strengths of the commitment to self-reference and explain what must be maintained 
by anyone who wishes to argue for the Body Claim via the notion of self-reference. I 
shall sometimes refer simply to defenders of the Body Claim, this should be taken to 
be restricted to defenders of the Body Claim via the notion of self-reference. 
Chapter two offers a critique of the `no reference view' of first-person 
thought. Versions of this view have been offered by both Wittgenstein and Anscombe. 
Associated with this position is the idea that the self-ascription of mental states should 
be given a non-factualist reading. I explain why the defender of the Body Claim via 
self-reference must reject the no reference view and show how this can be done. 
The third chapter is, in many ways, the heart of the thesis as a whole. It 
concerns, what has come to be known as Russell's Principle. I show that Russell's 
Principle is of fundamental importance in some influential arguments for the Body 
Claim. However, Russell's Principle occupies an ambiguous and unstable position. 
For if Russell's Principle is accepted it poses a serious threat to the tight link between 
self-consciousness and self-reference that is required for the defence of the Body 
Claim. I argue for this by way of a critical exposition of Evans' theory of first-person 
thought. The way out of the morass is the rejection of Russell's Principle. With 
Russell's Principle out of the way, the defender of the Body Claim is free to assert the 
strong conceptual connection between self-consciousness and self-reference. 
Chapter four moves from self-consciousness to embodied experience. The two 
conceptions of embodied experience are distinguished and described. I then discuss 
the defence of the Body Claim recently offered by Cassam. Cassam understands 
embodied experience in the strong sense, as bodily self-awareness. First I show that 
his argument is flawed. Second I show that there is no such thing as bodily self- 
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awareness. If the Body Claim is defensible, embodied experience must be understood 
weakly, as bodily-awareness. 
Chapter five looks for an argument for the Body Claim in the work of 
Strawson. I argue that none of Strawson's arguments are convincing. However, 
although Strawson's arguments are unsuccessful, they point towards a better 
argument. I dub this the self-location argument, and in chapter six I defend it. The 
self-location argument shows that a self-conscious subject must experience him or 
herself as spatially located. This is an achievement, but it does not yet vindicate the 
Body Claim. For it may be suggested that a self-conscious subject could experience 
him or herself as a spatially located but bodiless `point of view'. 
The final two chapters consider, what I take to be, the most serious arguments 
against the possibility of such a point of view. The first argument, discussed in 
chapter seven, relies on an account of the notion of solidity and the role it plays in our 
experience of the world as spatial. The second argument, the topic of chapter eight, 
offers an account of spatial action and its relation to both bodily-awareness and our 
ability to give content to the idea that perception is spatial. Unfortunately for the 
proponent of the Body Claim, neither of these arguments are successful. 
My conclusion is that it has not been shown that self-consciousness without 
embodied experience is inconceivable. But this is not to deny that embodied 
experience plays a fundamental role in determining the way in which we experience 
the world. Even if the link between self-consciousness and embodied experience is 
contingent, it is plausible to think that it is, if I may be allowed this phrase, `a deep 
contingency'. Furthermore, throughout the discussion of the various attempts to 
establish the Body Claim we learn much about both self-consciousness and embodied 
experience. 
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1. Self-Consciousness 
1.1 Self-Awareness 
I distinguished above between two ways of understanding self-consciousness. The 
first is as an introspective awareness of the self. The second is as first-person thought. 
I say more about first-person thought in the following sections. In this section I 
discuss self-consciousness understood as an introspective awareness of the self, for 
which I reserve the term `self-awareness'. 
Self-awareness is an introspective awareness of the self as a thing. The 
hypothesis that we are self-aware is the hypothesis that when one introspects one is 
directly aware of something which is presented to one as oneself. There are at least 
two ways in which philosophers have understood this view. The first is that, in 
introspection, one is aware of oneself as a purely mental thing, as a bearer of mental 
properties only. The second is that, in introspection, one is aware of oneself as a 
(partly) physical thing, as a bearer of (at least some) physical properties. I will argue 
that understanding self-consciousness as mental self-awareness deprives the Body 
Claim of much of its plausibility, whilst thinking of self-consciousness as bodily self- 
awareness trivialises it. The proponent of the Body Claim would do well to move to 
an understanding of self-consciousness as first-person thought. 
Since Hume it has been common to deny that there is such a thing as mental 
self-awareness. Hume, of course, famously wrote that, 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular 
perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch 
myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. (Hume, 
1978, pp. 252) 
There are a variety of interpretational issues to be settled concerning this passage', but 
on the face of it Hume appears to be denying what the proponent of self-awareness is 
asserting. Namely that introspection reveals an awareness of the self as an object. 
Presumably, furthermore, Hume is concerned to deny that we are introspectively 
1 Nice discussions of which can be found in Craig, 1987, Ch. 2, Penelhum, 2000, and Pitson, 2002. 
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aware of ourselves as mental things, the idea that we might be introspectively aware 
of ourselves as physical things was surely not his target. 
Philosophers have long been divided as to whether Hume was correct to reject 
mental self-awareness2. I tend to side with Hume. A simple line of reasoning that can 
move one to this position begins with the thought that the only reason to think that 
there might be an introspective awareness of the self as a mental object would be if it 
could explain the rather special knowledge that we have of our mental properties. As 
Shoemaker has written, 
Presumably it will be pointless, at best, to suppose that there is introspective perception of the self 
unless this perception plays some role in explaining our introspective self-knowledge - our knowledge 
of our own mental states. The most straightforward account would be this: I know that I have thus and 
such a mental state - that I am angry, in pain, or desirous of a drink - because I introspectively observe 
myself having it. (Shoemaker, 1986, p. 13) 
The problem, however, is that it does not seem especially plausible to say that the way 
in which we come to know that we have thus and such mental state is by an 
introspective awareness of the self as being thus and such. As Evans so eloquently put 
it, "in making a self-ascription of belief, one's eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally 
literally, directed outward - upon the world. " (Evans, 1982,225). The model of self- 
knowledge according to which I know what I believe by an `inward glance' at myself, 
seems at odds with our actual practice according to which I know what I believe by 
observing the world around me. 
Of course, simply making this observation is not to present an argument 
against the mental self-awareness view. The proponent of that view will immediately 
point out that, whilst it may be inappropriate to treat knowledge of our beliefs on the 
`inward glace' model, knowledge of our desires, hopes, fears, emotions, and 
sensations is another matter. This may or may not be the case. But as long as the 
proponent of mental self-awareness is willing to grant Evans' point about beliefs the 
damage is, to a certain extent, done. For, if this concession is made, at least some self- 
knowledge is not to be explained via an introspective awareness of the self. This 
2 Concurring with Hume are both Kant, 1997, A 107 & B408, and Schopenhauer, as quoted in Janaway, 
1989, p. 120. More recently the mental self-awareness view has been rejected by Shoemaker, 1986 & 
1994, and Martin, 1997. Those who appear to reject the Humean line include Russell, 19 10-11, 
(although by the time of Russell, 1921, p. 141, he has clearly changed his mind), Chisholm, 1969, and 
G. Strawson, 1997. 
12 
poses a threat to the general explanatory utility of mental self-awareness, for if it is 
not needed to explain some self-knowledge why should we think it is needed to 
explain the rest? 
It seems that we have good reason to want to dissociate the Body Claim from 
the understanding of self-consciousness as mental self-awareness. The very fact that 
so many philosophers have followed Hume in denying that we have such an 
awareness is enough to give us pause. And if it turns out, as I have been suggesting, 
that mental self-awareness has little or no explanatory role to play in accounting for 
self-knowledge, we may have good reason to be of the same mind as Hume. But, of 
course, if there is no mental self-awareness there is little interest in giving its 
transcendental conditions. 
There is a far more pressing reason to dissociate the Body Claim from an 
understanding of self-consciousness as bodily self-awareness. The Body Claim states 
that embodied experience is a transcendental condition of self-consciousness. If we 
understand self-consciousness as bodily self-awareness this claim becomes the 
triviality that embodied experience is a transcendental condition of an introspective 
awareness of oneself as a physical thing. I have far more to say about bodily self- 
awareness in chapter four (recall that `bodily self-awareness' appears twice in fig. ]), 
for now I need simply point out that an interpretation of the Body Claim that does not 
trivialise it is to be preferred. 
1.2 First-Person Thought 
The second way of understanding self-consciousness is as first-person thought. 
Understood in this way, self-consciousness is a property of certain thoughts. Self- 
conscious thoughts are thoughts about oneself, but not all thoughts about oneself are 
self-conscious. Suppose I believe that Smith is about to be attacked by a tiger. This is 
a belief about myself, but it is not self-conscious. It can be that although I believe that 
Smith is about to be attacked by a tiger, and I am Smith, I fail to believe that I am 
about to be attacked by a tiger, for the reason that I fail to believe that I am Smith. 
Self-conscious thoughts are thoughts about oneself concerning which it is not possible 
to fail to realise that they are about oneself. Self-consciousness is that property which 
accounts for this feature of some of the thoughts that one has about oneself. Roughly 
speaking, a self-conscious thought is one which one would express in language by 
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using the first-person pronoun, T. For this reason, we can call such thoughts 'I'- 
thoughts, and this second conception of self-consciousness first person thought. I will 
often refer to `I'-thoughts as self-ascriptions. This is for the reason that `I'-thoughts 
involve the ascription of predicates to oneself, for instance `I have a headache', `I am 
six feet tall' etc. 3 
Self-conscious thoughts can also be illuminatingly characterised by their 
functional role. It is a familiar point that self-conscious thoughts directly dispose one 
to act, whereas unself-conscious thoughts do not. If I believe that I am about to be 
attacked by a tiger, I will be disposed to cower in fear. If I believe that Smith is about 
to be attacked by a tiger, I will only be disposed to cower if I also believe that I am 
Smith4. In addition to directly disposing one to act, self-conscious thoughts are 
thoughts which are liable to be affected by the `various special ways' one has of 
gaining knowledge about oneself. Self-conscious thoughts are sensitive to 
information gained in various special ways. These special ways certainly include 
introspection and arguably also include memory, bodily-awareness and self-locating 
abilities. If I am introspectively aware of a headache, my self-conscious thoughts will 
adjust to accommodate this; I will come to believe that I have a headache. On the 
other hand, I will not necessarily come to believe that Smith has a headache, since I 
may fail to believe that I am Smith. I will return to this feature of self-conscious 
thought in chapter two. 
I do not mean to suggest by these remarks that `I'-thoughts can be analysed 
purely in terms of their functional role. Rather, considerations of this kind allow us to 
locate the phenomenon of self-conscious thought. First-person thoughts are thoughts 
which tend to be expressed by the word `I', directly dispose one to action, and are 
sensitive to certain special ways of gaining knowledge about oneself. 
It is beyond sceptical doubt that we are self-conscious in the sense that we 
have the capacity to think first-personally. This is good news for the defender of the 
Body Claim, for the Body Claim can be thought of as offering a transcendental 
condition of a capacity that is uncontroversially possessed by the majority of mature 
human beings. Another good reason for taking the Body Claim to be stating a 
3I shall speak of mental self-ascriptions (self-ascriptions of mental predicates) and physical or bodily 
self-ascriptions (self-ascriptions of physical or bodily predicates). 
4 The link between self-conscious belief and dispositions to act is articulated in Perry, 1977 & 1979. 
5 This aspect of self-conscious thought is stressed in Evans, 1982, Ch. 7. 
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transcendental condition of first-person thought is that it has more philosophical 
interest than has self-awareness. As Shoemaker suggests, the primary reason for 
postulating self-awareness is as an explanation of certain features of some first-person 
thoughts. First-person thought is the interesting phenomenon, and it is that to which 
we should primarily be paying attention. Finally, taking the Body Claim as a claim 
about the transcendental conditions of first-person thought helps us to understand why 
defenders of the Body Claim have tended to concentrate on arguments which proceed 
via the notion of self-reference. Self-awareness has nothing obviously to do with self- 
reference, unless it is by way of first-person thought. For first-person thought, it is 
frequently claimed, is self-referential6. 
1.3 Self-Reference 
The defender of the Body Claim is committed to there being a conceptual connection 
between self-consciousness and self-reference. To argue for the Body Claim by 
showing that embodied experience is a transcendental condition of self-reference, one 
must claim that the capacity to self-refer is a transcendental condition of self- 
consciousness. If the capacity for first-person thought does not entail the capacity for 
self-reference then no matter how successful one is at spelling out the transcendental 
conditions of self-reference, one will not have reached so far as self-consciousness. 
One position that could be taken with regards to the connection between self- 
consciousness and self-reference is that every first-person thought is self-referential. 
This view can be thought of as a commitment to what I shall be calling the self- 
reference rule. The self-reference rule states that any first-personal thought refers to 
the person who produced it7. Holding this view would secure the connection between 
self-consciousness and self-reference that is required for the Body Claim. On the 
other extreme, it might be held that no first-person thought is self-referential. This `no 
reference view' is the subject of the following chapter. If correct, this view would 
clearly undermine arguments for the Body Claim that proceed via self-reference. 
6 Bach, 1987, pp. 39-41, objects to saying that thoughts refer, claiming that reference is a four-place 
relation between speaker, word, audience and object. But one can linguistically refer whilst on one's 
own. Linguistic reference here can be thought of as a three-place relation between speaker, word and 
object. Similarly, reference in thought can be a three place relation between thinker, thought and object. 
The self-reference rule is the analogue in thought of what Kaplan, 1977, takes to be the character of 
the word `1'. The self-reference rule is defended in Campbell, 1994a. 
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The debate between the defender of the self-reference rule and the proponent 
of the no-reference view is a debate between two extremes. There are at least two 
intermediate views which are relevant to the defender of the Body Claim. The Body 
Claim can be argued for without reliance on the exceptionless self-reference rule. For, 
as long as it is maintained that central cases of first-person thought are self-referential, 
we will still have the required conceptual connection between self-consciousness and 
self-reference. Similarly, it might be held that even though many first-personal 
thoughts are self-referential, the central cases of first-person thought are not. This 
position would cause problems for the Body Claim if it were held that self- 
consciousness could be accounted for purely in terms of the non-referential central 
cases. For then it could be that a self-conscious subject may fail to satisfy the 
transcendental conditions of self-reference. 
Of course something must be said about what the central cases might be. At 
this point I think the best way to proceed is intuitively. Intuitively, the central cases of 
first-person thought are self-ascriptions of mental predicates, for example the self- 
ascription of beliefs, desires, sensations, and experiences. It is self-ascriptions of 
mental predicates that have traditionally been thought to be particularly expressive of 
self-consciousness. Indeed, the proponent of the Body Claim must have mental self- 
ascriptions in mind, since the claim that the capacity to self-ascribe physical 
predicates requires embodied experience is far less interesting than its mental 
counterpart. The four positions I have been sketching can be represented as follows: 
First-Person Thought 
Self-Reference No Reference 
Self-Reference Rule II Self-Reference in II No Reference in II No Reference View 
Central Cases Central Cases 
fig. 2 
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Whilst I believe that there is a strong case to be made for the self-reference rule, it 
should be clear why holding such a strong position is not required of the defender of 
the Body Claim. For, the defence of the Body Claim maintains that embodied 
experience is a transcendental condition of self-reference. If it is further claimed that 
central cases of self-consciousness are self-referential it follows that central cases of 
self-consciousness have, as a transcendental condition, embodied experience. If it is 
further claimed that self-consciousness necessarily involves these central cases, the 
Body Claim is safe and dry. I take it, also, that the positions on the `no reference' side 
of fig. 2 are not the intuitive views, that some form of commitment to self-reference is 
the default position. This means that arguing against the two forms of the no reference 
view is all that is required for a defence of the connection between first-person 
thought and self-reference. No additional argument is required. 
The fact that the proponent of the Body Claim can get by without a 
commitment to the self-reference rule allows him or her to avoid certain tricky cases. 
For, there are views upon which although central cases of first-person thought are 
self-referential, certain atypical cases serve as counterexamples to the exceptionless 
self-reference. The self-reference rule faces threats from substance dualism, the nature 
of the imagination, and certain recalcitrant linguistic phenomena. I say a little about 
these here in order to clear the way for the real challenge posed by the no reference 
view and its ilk. 
Certain views concerning the metaphysics of the self, of which substance 
dualism is the most obvious (but there may be others), appear to entail the falsity of 
the self-reference rule. According to substance dualism what I am is an immaterial 
soul `connected' to a body. This view has no problem dealing with mental self- 
ascriptions which uncontroversially ascribe a mental predicate to the immaterial soul. 
But the dualist faces a trilemma when he or she comes to give an account of physical 
self-ascriptions such as `I am six feet tall'. For the soul is not supposed to have any 
non-mental properties. The three horns of the trilemma are these: (1) Claim that all 
non-mental self-ascriptions are false, (2) Reject the claim that what (you and) I am is 
an immaterial soul, in favour of the claim that the self is a `compound of two 
substances', a body and a soul, and (3) Claim that the occurrence of `I' in non-mental 
self-ascriptions is misleading, that it really refers to something other than oneself, i. e. 
one's body. 
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None of these options are particularly attractive. The claim that all non-mental 
self-ascriptions are false is highly counterintuitive. The version of dualism which 
treats the self as a compound of two substances is problematic, not least in implying 
that what one is (the compound) is non-identical to the thing that instantiates all one's 
mental properties (the soul)8. This leaves the view that non-mental self-ascriptions 
really refer to something other than oneself, and so are not really self-ascriptions. And 
this view contradicts the self-reference rule. This view faces serious difficulties in the 
face of our linguistic practices9, but its refutation requires a refutation of the 
metaphysics upon which it is based. 
Fortunately the defender of the Body Claim need not set about refuting 
substance dualism. For the dualist allows that the central cases of first-person thought 
are self-referential. Although, for various reasons, it seems unlikely that the dualist 
would want to defend the Body Claim, there is no reason why a dualist could not do 
so via the notion of self-reference. 
Thinking about the imagination has led some philosophers to deny the self- 
reference rule. We can see why one might be tempted by this view by considering the 
following piece of reasoning: (1) I can only imagine that which is possible10, (2) I can 
imagine that I am Napoleon, (3) It is not possible that I am Napoleon. These three 
claims appear to be inconsistent. One tempting way of resolving the inconsistency is 
by claiming that the second occurrence of `I' in the phrase `I am imagining that I am 
Napoleon' does not in fact refer to oneself. Rather, one is thinking about Napoleon in 
the `imaginary first-person' 11. This, it would seem, contradicts the self-reference rule. 
I will not comment on the strength of this line of reasoning, for there is no 
reason for the defender of the Body Claim to take a stance on this issue. For 
occurrences of `I' that occur within the scope of `I am imagining that... ' are clearly 
not central cases of first-person thought. It is a fascinating question how first-person 
reference operates in the context of the imagination, but it is not one with which I 
shall be concerned. 
8 See Olson, 2001. 
9 See Stanley, 1998. 
10 See the introduction. This view is most famously held by Hume, "'Tis an established maxim in 
metaphysics, That whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in 
other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. " (Hume, 1978, p. 32). 
" See Velleman, 1996. 
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Finally, some philosophers have claimed that certain linguistic phenomena 
have shown that the word `I' is not governed by a linguistic analogue of the self- 
reference rule 12. This, coupled with some version of the thesis that thought mirrors 
language may be thought to pose a problem for the self-reference rule in the domain 
of thought. Again, this debate need not trouble the proponent of the Body Claim. For 
the linguistic phenomena cited are clearly all atypical uses of `I', for instance leaving 
a note on someone else's office door reading `I am not here today'. Central cases are 
left untouched. If the Body Claim can be defended without reliance on the self- 
reference rule, these cases should not be troubling. In the following chapter I shall be 
arguing against both the strict no reference view and the view that the central cases of 
first-person thought are non-referential. I claim that there is a tight conceptual 
connection between self-consciousness and self-reference. I leave it as an open 
question whether the self-reference rule is true. 
12 See, for example, Corazza, Fish and Gorvett, 2002. 
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2. No Reference Views 
2.1 First-Person Guarantees 
It has frequently been noted that the word `I', and corresponding `I'-thoughts, are 
subject to guarantees against a number of kinds of error. It has been argued these 
guarantees can be explained, or rather explained away, by either the no reference view, 
or its sibling view that there is no self-reference in central cases of first-person thought. 
The no reference view is associated with Anscombe and the less extreme view with 
Wittgenstein. Anscombe offers a purely non-referential account of `I', while 
Wittgenstein gives an non-factualist reading of the central cases'. To accept either 
Anscombe's or Wittgenstein's explanations of these guarantees would be to undo the 
conceptual connection between self-consciousness and self-reference that is required for 
a defence of the Body Claim. In this chapter I argue that neither Anscombe's nor 
Wittgenstein's positions are acceptable, and that the two no reference views should be 
rejected2. 
Before going on to describe the guarantees in question, it is necessary to 
forestall certain objections by saying something about Wittgenstein exegesis. It is well 
known that a central aspect of Wittgenstein's project is to avoid giving theories. As a 
result, in many areas there is not really any such thing as `Wittgenstein's position'. 
Non-factualism about self-ascriptions is no exception3. Whilst there are passages in 
which Wittgenstein appears to advocate non-factualism, there are others in which he 
clearly indicates that examples must be treated individually on a case by case basis. 
Thus it would be a mistake to think that any of the forms of non-factualism to be 
discussed in this chapter are, strictly speaking, Wittgenstein's view. Having said this, it 
will be simpler if I continue to speak in this way. What is interesting for the present 
purposes is the view that Wittgenstein's remarks point towards, even if it is not 
eventually endorsed by him. Such an interest seems legitimate since there are 
Non-factualism is often referred to as expressivism. My reason for declining to adopt this terminology 
will come out in what follows. 
2 Many of the questions pursued in this chapter are discussed in Brinck, 1997, Ch. 2. Whilst I am 
sympathetic to many of Brinck's conclusions, my treatment of the issues differs markedly from hers. 
3 An account of Wittgenstein's attitudes towards non-factualism can be found in Hacker, 1990. For a note 
of scepticism concerning whether Wittgenstein endorsed the non-factualist view see Wright, 1998. For 
the opposing view see Jacobsen, 1996. 
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philosophers, currently endorsing a number of non-factualist positions, who are clearly 
influenced by Wittgenstein but who eschew his mistrust of theories. 
The first-person guarantees in question are the following: (i) Guaranteed 
reference - `I'-thoughts cannot fail to refer, (ii) First-person authority - in central cases 
of `I' -thoughts we are guaranteed against making a mistake concerning the predicate 
which is self-ascribed, (iii) Immunity to error through misidentification - in central 
cases of `I' -thoughts we are guaranteed against making certain mistakes concerning 
who it is that we know to be such and such. Each of these guarantees requires a certain 
amount of explanation. I devote less time to guaranteed reference and first-person 
authority and more time to immunity to error through misidentification (IEM), for the 
reason that IEM is not generally that well understood. The following is partly an attempt 
to remedy this state of affairs. 
2.2 Guaranteed Reference and First-Person Authority 
Thoughts whose function it is to refer to objects can fail to do so, and can do so for 
different reasons. First, a thought can fail to refer because there is nothing for it to refer 
to, its intended object does not exist. This presumably is true of thoughts about Vulcan, 
or when one thinks about that pink elephant whilst hallucinating. Of these cases, some 
will say that the subject has thought a thought which fails to refer, others will say that 
the lack of referent means that no thought is really being thought4. Whatever one says of 
such cases, it would seem that the same is not possible with `I'-thoughts. It cannot be 
the case that one's `I'-thought fails to refer due to the intended referent's not existing. 
A second way in which a thought can fail to refer is by there being too many 
objects. If I intermittently see two people, taking them to be one and the same person, 
Bert, I may go on to think, `Bert is here'. Further, if both Bert's are here it is plausible 
to think that I have failed to refer to either5. Similarly, if I see the head of snake a and 
the tail of snake b poking out from either side of a rock, my thoughts about that snake 
will fail to refer to either. It would seem that the same is not possible with `I'-thoughts. 
4 For an object-dependent view of this kind see Evans, 1982. 
5I ignore the possibility that this may count as a case of so-called `divided reference'. Divided reference 
might be thought to occur when the causal links governing a singular thought are deviant. If it is correct 
to characterise such cases, then it is plausible to think that `I'-thoughts will be immune to the 
phenomenon of divided reference. On divided reference see Kvart, 1989. 
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`I'-thoughts cannot fail to refer through an excess of objects6. On the face of it, the fact 
that `I'-thoughts are guaranteed against these kinds of reference failure is something for 
which we should be able to provide an explanation. What this explanation might be is 
something to which we shall return. 
Another phenomenon associated with first-person thought for which an 
explanation is certainly required is first-person authority7. First-person authority is what 
keeps in business those philosophers working on the problem of self-knowledge. First- 
person authority is a certain guarantee that subjects have concerning some mental self- 
ascriptions. 'Y-thoughts which self-ascribe beliefs, desires, wishes, emotions, 
sensations, intentions and so on, are known to be true by the subject with a certain 
authority that other kinds of thought do not possess. In standard cases of introspective 
self-knowledge - cases which do not involve irrationality or inference from observed 
behaviour - it cannot be that a subject sincerely thinks `I believe that P' but has made a 
mistake and that in reality they believe that Q, or that not-P. Brute error is ruled out in 
such cases. Indeed, for a great many mental properties P, the person who is best placed 
to know whether or not I instantiate P is myself 8. If I sincerely think, `I am in pain', 
then the chances are that I am in pain. There may even be some mental properties of 
which I have absolutely infallible knowledge, but authority needn't amount to 
infallibility. Emotions provide a nice example. For the most part, the person best placed 
to say which emotion I am in is myself. But this is not always the case. Sometimes my 
emotions are hidden from me. I may, for example, discover that I am jealous by noting 
my reaction to some situation. This is useful for providing a negative characterisation of 
first-person authority, for in such a situation I lack the usual authority. 
Adequately accounting for first-person authority has not proved to be an easy 
task, but some account is clearly required. Other people have epistemological access to 
our mental lives only through our observable behaviour. But this does not appear to be 
6 Lewis, 1976, offers an account of personal identity which makes room for the possibility that there can 
be two thinkers of one `I'-thought (see especially, Postscripts). This is not the place to discuss his theory, 
but I assume that he would assent to a version of the self-reference view relativised to person-stages. 
It might be claimed that first-person authority is not relevant to the issue of first-person thought, since 
first-person authority (self-knowledge) need not involve the I concept. For instance, Hossack writes, 
"There are many creatures that can know by self-knowledge when they are in pain, even though they may 
not have a concept of the self' (Hossack, 2002, p. 164). But what is it that these creatures are supposed to 
know? In describing the relevant knowledge we must say that they know when they are in pain, and this 
occurrence of `they' is standing in for the I concept, see Casteneda, 1966. It seems to me that if creatures 
are to be attributed self-knowledge they must be thought of as, at the very least, having something like the 
kind of non-conceptual self-consciousness described in Bermudez, 1998. 
8 As will become clear in the sections that follow, this characterisation of first-person authority in terms 
of knowledge begs the question against the non-factualist. At this point it is innocent enough, however. 
22 
the case with regard to the epistemological access that we have to our own minds. First- 
person authority seems to rest on something like a direct access to our own minds. Is 
this really the case? And if so, how is such access to be understood? Again, this 
explanation is something to which I shall return. 
2.3 Immunity to Error Through Misidentification 
It is often claimed that there are a range of self-ascriptions which are immune to error 
through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun (IEM). What this means, 
and exactly which self-ascriptions are properly classed as IEM, is a topic hotly disputed. 
Some claim that only mental self-ascriptions are IEM, others claim that some physical 
self-ascriptions are IEM. The phenomenon of IEM was first brought to our attention by 
Wittgenstein who, in The Blue Book claims that, 
There are two different cases in the use of the word `I' (or "my") which I might call "the use as object" 
and "the use as subject". Examples of the first kind of use are these: "My arm is broken", "I have grown 
six inches", "I have a bump on my forehead", "The wind blows my hair about". Examples of the second 
kind are: "I see so and so", "I hear so and so", "I try to lift my arm", "I think it will rain", "I have 
toothache". One can point to the difference between these two categories by saying: The cases of the first 
category involve the recognition of a particular person, and there is in these cases the possibility of error, 
or as I should rather put it: The possibility of an error has been provided for... It is possible that, say in an 
accident, I should feel a pain in my arm, see a broken arm at my side, and think it is mine, when really it 
is my neighbours... On the other hand, there is no question of recognising a person when I say I have 
toothache. To ask "are you sure that it is you who have pains? " would be nonsensical. (Wittgenstein, 
1958, pp. 66-7) 
Wittgenstein is here pointing out that a certain class of self-ascriptions are immune to a 
particular kind of error9. The same phenomenon is pointed to by Strawson in The 
Bounds of Sense. There he claims that 
When a man (a subject of experience) ascribes a current or directly remembered state of consciousness to 
himself, no use whatever of any criteria of personal identity is required to justify his use of the pronoun 
`I' to refer to the subject of that experience. (Strawson, 1966a, pp. 164-5)10 
9 Wittgenstein suggests that it is a misunderstanding of this grammatical feature of `I' which tempts many 
towards the Cartesian view that "the real I lives in my body" (1958, p. 66). A similar suggestion is made 
in Strawson, 1966a, pp 164-6. 
10 Also see Bennett, "I can wonder whose stomach is rumbling, but not whether it is my neighbour or 
myself who is embarrassed. " (Bennett, 1966, p. 109). 
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As elucidated by Wittgenstein and Strawson, the notion of IEM is left rather vague. It is 
Shoemaker who first gives us a precise definition. He writes, 
to say that a statement `a is cp' is subject to error through misidentification relative to the term a means 
that the following is possible: the speaker knows some particular thing to be cp, but makes the mistake of 
asserting `a is cp' because, and only because, he mistakenly thinks that the thing he knows to be cp is what 
`a' refers to (Shoemaker, 1968, pp. 7-8) 
One thing that clearly must be added to this definition is relativity to grounds. It is 
obvious that a judgement may be IEM when based on one kind of ground, but subject to 
error when based on another. To see this, compare introspection with talking to one's 
analyst as ways of discovering one's mental states. Through introspection it is 
impossible for me to discover that someone resents their mother, and mistakenly think 
that it is I who resent my mother. Through talking to one's analyst, on the other hand, it 
is quite possible for me to discover that someone resents their mother, and mistakenly 
think that it is me. So, judgements are IEM relative to certain grounds. 
So according to Shoemaker's definition, the self-ascription `I have a headache' 
is IEM relative to introspection, since it is impossible for me to know, via introspection, 
that some particular person has a headache but mistakenly think that it is I who have it. 
Coming to know, via introspection, that someone has a headache is nothing less than 
coming to know that I have a headache". Shoemaker's explanation of how it is that 
such judgements are immune to error is similar to that of both Wittgenstein and 
Strawson. It has, he believes, to do with the fact that such self-ascriptions are not based 
on an identification of the subject. It is impossible to misidentify oneself because there 
is no identification of oneself to go wrong. 
This point is picked up by Evans in his treatment of IEM12. Immunity to error is 
a direct consequence of, what Evans calls, identification-freedom. According to Evans, 
to entertain a singular proposition about an object, the thinker must know which object 
the thought is about. One way this can be achieved is by means of an identification. For 
example, the thought `a is F' might be the result of the belief that `b is F and the belief 
t' Campbell, 1999b, claims that the phenomenon of thought insertion shows that judgements based on 
introspection need not be IEM. This claim is sensibly disputed by Gallagher, 2000. A structurally similar 
debate concerning whether the phenomenon of anarchic hand syndrome shows that self-ascriptions of 
action based on proprioception are not IEM can be found in Marcel, 2003, and Peacocke, 2003. 
12 Evans, 1982, Chs. 6 & 7. 
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that `a = Y. Paraphrasing Evans, if knowledge of the truth of the singular proposition `a 
is F can be seen as the result of knowledge of the truth of a pair of propositions `b is F 
and `a = b' then we can call it 'identification-dependent'. The latter proposition `a = b' 
is its identification component. If a singular proposition is identification-dependent, the 
thinker knows which object it is about in virtue of an identification. If, on the other 
hand, a thought does not rest on an identification component, then it is identification- 
free. 
IEM, as defined by Shoemaker, follows from identification-freedom for the 
following reason: if a judgement is subject to error through misidentification, it must be 
possible for the thinker to make a mistake in the identification-component upon which it 
rests. But an identification-free judgement is not based on an identification-component, 
therefore it cannot be subject to error through misidentification, and so must be 
immune13. This close relationship between IEM and identification-freedom forms a 
common core running through the accounts of IEM given by Wittgenstein, Strawson, 
Shoemaker and Evans. We can articulate this common core as follows 14: 
The proposition `a is F is immune to error relative to grounds G iff every possible 
judgement that a is F (based on grounds G) either: 
(1) does not rest on two beliefs of the form `b is F and `a = W. 
or 
(2) rests on beliefs of the form `b is F and `a = b', but `a = b' is not rationally 
doubtable. 
This definition captures the way in which IEM is a consequence of identification- 
freedom 15. According to this definition, if a judgement is identification-free, when 
13 Pryor, 1999, argues that IEM does not follow from identification-freedom. This is due to his 
idiosyncratic definition of IEM. I argue against Pryor's definition of IEM the Appendix. 
14 My definition of IEM treats it as a property of propositions. However, throughout this section I have 
often spoken of individual judgements as IEM. Whilst this is a useful way of speaking, it may strike one 
as odd, since it is unclear in what sense individual judgements are immune to error - they are either errors 
or they are not. The claim that a judgement J is IEM should be understood as shorthand 
for the claim that 
(i) J expresses a proposition which is IEM relative to G, and (ii) J is based on G. 
15 Evans' definition of IEM is actually slightly different. He defines it as follows, "a judgement is 
identification-free [and thus immune to error] if it is based upon a way of knowing about objects such that 
it does not make sense for the subject to utter `Something is F, but is it a that is F? ', when the first 
component expresses knowledge which the subject does not think he 
has, or may have, gained in any 
other way. " (1982, pp. 189-190). This last constraint is not included in my 
definition of IEM. This should 
not worry us, since it is only necessary to 
introduce such a constraint if we rely on the idea of a judgement 
making sense for a subject. I avoid this 
locution, and intend Evans' and my definitions to be equivalent. 
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based on grounds G, it will be IEM. The necessity for condition (2) can be seen if we 
consider a judgement which is identification-dependent but which the identification 
upon which it is based is not rationally doubtable. It is plausible to think that this will 
display immunity to error, since the indubitable character of the identification 
component will ensure that errors of misidentification will not occur. If this is right, 
identification-freedom and immunity to error could come apart. 
Leaving such possible cases aside, we can think of IEM and identification- 
freedom as two sides of the same coin. We can also see how IEM relates to the 
functional role of `I'-thoughts. In chapter one I said that `I'-thoughts are liable to be 
affected by the various special ways that we have of gaining knowledge about oneself. 
These special ways clearly include introspection. Coming to believe, via introspection, 
that someone has a headache will dispose me to believe that I have a headache. By now 
this point is very familiar. The `special ways' of gaining knowledge of oneself that play 
a part in the functional role of `I'-thoughts just are those ways of gaining knowledge 
that lead to self-ascriptions that are IEM. 
Simply pointing out that IEM is a consequence of identification-freedom is 
insufficient as an explanation of IEM. For we have yet to be given an explanation of 
identification-freedom. As we shall see, Wittgenstein suggests an explanation of 
IEM/identification-freedom in terms of a non-factualist account of self-ascriptions. 
Before addressing this suggestion, however, it is necessary to dispense with the 
objection that we have not characterized IEM correctly. 
2.4 Another Brand of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification? 
Some philosophers have defined immunity to error through misidentification in a way 
significantly different from the account given above. For instance, Wright says that, 
A claim made on a certain kind of ground involves immunity to error through misidentification just when 
its defeat is not consistent with retention of grounds for existential generalization (Wright, 1998, p. 19)16 
This should be made clearer by example. Suppose I judge `I was in Scotland last week', 
basing this upon my apparent memories of being in Scotland. However, I am then 
16 This different notion appears in discussions by Hamilton, 1995, Wright, 1998, Pryor, 1999, and 
Campbell, 1999a & 2002, Ch. 5. In his, 1999b, Campbell appears to have something more like the 
standard definition of IEM in mind. 
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informed that my apparent memory of being in Scotland last week is, in fact, a quasi- 
memory. A quasi-memory being a state subjectively indistinguishable from a memory 
but which need not derive from the past history of the subject him or herself. If I have a 
quasi-memory of doing x, it may have been me who did x, or it may have been someone 
else. As such, memory is a sub-species of quasi-memory17 . In this situation, I will no 
longer be justified in believing that I was in Scotland last week, but I will be justified in 
making the general judgement `Someone was in Scotland last week'. I can, as it were, 
retreat from the singular proposition to the general proposition, using the original 
grounds plus the piece of evidence that undercut my original judgement. The fact that I 
can do this, claims Wright, shows that my original judgement was not immune to error. 
On the other hand, consider the introspectively-based judgement `I have a headache'. If 
someone (incredibly! ) undercuts my grounds for thinking that I have a headache, it is 
arguably not possible for me to retreat to the judgement `someone has a headache'. This 
shows that my judgement `I have a headache' is immune to error. 
Now all of this is compatible with the view that propositions based on memory 
are IEM as I have defined it. It may well be that memory-based propositions rest on no 
identity component, yet their grounds can be retained as grounds for existential 
generalization. This is enough to show that the kind of immunity to error which Wright 
et al have in mind really is something new. We might come up with another name for it 
then: for want of something more eloquent, I shall call it IEM*. 
IEM* is a rare phenomenon. Much more so than its proponents have thought. 
Suppose that, on the normal perceptual grounds, I form the judgement `I see a canary'. I 
am then informed that really, my visual impression as of a canary is hallucinatory, and 
is caused by someone else's seeing a canary. Whenever they see a canary they press a 
button which causes me to suffer a canary-illusion. In this case I will be justified in 
retreating to the existential proposition `someone sees a canary' 18. Thus, there are at 
least some mental self-ascriptions which are not IEM*' 9. 
What, then, is IEM* tracking? It is tempting to think that IEM* is the result of a 
judgement's being infallibly known or its being groundless. A judgement is IEM* when 
it is impossible for its grounds to be undercut in such a way as to leave open the 
17 The notion of a quasi-memory was first introduced by Shoemaker, 1970. 
18 This seems to me enough to cast very serious doubt on Prior's suggestion that Shoemaker is primarily 
concerned with I EM *. See Pryor, 1999, pp. 286-88; see Shoemaker, 1968, p. 8, for his use of the canary 
example. 
19 Wright, 1998, Campbell, 1999a, and Pryor, 1999, all assume that this sort of present-tense mental self- 
ascription is IEM*. 
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possibility of the corresponding existential judgement. But it seems that for any 
judgement whatsoever, if it is possible to undercut its grounds, it is possible to undercut 
them in such a way as to leave open just such a possibility. We can formulate this as a 
general thesis: any self ascription `I am F which it is possible to undercut, can be 
undercut by the information that one suffers the illusion that one is F in just those cases 
when someone else is F. This allows one to retreat to the existential proposition 
`someone is F. So IEM* arises in just those cases where a proposition's grounds cannot 
be undercut at all. This will turn out to be the case if the proposition is infallibly known, 
or if it is based on no grounds whatsoever. 
But if IEM* just flags groundlessness or infallibility then it looks as if it defines 
too narrow a class of self-ascriptions to be of much independent interest. This is 
especially clear given that what many philosophers are looking to immunity to error to 
do is to capture that class of self-ascriptions seen as somehow central to self- 
consciousness. The class of first-person thoughts which is central to self-consciousness 
has traditionally included self-ascriptions of experiences. But the proposition `I can see 
a canary', as we have seen, is not IEM*. This might be conceded but it be pointed out 
that the judgement `I seem to see a canary' is nevertheless IEM*. And it is judgements 
of this kind that are really expressive of self-consciousness. This seems fair enough. But 
as long as we agree that IEM* is tracking infallibility, there is scope for arguing that the 
introspectively-based self-ascriptions `I have a pain' or `I am judging that P' are not 
IEM*. This will be the case if, for example, it is possible to mistake an itch for a pain, 
or to mistake an imagining for a judging. 
To spell this out in the case of `I am in pain' : suppose you experience what you 
take to be a pain. Now suppose someone reliably tells you that you are not really 
experiencing a pain but an itch, and that this has been caused by someone else's 
suffering a real pain. Whenever they experience a pain, they press a button which causes 
you to feel a pain-like itch. In this case, you will be justified in retreating from the 
singular proposition `I have a pain', to the general proposition `someone has a pain' 
whilst retaining the same grounds. If this describes a possible situation, and it certainly 
seems to, then `I am in pain' is not IEM*. But, of course, there is little reason to think 
that the self-ascription of sensations is not somehow central to self-consciousness 
20. 
20 If you are sceptical about the possibility of mistaking pains for itches etc. see the sorites-style argument 
in Williamson, 2000, Ch. 4. 
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My argument that IEM* is not a property of judgments such as `I am in pain' 
may strike some as somewhat dubious. Of course, in these cases, the subject will be 
justified in retreating to the general proposition, but isn't this justification all packed 
into the piece of defeating evidence? This feature might seem objectionable. Can't we 
simply reformulate our definition of IEM* so that the justification that the subject has 
for retreating to the general proposition must already be there in the justification for the 
original singular judgement? This would rule out my examples as counterexamples to 
the claim that fallible mental self-ascriptions can be IEM*. The problem with this 
suggestion is that it becomes impossible to distinguish IEM* from IEM. If, in the 
justification that I have for the singular judgement `I am FI am able to discern two 
elements, one of which can be discarded and the other retained, leaving me justified in 
thinking `Someone is F then it looks very much as though that original judgement was 
based on the information that a was F and that I=a, i. e. it was based on an 
identification. And now the difference between the two forms of IEM is entirely eroded. 
Thus, if the proponent of IEM* wishes that notion to be distinguished from the standard 
conception of IEM, he or she had better not make this change to the formulation. 
I take it, then, that IEM* is not a particularly interesting phenomenon in its own 
right. Of course, the fact (if it is one) that some judgements are infallible or groundless 
is philosophically interesting, but we knew that already. Infallibility is just a special 
case of first-person authority. As we have already allowed that the phenomenon of first- 
person authority requires an explanation, it seems unnecessary to speak of IEM*, and it 
is particularly misleading to treat it as if it were a distinct phenomenon21. 
2.5 The No Reference View 
Now that we have a decent view of the phenomena of guaranteed reference, first-person 
authority and IEM, we can look at the claim that they are best explained by versions of 
the no reference view. I begin with guaranteed reference. Since guaranteed reference 
holds for all `I'-thoughts its explanation must be similarly general. It will have to be 
explained by the extreme version of the no reference view according to which `I'- 
thoughts never refer. The no reference view, rather than explaining guaranteed 
21 This is somewhat unfair to Wright, 1998, who suggests that IEM* is not a particularly interesting 
phenomenon, since it is a trivial consequence of groundlessness. But whilst Wright correctly points out 
that groundlessness is sufficient for IEM*, the point of the present discussion is to argue that 
groundlessness (or infallibility) is both necessary and sufficient for IEM*. 
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reference, explains it away. According to the no reference view, self-ascriptions do not 
refer to the person who thinks them, they do not refer at all. It is no surprise then that 
they cannot fail to refer, referring is not their function. The no reference view explains 
the guarantee that `I'-thoughts have against reference failure, not by explaining how 
they are guaranteed to refer, but by showing that there is no question of success or 
failure here. 
22 The no reference view is defended and put to this very use by Anscombe. 
Anscombe presents a host of considerations against the view that `I' is ever a referring 
expression. Although Anscombe's arguments are stated at the level of language, I take it 
that she would suppose them to have analogues at the level of thought. The central case 
against treating `I' as a referring expression is the following: first, Anscombe takes it 
that if `I' is a referring expression, then it is an expression whose reference is, in a 
certain sense, guaranteed. Second, she thinks that if `I' is a referring expression it must 
be understood on the model of either a proper name, a demonstrative, or an abbreviation 
of a definite description. Further, each of these kinds of referring expression requires, 
what Anscombe calls, a `conception' by means of which it reaches its referent. This 
conception must be such as to explain the guaranteed reference of 'I'. However, the 
argument continues, no satisfactory conception can be specified for 'I': either it fails to 
deliver up guaranteed reference, or it succeeds but only by delivering a immaterial soul. 
Since there are no immaterial souls, it follows that `I' cannot be understood on the 
model of proper name, demonstrative or definite description. It follows from this that `I' 
is not a referring expression. The analogous conclusion at the level of thought is that `I'- 
thoughts are not self-referential, and this is the extreme version of the no reference 
view. 
There are a number of ways in which Anscombe's argument can be challenged. 
It might be argued (as in Evans, 1982, Ch. 7) that `I' follows the model of `here' or 
`now'. Or Anscombe's claim that every referring expression must be associated with a 
conception might be challenged. Finally, it could be pointed out that guaranteed 
reference could be explained by some means other than the conception associated with 
T. I will not directly challenge Anscombe's argument. But I will give reason to think 
22 Anscombe, 1975. Discussions of Anscombe's arguments can be divided into those who, broadly 
speaking, agree with her position, and those who do not. Those who agree include, Clarke, 1978, Kenny, 
1979, and Malcolm, 1979. Those who disagree include, White, 1979, Hamilton, 1991, Brandom, 1994, 
pp. 552-561, McDowell, 1998, and Harcourt, 2000. The Wittgensteinian/Anscombian view is criticised in 
Glock and Hacker, 1996. However, they suggest that `I' is "best seen as a degenerate or limiting case of a 
referring expression" (1996, pp. 95). 
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that her conclusion must be false. If an argument can be mounted successfully against 
the more moderate `no reference in central cases' view, then Anscombe's position will 
fall with it. For if it can be shown that central cases of `I'-thoughts are self-referential, it 
has already been shown that the extreme view is false. The rest of this chapter 
constitutes my argument against the more moderate version of the no reference view, 
and so also against Anscombe's position. It will also be argued that there is another, 
more satisfactory, explanation of guaranteed reference, thus rendering the no reference 
view explanatorily redundant. 
2.6 Non-Factualism 
Whilst guaranteed reference is a feature of all `I'-thoughts, first-person authority and 
IEM are features of the central cases only. An adequate explanation of these phenomena 
must reflect this. One view, inspired by certain remarks of Wittgenstein, is that such an 
explanation is to be found in non-factualism about self-ascriptions. The idea is that non- 
factualism will allow us to explain away both of these phenomena. The further claim is 
that the truth of non-factualism about mental self-ascriptions entails that central cases of 
first-person thought are not self-referential. 
Non-factualism is best seen as the rejection of certain assumptions of what we 
might call the standard picture23. According to the standard picture, mental self- 
ascriptions are utterances that express propositions, are straightforwardly true or false, 
function as assertions, and the acceptance of which is constituted by a belief in the 
proposition expressed. Indeed, they are not only believed but known to be true in some, 
yet to be explained, direct manner. To clarify, let us take as an example of a mental self- 
ascription, an utterance of, `I have a headache'. The standard picture claims that this 
self-ascription expresses the proposition that I have a headache, and that its expressing 
this proposition is (at least partly) constitutive of its having the meaning it does. The 
self-ascription represents me as having a headache. If I have a headache the self- 
ascription will be true, if I have no headache it will be false. To say that this self- 
ascription is an assertion is to say that it is put forward as a truth, in uttering it I commit 
myself to its truth. When I accept a self-ascription I believe the proposition that is 
23 In thinking about non-factualism I have been greatly helped by discussions with Mark Kalderon, who 
also kindly allowed me to read a draft of his 
forthcoming book, Moral Fictionalism. Much of what I have 
to say in the rest of this chapter is directly influenced by that work. 
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expressed. When I utter, `I have a headache', I do so because I accept that sentence, that 
is I believe that I have a headache. 
Non-factualism rejects all of these assumptions of the standard picture. The non- 
factualist about mental self-ascriptions claims that they are non-representational, they 
do not express propositions, rather their meaning is fixed by the fact that they express 
the first-order state that they appear to represent. As a consequence, they do not 
function as assertions, and acceptance of a mental self-ascription is not belief. Some 
quotations from Wittgenstein will help us to get a feel for this view. Directly after he 
first introduces the notion of IEM (quoted at length above), Wittgenstein offers a non- 
factualist explanation, 
And now this way of stating our idea suggests itself: that it is impossible that in making the statement "I 
have a toothache" I should have mistaken another person for myself, as it is to moan with pain by 
mistake, having mistaken someone else for me. To say "I have pain" is no more a statement about a 
particular person than moaning is. (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 67) 
Wittgenstein makes essentially the same point in Philosophical Investigations. It is 
worth quoting Wittgenstein at length here, as it is useful to see the connections between 
this and the material already quoted, 
"When I say `I am in pain', I do not point to a person who is in pain, since in a certain sense I have no 
idea who is"... I did not say that such-and-such a person was in pain, but "I am... " Now in saying this I do 
not name any person. Just as I don't name anyone when I groan with pain... What does it mean to know 
who is in pain? It means, for example, to know which man in this room is in pain: for instance, that 
it is 
the one sitting over there with the fair hair, and so on. -What am I getting at? At the fact that there 
is a 
great variety of criteria for personal `identity'... Now which of them determines my saying that `I' am 
in 
pain? None. (Wittgenstein, 1953, §404) 
Wittgenstein's suggestion is that utterances in which `I' is used as subject (are IEM) are 
expressive rather than representational. Furthermore, since he seems to take mental self- 
ascriptions to be IEM quite generally, it would seem that he is offering a non-factualist 
account of mental self-ascriptions. Another passage which might 
be taken to support 
such a view is the following, 
Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of 
the sensation 
and used in their place. A child has hurt 
himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him 
exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach 
him new pain behaviour... "So you are saying that the 
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word `pain' really means crying? "-On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and 
does not describe it. (Wittgenstein, 1953, §244) 
Here we see Wittgenstein suggesting that mental self-ascriptions are expressive rather 
than representational24. If this view is correct, the weak version of the no reference view 
is vindicated. For, on this account, the central cases of self-consciousness do not 
represent the subject as being a certain way. But, if this is the case, the central cases of 
self-consciousness are not self-referential. 
It is extremely natural for a worry to arise at this point. The conceptual 
connection between self-consciousness and self-reference upon which the Body Claim 
rests is supposed to hold at the level of thought. But non-factualism is standardly taken 
to be a thesis concerning language. After all, its central claims concern assertion and 
expression. Why should the proponent of the Body Claim be worried about the idea that 
certain linguistic self-ascriptions are not self-referential? The simple answer is that it 
would be extremely odd to think that an utterance of `I have a headache' does not 
express the proposition that I have a headache, whilst the corresponding thought does 
express that proposition. Non-factualism about mental self-ascriptions seems to sit more 
comfortably with the view that self-ascriptions in thought are non-representational, that 
they do not represent the thinker as being a certain way. If non-factualism is true the 
linguistic expression of central cases of self-consciousness are not referential, and this 
pushes us towards the view that the first-person thoughts themselves are not self- 
referential. As such, the defender of the Body Claim does have a reason to be concerned 
about non-factualism. 
The central claim of non-factualism is the non-representational character of 
mental self-ascriptions. 
The Non-Representation Thesis: Mental self-ascriptions do not express propositions 
which represent the subject as having some mental property. 
24 Recall my qualms about interpreting Wittgenstein. That Wittgenstein is probably not making a general 
claim is supported in the following passage, "A cry in not a description. But there are transitions. And the 
words "I am afraid" may approximate more, or less, to being a cry. They may come quite close to this and 
also be far removed from it. " (Wittgenstein, 1953, Part II, p. 189). Also, note the emphasis in this 
following, "`I believe... ' throws light on my state. Conclusions about my conduct can be drawn from this 
expression. So there is a similarity to expressions of emotion, or mood, etc. " (Wittgenstein, 1953, Part II, 
p. 191). Furthermore, Wittgenstein's denial that the word `pain' really means crying, quoted 
in the main 
text, suggests that he does not accept non-factualism as I have been formulating it. 
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This is the point that Wittgenstein makes when he denies that the sentence `I have a 
pain' is a statement about a particular person, that it describes the subject. Given certain 
plausible assumptions, several other thesis follow from the non-representation thesis. 
One such assumption is that truth and falsity is primarily a property of propositions. 
Sentences are true or false in virtue of expressing true or false propositions. It follows 
that non-factualism is committed to the following claim, 
The Non-Truth-Evaluable Thesis: Mental self-ascriptions are neither true nor false in 
the standard sense25. 
Another plausible assumption is that both belief and assertion are relations between a 
speaker and a proposition26. When a subject asserts that P he or she holds the assertion 
relation to the proposition that P. Similarly, when a subject believes that P he or she 
holds the belief relation to the proposition that P. It follows that the non-factualist is 
committed to the following two theses, 
The Non-Assertion Thesis: The assertive utterance of a mental self-ascription is not 
the assertion of a proposition. 
The Non-Cognitivist Thesis: The acceptance of a mental self-ascription is not belief in 
a proposition. 
The non-factualist's acceptance of the non-cognitivist thesis should presumably be 
thought to involve a commitment to the view that mental self-ascriptions are not known. 
These are all negative claims that the non-factualist makes concerning mental self- 
ascriptions, but the non-factualist is committed to some positive claims also. In 
particular, the non-factualist claims that rather than representing the subject as being a 
certain way, mental self-ascriptions are expressive of the first-order state they appear to 
represent. For example, an utterance of `I have a headache' does not represent the 
utterer as having a headache, rather it is an expression of the headache that is had. But 
here we have reached a confusion in terminology. I have been speaking of sentences 
expressing propositions, this is a semantic relation. But now we are told that utterances 
25 This is consistent with self-ascriptions being true* or false* in some non-standard sense. 
26 For the purposes of this chapter I disregard the objections raised by Lewis, 1979, to the view that belief 
is a relation to a proposition. 
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express mental states, and this is a pragmatic relation. Indeed, most philosophers who 
have discussed this type of non-factualism have referred to it as expressivism. Kalderon 
(forthcoming) suggests the term `convey' for this pragmatic relation, but he defers to 
established usage. To avoid confusion, I will use the somewhat cumbersome `c-express' 
and its cognates, to refer to the relation that non-factualists claim holds between mental 
self-ascriptions and the first-order mental states they appear to represent. The non- 
factualist thus holds, 
The C-Expression Thesis: Mental self-ascriptions c-express (convey) the first-order 
mental states they appear to represent. 
There is one final claim made by the non-factualist which is central to the position. This 
is a claim about the meaning of mental self-ascriptions. Standardly, when a sentence 
expresses a proposition the meaning of that sentence consists (at least partly) in its 
expressing that proposition. Of course, since the non-factualist denies that mental self- 
ascriptions express propositions, this view is unavailable. The non-factualist claims, 
rather, that the meaning of mental self-ascriptions consists in their c-expressing the first- 
order states they appear to represent. Thus, 
The Semantic Thesis: The meaning of a mental self-ascription does not (even partly) 
consist in its expressing a proposition. Rather, the meaning of a mental self-ascription 
consists entirely in its c-expressing the first-order state it appears to represent. 
These then are the central commitments of non-factualism about mental self-ascriptions. 
We can now ask how it is that non-factualism explains the phenomena of first-person 
authority and IEM. 
Above, I characterized first-person authority by saying that if I sincerely judge `I 
am in pain', then the chances are that I am in pain. The non-factualist focuses on this 
way of saying what first-person authority is. The non-factualist's acceptance of the non- 
truth-evaluable thesis and the non-cognitive thesis prevents him or her from saying 
either of the following things: (i) Sincere mental self-ascriptions are, to a greater or 
lesser extent, guaranteed to be true, (ii) Each person has `direct' and authoritative 
knowledge of their own mental states. As such, there is a sense in which non-factualists 
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deny self-knowledge-the position is a dissolution rather than a solution to problems 
arising from the phenomenon of first-person authority. Hence, Wittgenstein's remark, 
I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking. 
It is correct to say "I know what you are thinking", and wrong to say "I know what I am thinking. " 
(A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar. ) (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. II, p. 222) 
Non-factualists claim that mental self-ascriptions are not, in the normal circumstances, 
knowledgeable. Thus, there is no problem in explaining how we come about such 
knowledge. Since self-ascriptions are c-expressive rather than representational, there is 
nothing there to know. All there is to be explained is that a sincere utterance of, say, `I 
am in pain' is a highly reliable indicator that the utterer is in pain. This, it seems, is well 
explained by the c-expression thesis. For, self-ascriptions are, when sincere, c- 
expressions of the first-order states they appear to represent. But if a sincere utterance is 
a c-expression of a state, then it is a highly reliable indicator of the existence of that 
state in the same way that, for example, a groan is a highly reliable indicator of the 
existence of a pain state. It seems, then, that non-factualism does provide a good 
deflationary account of first-person authority. 
We must also ask how successful non-factualism is in explaining the 
phenomenon of IEM. To put matters roughly, IEM is a feature of self-ascriptions that 
employ no criteria of identity of the subject. They are self-ascriptions that do not rest on 
an identification-component. And now it seems that non-factualism, if true, explains 
this phenomenon. For mere c-expressions of mental states employ no criteria of identity 
of the subject (or anything else), for the reason that they do not represent the subject (or 
anything else). Thus, if self-ascriptions are given a non-factualist reading, they will turn 
out to be IEM. As Wittgenstein puts it, 
it is impossible that in making the statement "I have a toothache" I should have mistaken another person 
for myself, as it is to moan with pain by mistake, having mistaken someone else for me. (Wittgenstein, 
1958, p. 67) 
There is one worry, however, concerning the power of non-factualism to explain IEM. 
Non-factualism is a thesis about mental self-ascriptions only. Nobody would claim that 
physical self-ascriptions are c-expressive of the states that they appear to describe. It 
follows that non-factualism can only give a full explanation of IEM if IEM is a feature 
36 
of mental self-ascriptions only. However, some have claimed that IEM is a feature of 
some physical self-ascriptions also27. 
There are at least three ways in which the non-factualist could respond to this 
worry. First, they could simply deny that any physical self-ascriptions are IEM, on the 
grounds that they are not c-expressive. Second, they could attempt to show how 
physical self-ascriptions `borrow' their IEM from mental self-ascriptions, upon which 
they are based28. Third, they could agree that non-factualism only gives a partial 
explanation of IEM but, it must be said, an explanation of the most central cases of 
IEM. Whichever way the non-factualist goes, it is clear that he or she has at least the 
beginnings of an explanation of IEM. When this is coupled with the explanation of first- 
person authority, non-factualism does have some explanatory success. 
Before moving on to the reasons for thinking non-factualism an unacceptable 
view, I will say something about the c-expression thesis. I have already given one 
reason for thinking that expressivism is not a good label for the non-factualist view (the 
ambiguity of the word `express'), but there is another reason. This second reason is that 
the standard picture of mental self-ascriptions as representational and so on, can happily 
accept the c-expression thesis. In fact, there is a sense in which the proponent of the 
standard picture is more of an expressivist than is the non-factualist. 
To use a phrase taken from Wittgenstein, a c-expression of a mental state 
`throws light on my state'. An interesting, and less metaphorical, analysis of c- 
expression is given by Taylor, 1979. Taylor regards a c-expression as a bodily 
manifestation of a state which reveals that state by communicating it to others29. This 
view correctly entails that crying out c-expresses pain, smiling c-expresses joy, etc. 
Non-factualism claims that mental self-ascriptions c-express the first-order 
states they appear to represent. Is this plausible? Let 0 range over the psychological 
verbs of which non-factualism is supposed to hold30. What, if anything, does an 
utterance of '10 (that) P' c-express? Let us first take belief: `I believe that P'. It seems 
reasonable to say that this utterance is a bodily manifestation of the belief that P which 
reveals that state by communicating it to others. This sits well with the fact that uttering 
27 The first to claim this was Evans, 1982, Ch. 7. 
28 Wright, 1998, §2, suggests something like this. 
29 This is a very rough gloss on Taylor's much more nuanced view. I would not wish to commit myself to 
Taylor's view of c-expression. I do have concerns, especially with the `communication' aspect. This 
is 
especially clear for my own purposes, since I am primarily interested in thought, not 
language. 
30 The following is easily modified to allow for those self-ascriptions where the mental term appears as an 
adjective, e. g. `I am in pain' or `I am happy'. 
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`I believe that P' c-expresses a commitment to the truth of P. But what is a commitment 
to the truth of P if not a belief that P? If this is correct, the self-ascription of belief will, 
as the non-factualist maintains, indeed c-express the mental state it appears to represent. 
However, the standard picture can accept this point. There is no obvious reason 
to think that accepting the c-expression thesis undermines the claim that mental self- 
ascriptions are representational, etc. Furthermore, unless one is already committed (as is 
the non-factualist) to the view that acceptance of `I believe that P' is not belief, there 
appears little reason for denying that `I believe that P' is a bodily manifestation of the 
second-order belief that I believe that P which reveals that state by communicating it to 
others. The proponent of the standard picture can consistently maintain that acceptance 
of `I believe that P' is belief and that an utterance of that sentence is c-expressive of that 
(second-order) belief. Thus, the proponent of the standard picture can claim that an 
utterance of `I believe that P' c-expresses both the state of believing that P, and the state 
of believing that one believes that P. It is in this sense that the proponent of the standard 
picture is being more of an expressivist than the non-factualist, for the non-factualist 
denies that an utterance of `I believe that P' is c-expressive of the belief that one 
believes that P as, according to the non-factualist, there is no such belief. 
What about self-ascriptions of other kinds of mental predicates, such as `I hope 
that P', `I want such-and-such' and so on. In each case, it is highly intuitive to say that 
the self-ascription c-expresses the first-order state it appears to describe. Indeed, it is 
reasonable to think that the c-expression thesis is quite generally true for mental self- 
ascriptions. Utterances of mental self-ascriptions are c-expressive of the first-order 
states they appear to describe. We can see that not only is this compatible with the 
standard picture of mental self-ascriptions, but the proponent of the standard picture is 
also perfectly free to claim that utterances of mental self-ascriptions are also c- 
expressive of the second order belief in/knowledge of the proposition that 10 (that) P. 
Thus, self-ascriptions are doubly c-expressive. 
It might be objected that it is implausible to think that a single piece of (verbal) 
behaviour could be c-expressive of two distinct states31. On this view, since self- 
ascriptions typically c-express the first-order states they appear to represent, they cannot 
c-express any second-order state. But this view has little to recommend it. My violent 
outburst may well express both my rage and my insecurity. To defend such a view, we 
would need to be given an account of what c-expression is which precluded one 
31 Jacobsen, 1996, makes such a claim. 
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utterance from c-expressing two distinct states. But it is seems likely that any such 
account would be a defective account of c-expression. 
2.7 The Frege-Geach Problem 
There are a family of arguments, made familiar by Geach, 1965, against the form of 
non-factualism I have been discussing. This has become known as the Frege-Geach 
problem. Roughly speaking, the Frege-Geach problem consists in pointing out that the 
set of sentences that the non-factualist claims are c-expressions (in this case, mental 
self-ascriptions) can occur in contexts in which they cannot be expressions of anything. 
The first difficulty for the non-factualist involves inferences. Consider the following 
instance of modus ponens: 
(1) If I believe that P, then I should believe that Q. 
(2) I believe that P. 
Therefore, 
(3) 1 should believe that Q. 
On the face of it this is a valid argument. But in order for an instance of modus ponens 
to be valid both the antecedent of the first premise and the second premise must have 
the same meaning. If they differ in meaning, the argument will be invalid due to 
equivocation. According to non-factualism, the second premise does not express a 
proposition, rather its meaning consists in its c-expressing the belief that P. The problem 
arises when we notice that the antecedent of the first premise does not c-express the 
belief that P. The first premise can be sincerely uttered by someone who fails to believe 
that P. indeed by someone who believes not-P. If the antecedent of the first premise 
does not function as a c-expression of the belief that P, then its meaning cannot consist 
in its c-expressing the belief that P. So according to the non-factualist this argument is 
invalid. But this is disastrous as it casts doubt upon the coherence of a large portion of 
our capacity for practical and theoretical reasoning, for it is plausible to think that the 
kind of reasoning displayed in the above example occurs in much of our rational 
32 decision making. 
32 The importance of this kind of first-personal reasoning is stressed in Burge, 1998. 
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The second difficulty for the non-factualist about mental self-ascriptions 
involves negation. According to the non-factualist mental self-ascriptions have no truth- 
values or, at least, are neither true nor false in the standard sense. But, in this case, what 
are we to make of an utterance of `It is not the case that I believe that P'? Negation is an 
operation which reverses truth-values. If the mental self-ascription has no truth-value, 
then its negation is meaningless. But of course this is not the case. Therefore the 
occurrence of `I believe that P' which appears after the negation operator must differ in 
meaning from the standard assertive utterance. To this it might be responded that `It is 
not the case that I believe that P' c-expresses the belief that not-P. But this is false, for 
in uttering `It is not the case that I believe that P' I might be giving voice to my 
agnosticism regarding P. A better response is to argue that there is a kind of truth, 
truth*, according to which c-expressions can be true*. But the defender of this view 
owes us an account of truth* and of negation*. 
A third difficulty for non-factualism is that it appears to make intersubjective 
conversation about one's mental states near impossible. If my utterance of `I believe 
that P' does not express the proposition that I believe that P, then it means something 
different from your utterance of `You believe that P'. We are talking past each other. 
Worse, when I utter `I believe that P' it is impossible for you to believe what I said, 
since I have not expressed a proposition and belief is a relation between a subject and a 
proposition. It might be argued that my utterance c-expresses my belief that P, and so in 
believing me, you bear the belief relation to the proposition that P. But this is wrong, as 
it should be possible for you to assent to what I said without thereby believing P. A 
theist can agree with my utterance of `I believe that God does not exist'. The problem is 
that, according to non-factualism, first and third-person utterances of mental predicates 
differ in meaning. As Heal puts it, on this view, "our psychological talk fragments into 
two unrelated halves" (Heal, 2002, p. 3). 
This semantic ambiguity concerning the first and third-person also infects the 
present and past-tense. Presumably the past-tense `I believed that P' expresses the 
proposition that I believed that P. It cannot be a c-expression of my belief that P, for I 
may no longer have that belief. But if I can assert the proposition that I believed that P, 
why can I not assert the same thing at a time which requires the present-tense 
formulation? Wittgenstein considers and rejects this line of thought in the following, 
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"But surely `I believed' must tell of just the same thing in the past as `I believe' in the present! "-Surely 
q-1 must mean just the same in relation to -1, as 
I1 means in relation to 1! This means nothing at all. 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, Part II, §X) 
But the analogy is a weak one. The difference is that the truth of `I believe that P' at t, 
entails the truth of `I believed that P' at t2. No such relation holds between 4-1 and 41. 
One might be tempted to say that `I believed that P' c-expresses my memory of 
believing that P. But this still leaves us with semantic ambiguity: the meaning of the 
present-tense self-ascription is constituted by its c-expressing a belief, the meaning of 
the past-tense self-ascription is constituted by its c-expressing a memory. 
Finally, an objection has recently been put forward to non-factualism based on 
minimalism about truth33. Minimalism about truth is the view that all there is to truth is 
the disquotation schema: `P' is true if and only if P. According to minimalism, P can be 
replaced by any grammatically suitable sentence, and mental self-ascriptions are clearly 
grammatically suitable sentences. Thus, self-ascriptions have truth conditions. For 
example, `I am in pain' is true if and only if I am in pain. It follows that, at least, the 
non-truth-evaluable thesis is false. Without this, it is suggested, non-factualism 
collapses. For, the falsity of the other components of non-factualism follows from the 
falsity of the non-truth-evaluable thesis34 
These objections to non-factualism about mental self-ascriptions are formidable. 
And if non-factualism about mental self-ascriptions is false, it cannot explain first- 
person authority or IEM. If non-factualism is false, we need to come up with alternative 
explanations. It is worth, then, seeing if the view can be salvaged. One way of doing 
this would be to attempt to develop non-factualism in such a way as to accommodate 
the claim that self-ascriptions have the semantic structure they appear to have. This 
response usually attempts to draw a parallel between self-ascriptions and performatives. 
3s For reasons that will become clear, I shall call this view Fictionalism 
33 See, in particular, Wright, 1992. 
34 Of course, this final argument relies on the truth of minimalism. One might want to reject it, then, by 
rejecting the claim that the disquotation schema tells us all there is to know about truth. As Jacobsen, 
1996, points out, this option is not open to Wittgenstein, who appears to accept minimalism. 
35 It might be thought that non-factualism could be salvaged by attempting to construct a `logic of 
attitudes', thereby providing a quasi-realistic theory of self-ascriptions. This is the option, suggested in 
the main text, of attempting to give sense to notions such as truth* and negation*. On quasi-realism, see 
Blackburn, 1984, Ch. 6. I do not have the space to explore this option here, but I have some reservations. 
First, the complications of constructing an alternative logic are to be avoided if possible. If a simpler 
theory is in the offing it should be tried and tested first. Second, there are serious doubts about the success 
of the quasi-realist programme, see Hale, 1993. 
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2.8 Fictionalism 
Whist the Frege-Geach problem spells the end of non-factualism, some of its central 
theses remain unscathed. For example, although he is no non-factualist Wright (1998. 
p. 36) denies that the Frege-Geach problem has any real force against a suitably 
sophisticated view36. He regards the problem as showing that self-ascriptions such as `I 
believe that P' have truth-evaluable content, but fall short of showing that they assert 
anything. He cites performatives as a model: `I promise to pay' has truth-evaluable 
content, yet in uttering the sentence I do not assert that content. On this picture of 
performatives, `I promise to pay' is true if and only if I promise to pay, and is therefore 
true every time sincerely uttered. This explains the fact that `I promise to pay' can be 
meaningfully negated, appear in instances of modus ponens etc. However, in uttering `I 
promise to pay', I have not asserted that I promise to pay. Rather, I have promised to 
pay. 
Looking back to the six theses of non-factualism, this position rejects the non- 
representation thesis, the non-truth-evaluable thesis and the semantic thesis. That is, 
mental self-ascriptions do express propositions, and so can be true or false, and their 
meanings are (at least partly) constituted by their expressing those propositions. 
Rejecting these theses allows us to accept all the morals of the Frege-Geach point. 
However, we are still in a position to accept the non-assertion thesis, the non-cognitive 
thesis and the c-expression thesis. That is, the assertive utterance of a mental self- 
ascription is not assertion, the acceptance of a mental self-ascription is not belief, and 
mental self-ascriptions c-express the first-order mental states they (actually) represent. 
This view I will refer to as fictionalism. 
The fictionalist view takes over that part of the standard picture of mental self- 
ascriptions which pertains to semantics. The meanings of mental self-ascriptions are just 
as we pre-theoretically expect them to be. However, fictionalism takes over that aspect 
of non-factualism which pertains to pragmatics. Although mental self-ascriptions are 
representational, accepting one does not amount to believing it, and uttering one does 
not amount to asserting it. The same can be said, it is suggested, about performatives 37. 
36 Variations of this view are defended in Jacobsen, 1996, Bar-On, 2000, and Bar-On & Long, 2001. The 
issues are subtly discussed in Falvey, 2000, who endorses the c-expression thesis but not the other aspects 
of non-factualism or factionalism. 
37 This is, of course, in opposition to Austin, "None of the [performative] utterances cited is either true or 
false: I assert this as obvious and do not argue it" (1962, p. 6). The view that performatives are, in fact, 
truth-evaluable is expressed in Lewis, 1970, p. 224, and Davidson, 1968, p. 107. 
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It is not clear to me, however, that the model of performatives is really helpful 
here. Is it true that when I utter, `I promise to pay you on Tuesday' I neither assert nor 
believe the proposition expressed? Here is an intuitive argument against such a view. If, 
on hearing my utterance, Bill says `Smith said that he promised to pay on Tuesday', Bill 
has said something true. But surely this means nothing other than `Smith asserted that 
he promised to pay'. To assert something is to put it forward as true, and when I say `I 
promise to pay on Tuesday' I put it forward as true that I promise to pay on Tuesday. 
Furthermore, there seems no obvious reason to think that in accepting the sentence `I 
promise to pay on Tuesday' I do not believe that proposition expressed. What could 
justify such a claim? 
This may not convince many. But there is another reason to think that, whilst 
there is an analogy between mental self-ascriptions and performatives, the analogy is far 
from complete. For, for the most part, performatives are self-constituting. By this I 
mean that by sincerely uttering a performative sentence one thereby makes it true. It is 
my saying that I promise to pay on Tuesday that makes it true that I promise to pay on 
Tuesday. This self-constituting feature of performative utterances is not shared by 
mental self-ascriptions. Certainly sincere utterances of mental self-ascriptions are 
invariably true, but this is not because they make themselves true. Uttering `I believe 
that P' does not make it true that I believe that P. So much appears to be clear38. 
A better model is fictional discourse (hence the label). When I say, `Holmes is a 
great detective', I have uttered a sentence which is representational, expresses a 
proposition which (at least in part) constitutes its meaning, and is either true or false. 
However, I have not asserted that proposition, and in accepting the sentence I do not 
believe the proposition it expresses. In fictional discourse we do not assert or believe the 
propositions expressed by the sentences we utter for the reason that we do not think 
them literally true. We speak `within the fiction'. Here, then, is a better model for 
understanding fictionalism about mental self-ascriptions. 
But the fact, if it is one, that fictionalism is internally consistent and not worried 
by the Frege-Geach problem is not the end of the matter. For we have yet to see whether 
it manages to adequately explain first-person authority and IEM. Fictionalism offers 
less satisfactory an explanation of first-person authority than does non-factualism. Non- 
factualism rejected the idea that self-ascriptions were representational, and that they 
were truth-evaluable in the standard sense. Thus, says the non-factualist, there is 
3S Pace Heal, 2002. 
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nothing to be known (hence the non-cognitivist thesis). First-person authority is not a 
matter of direct knowledge of mental states. Rather, it is simply that self-ascriptions are 
reliable indicators of a person's mental state. Fictionalism, on the other hand, allows 
that mental self-ascriptions are both representational and truth-evaluable. But now self- 
ascriptions express propositions which might, or might not, be known. Instead of 
likening mental self-ascriptions to groans of pain, of which it makes no sense to ask 
whether they are known, the fictionalist admits that they have content; that they say 
something. The fictionalist is now in a position to say that when mental self-ascriptions 
are sincere, they will, for the most part, be true. But, this is a less satisfactory 
explanation than the one given by non-factualism, for there is a further question to be 
answered, `Are mental self-ascriptions known? '. If the answer is yes, we have rejected 
the fictionalist non-cognitivist thesis and must explain how it is that they are known. If 
the answer is no, we can legitimately ask why not. Both non-factualism and fictionalism 
deny self-knowledge, but non-factualism has good reason-it makes no sense to say 
that mere c-expressions are known-fictionalism provides no such reason. 
How good an explanation can fictionalism give of IEM? Non-factualism 
explained IEM by pointing out that mere c-expressions of mental states employ no 
criteria of identity of the subject. Since self-ascriptions do not refer to the person who 
utters them, there is no need for any criteria of identity to be employed in securing that 
reference. But the fictionalist claims that self-reference does occur in self-ascriptions. 
We have now lost our explanation of IEM. The fact that self-ascriptions are c- 
expressive does not help to show how it is that they employ no criteria of identity, for 
they are no longer mere c-expressions. The fact that the acceptance of a mental self- 
ascription is not belief is no help here. It remains that self-ascriptions are 
representational. This is true for both language and thought. In thinking the thought `I 
have a headache', I have thought a thought with self-referential, representational 
content. The fictionalist claim is that I do not bear the belief relation to this thought. But 
if there is reference we are owed an explanation of how it is that errors of 
misidentification do not occur. Fictionalism does not provide such an explanation. 
This last point should spell the end of our concern with fictionalism as a putative 
obstacle to the Body Claim's reliance on a conceptual connection between self- 
consciousness and self-reference. Fictionalism is not a version of the no reference view. 
According to fictionalism, mental self-ascriptions are representational, they represent 
the subject as being a certain way. But to do this, they must refer to the subject. Thus, 
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even if fictionalism about mental self-ascriptions did provide a good explanation of 
first-person authority and IEM, it gives us no reason to doubt the conceptual connection 
between self-consciousness and self-reference. 
2.9 Explaining the First-Person Guarantees 
If, as we have seen reason to believe, the view that there is no self-reference in the 
central cases of first-person thought is false, then the view that `I'-thoughts are all non- 
referential is false. This means than none of the first-person guarantees with which we 
began have been adequately explained. In the present section I suggest how we might 
proceed in giving such explanations. 
Let me begin with guaranteed reference. Guaranteed reference is explained by 
the self-reference rule. What needed explanation was that `I' cannot fail to refer through 
there being either too many or too few objects. The self-reference rule easily explains 
this. The rule, which determines the reference for each and every utterance of `I', states 
that an utterance of `I' refers to the person who utters it. When I utter a sentence 
containing `I', my intended reference is mysel/9. But since `I' cannot be uttered by 
anyone who does not exist, `I' cannot fail to refer due to the lack of existence of its 
intended object. 
Similarly, the self-reference rule explains why `I' is immune to reference-failure 
through there being too many objects. A single token of `I' cannot be uttered by two 
distinct people. If two people utter `I', even if they are in the same place at the same 
time, there will be two utterances of `I', each one referring to the person who produced 
it. So the self-reference rule determines that `I' cannot fail to refer through there being 
too many objects. Everything that goes for language in this context also goes for 
thought. These explanations are, I claim, far more natural and satisfactory that either 
non-factualism or Anscombe's no-reference thesis. Of course this explanation relies on 
the self-reference rule and, as was pointed out in chapter one, there exist some reasons 
for thinking that there may be exceptions to the self-reference rule. But, of course, any 
reason for thinking that there are exceptions to the self-reference rule is also a reason for 
thinking that there are exceptions to guaranteed reference. This does not impugn the 
explanation. 
39 Anscombe, 1975, thinks this problematic because circular. For criticism see, O'Brien, 1994. This issue 
does not matter for the present purposes. 
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The task of explaining first-person authority is huge and this is not the place to 
take it on. I will, therefore, limit myself to explaining why non-factualism and 
fictionalism point us in the wrong direction. In their explanations of first-person 
authority, both non-factualism and fictionalism rely on the c-expression thesis. Earlier I 
said that self-ascriptions are, when sincere, c-expressions of the first-order states they 
appear to represent. Now if a sincere utterance is a c-expression of a state S, then it is a 
highly reliable indicator of the existence of S. Just as a groan is a highly reliable 
indicator of the existence of a pain state. But there are at least two reasons to think that 
this is, after all, not an adequate deflationary account of first-person authority. First, as 
Heal has argued, "for all we know there will be a fair number of false positives" (Heal, 
2002, p. 9). The c-expression thesis does not rule out the possibility that a subject may 
frequently sincerely utter `I believe that P', when no belief is being expressed. Just as it 
is conceivable that a subject may, in good faith, be disposed to groan with pain even 
though they feel none, so a subject may, in good faith, be disposed to utter `I believe 
that P' even though they do not. The second worry concerns the concentration on 
language rather than thought40. Let us suppose that the c-expression thesis can provide a 
deflationary explanation of the first-person authority we enjoy over our utterances of 
mental self-ascriptions. We still have not explained first-person authority in its entirety, 
for we are strongly inclined to say that a subject knows what he or she is thinking, 
desiring, feeling, etc. even if he or she displays no overt behaviour. The c-expression 
thesis is a thesis about (linguistic) behaviour. But first-person authority is a 
phenomenon which seems not to be adequately captured by an account of how subjects 
behave. First-person authority is something which is available to a subject who is not in 
a position to express any of his or her states behaviourally. These criticisms apply to 
both the non-factualist and fictionalist accounts of first-person authority. Whatever the 
correct account of first-person is, it should not rely on the c-expression thesis. 
The explanation of IEM is to be found in the postulation of, what I shall call, 
`single-object faculties'. Discussions of IEM tend to concern the question whether such- 
and-such faculty for gaining knowledge gives rise to judgements which are IEM. Thus, 
there have been debates as to whether judgements based on memory or bodily- 
awareness are IEM. What needs to be made clear is how one might go about claiming 
that self-ascriptions based on bodily-awareness or self-locating perceptions are IEM. 
That is, we need an answer to the question, what is it that one needs to claim about a 
40 See Wright, 1998, p. 37. 
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given faculty for gaining knowledge about oneself, f in order to secure the claim that 
self-ascriptions based on f are IEM? 
One way of doing this is to claim that f is necessarily a way of gaining 
knowledge of only one object41; what we might call a `single object faculty'. Take the 
case of bodily-awareness. If one holds that bodily-awareness is necessarily awareness of 
one's own body42, it seems that one will have all the materials required for a defence of 
the claim that self-ascriptions based on bodily-awareness are IEM. If bodily-awareness 
is necessarily an awareness of one's own body, it follows that one cannot be aware, via 
bodily-awareness, of the body of another. So, it will be impossible to know that 
someone's legs are crossed without thereby knowing that one's own legs are crossed. 
Looking back at the definition of IEM, we can see that, on this conception of bodily- 
awareness, the proposition that `b is F could not be distinct from the proposition `a is 
F, for there will be only one object with which one is acquainted through bodily- 
awareness. If (based on bodily-awareness) I am in a position to make the singular 
judgement `a is F then, ex hypothesi, either it is based on no identification, or the 
identification upon which it is based is indubitable. This for the reason that it is not 
possible to be aware of and to hold singular beliefs about a body, perceived via bodily- 
awareness, unless that body is one's own. 
Exactly similar remarks can be made for other faculties. For instance, the claim 
that introspection-based mental self-ascriptions are IEM is secured by the, surely 
correct, claim that introspection is necessarily a way of coming to know the contents of 
one's own mind. The claim that memory is necessarily a way of gaining knowledge of 
one's own past secures the claim that memory-based self-ascriptions are IEM. And so 
on. Arguing that a faculty is a single object faculty is a way of arguing that judgements 
based on that faculty are IEM. Nothing more seems to be required. Thus, whether or not 
one thinks that judgements based on a faculty, f, are IEM depends entirely on what one 
takes to be the correct theory off. 
This ties in with the way in which Wittgenstein and Strawson originally 
characterized IEM, as not requiring the application of any criteria of personal identity. 
For, if a faculty is a single object faculty, then coming to know via that faculty that 
someone is F just is coming to know that I am F. There is no need for me to apply any 
criteria of personal identity for me to discover who the person is that I know to be F. 
41 See Campbell, 1999a, pp. 92-3. 
42 As is argued (disregarding some complications) in Martin, 1995. 
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I have been arguing against non-factualism about self-ascriptions. In doing so, I 
have defended the intuitively compelling view that, at least, the central cases of first- 
person thought are self-referential. The phenomena of guaranteed reference, first-person 
authority and immunity to error through misidentification do not tell against self- 
reference. The conceptual connection between self-consciousness and self-reference is 
intact. 
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3. Russell's Principle 
3.1 The Ambiguous Status of Russell's Principle 
The defender of the Body Claim is committed to there being a tight conceptual 
connection between self-consciousness and self-reference. We have seen off one type 
of challenge to this connection. There is, however, another obstacle to be overcome. 
This comes in the form of those accounts of singular thought which adopt, what has 
become known as, Russell's Principle. I shall be arguing against Russell's Principle 
and thereby defending the close connection between self-consciousness and self- 
reference. 
The role played by Russell's Principle in the dialectic of the Body Claim is, 
however, ambiguous in the extreme. On the one hand, acceptance of the principle can 
readily lead one to think that central cases self-consciousness need not involve self- 
reference. In this respect Russell's Principle represents an obstacle to be overcome by 
the defender of the Body Claim. On the other hand, those philosophers who have 
defended the Body Claim, and related views, have often used Russell's Principle as a 
premise in their arguments for the Body Claim! In this respect the rejection of 
Russell's Principle deprives proponents of the Body Claim of one of their greatest 
weapons. In general there has been a failure to appreciate this crucial ambiguity. Once 
we have a clear view of the situation, we begin to understand the rather unusual way 
in which Evans fits in to the picture. For the position occupied by Evans in The 
Varieties of Reference is very naturally thought of as, at the very least, closely allied 
to the Body Claim. Yet, as we shall see in this chapter, Evans' view in fact poses a 
serious threat to the defender of the Body Claim, for Evans's view of singular thought 
entails that self-consciousness need not involve self-reference. This is a direct result 
of the absolutely central importance accorded by Evans to Russell's Principle. In 
chapters four and five we shall see how Russell's Principle has been used to support 
later stages of arguments for the Body Claim. The remainder of this chapter will be to 
defend my claim that Russell's Principle Provides a serious challenge to the defender 
of the Body Claim. This will be carried out through a detailed analysis of Evans' 
account of singular thought. At the end of the chapter, I go on to argue against 
Russell's Principle. 
AAI 
3.2 What Russell's Principle Is 
Russell articulated his principle of acquaintance in several places. Here is one, 
Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we 
are acquainted... The chief reason for holding this principle true is that it seems scarcely possible to 
believe that we can make a judgement or entertain a supposition without knowing what it is that we are 
judging or supposing about... It seems to me that the truth of this principle is evident as soon as the 
principle is understood (Russell, 1910-11, pp. 159-160). 
Acquaintance is an epistemic notion; being acquainted with an object involves having 
a certain kind of knowledge of it. This knowledge is `knowing which object it is that 
one is thinking about'. In line with his epistemological views, Russell himself thought 
that the only items with which we are acquainted in the requisite way were sense data, 
universals, our own mental states and, possibly, ourselves. Understood as involving 
these epistemological limitations, the principle of acquaintance has little to 
recommend it'. It follows from Russell's official position that either the proposition 
that London is the capital of England can be analysed into a proposition making 
reference only to sense data etc. or that it cannot be understood. 
But it seems reasonable to think that the heart of the principle of acquaintance 
can be divorced from Russell's own epistemological strictures. This is the strategy 
adopted by Evans. Evans claims that to be in a position to entertain a singular thought 
about a one must know which thing a is, but he thinks that one can have this kind of 
knowledge about, amongst other things, everyday physical objects. The kind of 
knowledge that Evans believes is required for one to know which object one is 
thinking about is, what he calls, `discriminating knowledge'. Evans calls his version 
of the principle of acquaintance `Russell's Principle' and I shall follow him in this. He 
writes, 
a subject cannot make a judgement about something unless he knows which object his judgement is 
about ... the 
knowledge which it [Russell's Principle] requires is what might be called discriminating 
knowledge: the subject must have the capacity to distinguish the object of his judgement from all other 
things. (Evans, 1982, p. 89) 
' See, for example, Sainsbury, 1979, pp. 26-41, who argues against Russell's position. 
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This means that unless I have such a capacity (to distinguish the object of my thought 
from all other things), I cannot think about it. I shall sometimes refer to the act of 
distinguishing an object from all other things as `identifying' it. Now there are, 
according to Evans, three ways in which I can satisfy Russell's Principle with respect 
to any given object: (i) I can identify it by perceiving it, (ii) I can identity it by having 
the ability to recognise it were I to perceive it, and (iii) I can identify it through my 
knowing distinguishing facts about it. 
As we shall see, Evans' account of how it is that we identify ourselves is a 
version of (i). That is Evans thinks that the way in which we distinguish ourselves 
from all other things, and thereby satisfy Russell's Principle with respect to ourselves 
(and are thereby able to entertain singular thoughts about ourselves) is by perceiving 
ourselves. To understand how an adherence to Russell's Principle leads Evans to the 
view that a subject might be self-conscious and yet incapable of self-reference, we 
need to look at some of the other aspects of his account of singular thought. Once we 
see how this general account deals with first-person thought, we shall see that his 
position leaves open the possibility of, what I shall call, massive reference failure. We 
will also see that the possibility of massive reference failure is something that the 
proponent of the Body Claim must deny. My view is that this should be done via a 
rejection of Russell's Principle itself. 
3.3 Evans on Singular Thought 
We need now to take a relatively lengthy detour through some other aspects of Evans' 
account of singular thought. In particular we must introduce the Generality 
Constraint, the distinction between fundamental Ideas, and the notion of an 
information-based thought. The reasons for doing this will become clear in the 
following sections. 
Alongside Russell's Principle, Evans further claims that singular thoughts 
must conform to the Generality Constraint2. Evans takes thoughts to be structured: 
they are, he thinks, composed of concepts, conceived of as abilities to think of objects. 
So, for instance, the thought `Bruce is bald' is composed of the concept Bruce and the 
2 Travis, 1994, argues forcefully against the Generality Constraint. Unfortunately, I do not have the 
space to discuss his arguments here. 
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concept of being bald. Anyone who can think that thought, possesses those two 
concepts. One of these is a concept of an object, one is a concept of a property. 
Following Evans3, we can call the first of these an Idea of an object. An Idea of an 
object is a concept of an object, that is, an ability to think of that object. Anyone able 
to think `Bruce is bald', has both an Idea of Bruce and the concept of being bald. 
We can now state the Generality Constraint. If a subject has an Idea of an 
object, a, then that subject has the conceptual resources to entertain the thought `a is 
F for every concept F which he or she possesses (and is categorially applicable). 
Similarly, if a subject has the concept F, that subject has the conceptual resources to 
entertain the thought `a is F for every object of which he or she has an Idea. 
The Generality Constraint requires us to see the thought that a is F as lying at the intersection of two 
series of thoughts: the thoughts that a is F, that a is G, that a is H, ..., on the one hand, and the thoughts 
that a is F, that b is F, that c is F,..., on the other. (Evans, 1982, p. 209) 
The Generality Constraint is, of course, an elaboration of a point made by Strawson in 
Individuals4. There, Strawson claims that one does not have the idea of a predicate 
unless one has the idea of something which can be affirmed of a range of individuals. 
Next we must move on to a distinction, made by Evans, between fundamental 
and non-fundamental Ideas. To understand this distinction between fundamental and 
non-fundamental Ideas of objects, we need another piece of Evans' terminology: `the 
fundamental ground of difference'. Every object has a fundamental ground of 
difference. The fundamental ground of difference of an object is that which 
differentiates that object from other objects of the same kind. So, for instance, the 
fundamental ground of difference (at a time) for a physical object, is its spatial 
location plus its sort (statue, lump of clay etc. ). That is, physical objects are 
differentiated from each other by their spatio-temporal location plus sort. Stating the 
fundamental ground of difference of a given kind is just (or is at least closely related 
to) stating the criterion of identity for objects of that kind. 
A fundamental Idea of an object is an Idea of that object as being the 
possessor of the fundamental ground of difference that it actually has. Evans writes 
that, 
3 Who claims to be following Geach, 1957. But see Geach, 1986. 
4 Strawson, 1959, p. 99. 
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one has a fundamental Idea of an object if one thinks of it as the possessor of the fundamental ground 
of difference which it in fact possesses. (Evans, 1982, p. 107) 
An example of a fundamental Idea of an object would be one based on the perception 
of the object in one's immediate environment. If I see a cat in front of me and think 
`that cat is black', I will be thinking demonstratively of the cat as the possessor of the 
fundamental ground of difference it, in fact, has; namely as located in such and such a 
time and place, and as being of such and such a kind. 
On the other hand, thinking of my cat, Tiddles, on the other side of the city, I 
will not have a fundamental Idea of him5. If I think `Tiddles is black', I am not 
thinking of him as being located in the place in which he is, in fact, located. I don't 
know where he is at the present time. My Idea of Tiddles satisfies Russell's Principle 
because, were I to see him, I would recognise him. 
Notice that the example given of a fundamental Idea exploits the 
demonstrative mode of identification. Indeed, demonstrative Ideas of physical objects 
are quite generally fundamental. On the other hand, the example given of a non- 
fundamental Idea exploits the recognition-based mode of identification. Both the 
recognition-based and the descriptive modes of identification give rise to non- 
fundamental Ideas. 
What exactly are non-fundamental Ideas of objects? Obviously, in my thought 
about Tiddles I am not thinking of him as the possessor of the fundamental ground of 
difference which he in fact possesses. And this is true of non-fundamental Ideas in 
general. However, according to Evans, non-fundamental Ideas do exploit the 
fundamental level of thought. 
Let 8 range over fundamental Ideas of objects. Evans thinks that I know what 
it is for the proposition `Tiddles is black' to be true, because I know what it would be 
for the propositions `6 is black' and `S = Tiddles' to be true. So it turns out that my 
understanding of propositions containing non-fundamental Ideas of objects rests on 
my understanding of propositions containing fundamental Ideas. 
The first of the above propositions, `8 is black' is just a standard proposition 
involving a fundamental Idea of an object. The second, however, is new. The second 
proposition is a fundamental identification. A fundamental identification is an 
5 Tiddles is, to my knowledge, no relation of Geach's well known moggy `Tibbles'. 
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identification between a fundamental Idea of an object and a non-fundamental Idea. It 
is the capacity to know what it would be for such fundamental identifications to be 
true that is distinctive of the ability to entertain thoughts containing non-fundamental 
Ideas of objects. Evans writes, 
we can take the subject's Idea-of-the-object, a, to consist in his knowledge of what it is for an arbitrary 
proposition of the form r8= aº to be true (Evans, 1982, p. 110) 
But what does this mean? One thing it surely can't mean is that in order to have a 
non-fundamental Idea of an object, one must know its actual fundamental ground of 
difference. If it did mean this, there would be nothing to distinguish fundamental from 
non-fundamental Ideas. It seems to me that the most reasonable way of understanding 
non-fundamental Ideas is that they require that one knows the sort of fundamental 
ground of difference relevant to the kind of object one is thinking about. So, for 
instance, if one has a non-fundamental Idea of a physical object, one must know what 
it would be for it to be located somewhere. That is, one must have a ability to 
conceive of the very object of one's thought as located in such-and-such a place. 
Evans brings this out later, in his discussion of demonstrative identification, 
In the case of a spatio-temporal particular, an adequate Idea of an object [i. e. either fundamental or 
non-fundamental] involves either a conception of it as the occupant of such-and-such a position (at 
such-and-such a time), or a knowledge of what it is for an object so identified to be the relevant object 
(Evans, 1982, p. 149) 
The final aspect of Evans' account of singular thought to which we must turn, is his 
notion of an information-based thought. Information-based thoughts are thoughts 
which employ Ideas that are governed by information gained in certain ways. 
Typically, these `information-channels' are perceptual. For example, suppose I can 
see a cat (Evans, 1982, p. 121). My thoughts about that cat will be governed by the 
content of my perception of it. If I see that the cat is black, I will be disposed to think 
that the cat is black, and so on. 
Information-based thoughts are dependent upon the existence of such 
information-channels. That is, they require an information-link; a link between the 
object of one's thought and one's Idea of that object. If the information (or 
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misinformation) which partly comprises my Idea of an object actually derives from 
either more or less than exactly one object, then my attempts to think the relevant 
thoughts will fail. I will come back to this kind of `ill-groundedness' later. 
Information-based thoughts include thoughts which employ both Ideas that are 
demonstrative, and Ideas that are recognitional, but not those that are purely 
descriptive. When a subject thinks about an object via a definite description, that 
subject's thoughts need not be governed by any information about that object. As we 
shall see later, it is a moot point whether `I'-thoughts are information-based. 
3.4 `I'-Ideas 
In the present section I will outline Evans' account of first-person thought. It is 
important to ask how first-person thought fits in to Evans' general view of singular 
thought just described. It transpires that there is a difficulty with Evans' view, 
centring around the issue of the distinction between fundamental and non- 
fundamental Ideas. This difficulty, which specifically concerns the possibility of non- 
fundamental `I'-Ideas, will be of importance when, in the next section, we come to 
discuss the possibility of massive reference failure. 
`I'-Ideas, in Evans' terminology, are the self-conscious Ideas we have of 
ourselves, `I'-thoughts are thoughts which contain `I'-Ideas. Evans treats `I'-thoughts 
on a demonstrative model. They are, he claims, similar to 'this'-Ideas and, in 
particular, 'here'-Ideas 6. This similarity shows up in the functional role of `I'-Ideas. 
This point should be familiar from chapters one and two. 
First, `I'-Ideas feed into our dispositions to act in a special way7. If I believe 
that I am about to be attacked by a tiger, I will be disposed to run away. However, if I 
believe that Smith is about to be attacked by a tiger, I will only be disposed to run 
away if I also believe that I am Smith. This feature is common to both `I'-thoughts 
and 'here'-thoughts. If I believe there is a tiger here, I will be disposed to run away. 
6 That `I'-Ideas are to be modelled on 'here'-Ideas would have been Evans' answer to Geach's 
question: "what is it that on his view the pronoun `I' is? What feature of `I' has Anscombe failed to 
notice? " (Geach, 1986, p. 535). What Anscombe, 1975, failed to notice was that `I' can be treated on 
the model of `here'. Geach obscures the point, however, by giving the impression that Anscombe 
explicitly denies that `I' follows the model of `here'. But there is no such denial in Anscombe's paper, 
where the only demonstratives considered are `this' and `that'. 
See, in particular, Perry, 1979. 
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On the other hand, if I believe that there is a tiger in my living room, I will only be 
disposed to run away if I also believe that my living room is here. 
Second, `I'-thoughts like 'here'-thoughts are disposed to be controlled by 
information gained in certain ways. Take 'here'-thoughts. If I see a tiger, I will be 
disposed to think `there is a tiger here'. My 'here'-thoughts will be determined by the 
information I receive via the perception of my immediate environment. There is no 
need for me to identify the place at which the tiger is as here. Another way to put this 
is to say that 'here'-thoughts, when based on perception, are identification-free. That 
is, they don't rest on an identification of the presented location as here. This 
identification-freedom gives rise to the IEM of perception-based 'here'-thoughts. 
So, 'here'-thoughts are disposed to be controlled by information gained via the 
perception of the immediate environment. Evans' claim about `I'-thoughts is that they 
behave in a similar way, except that the information channels by which they are 
disposed to be controlled, are different. One such information channel is 
introspection. If I have a headache, I will be disposed to think `I have a headache' or 
`I am in pain'. Furthermore, this does not require an identification of the person who 
has the headache as me. The thought `I have a headache' is identification-free, and 
this is what explains the fact that it is IEM. 
According to Evans, much the same can be said of certain of the ways we have 
of gaining knowledge of our bodily properties. Specifically, our method of gaining 
knowledge of the state of our own bodies (bodily-awareness), and our method of 
locating ourselves relative to our perceived environment. So, the judgements `I have 
crossed legs' or `I am in front of a tree' are, when based on the appropriate grounds, 
both identification-free. It is in these facts that we can see the similarity between 'I'- 
thoughts and 'here'-thoughts which Evans uses to justify his treatment of `I'-Ideas on 
the model of demonstratives. This similarity is put clearly in the following, 
the Idea which one has of oneself involves the same kinds of elements as we discerned in the case of, 
say, `here': an element involving sensitivity of thoughts to certain information, and an element 
involving the way in which thoughts are manifested in action. (Evans, 1982, p. 207) 
If what was claimed in chapter two is correct, these claims made by Evans can be 
secured by treating introspection, bodily-awareness and `self-locating perception' as 
single object faculties. 
56 
I shall now go back to the general features of the theory of singular thought. 
For `I'-thoughts are singular thoughts, and as such we should be able to apply Evans' 
general theory to them. We can begin by asking how it is that `I'-thoughts satisfy 
Russell's Principle. Russell's Principle states that in order to make a judgement about 
an object, I must know which object my judgement is about. Three ways of satisfying 
this constraint are identified by Evans: I can currently perceive the object, I can 
recognise it, or I can know distinguishing facts about it. Evans' likening of `I'- 
thoughts to demonstratives suggests that he has a version of the first in mind. That is, 
knowing which object my `I'-thought is about is a matter of being able to perceive it, 
roughly speaking. 
But this hasn't really told us very much yet. We need to know more about `I'- 
Ideas. Specifically we need to know how it is that we identify ourselves. This 
necessity becomes acute when we admit that `I'-Ideas conform to the Generality 
Constraint. We can grasp all sorts of propositions about ourselves, not just those 
which are controlled by the special information channels mentioned earlier. Since this 
is the case, there is more to be said about our `I'-Ideas than just the bare facts that 
they are controlled by certain ways we have of gaining information about ourselves, 
and that they feed into dispositions to act in a special way. I can grasp the thought `I 
will die'. In order to do this, according to Russell's Principle, I must know which 
object I am thinking about. And this means that I must be able to distinguish that 
object from all other things. But this is not done via those special information 
channels, mentioned earlier. So how is it that I am able to do this? 
Perhaps a better way to approach this question is to ask whether the Idea I 
have of myself in grasping the thought `I will die' is fundamental or non-fundamental. 
And, more generally, whether `I'-Ideas are fundamental or non-fundamental. This is a 
vital question and, unfortunately, Evans is not explicit. Recall, one has a fundamental 
Idea of an object if one thinks of it as the possessor of the fundamental ground of 
difference it in fact has. So before we can answer the question of whether `I'-Ideas are 
fundamental or non-fundamental, we need to know what the fundamental ground of 
difference for persons is. 
What is the fundamental ground of difference for persons? This is a 
metaphysical question, and the answer isn't obvious. However, Evans isn't interested 
in going too far into the metaphysical question and he simply assumes an answer. The 
answer he proposes is as follows, 
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It seems to me clear that as we conceive of persons, they are distinguished from one another by 
fundamental grounds of difference of the same kind as those which distinguish other physical things, 
and that a fundamental identification of a person involves a consideration of him as the person 
occupying such-and-such a spatio-temporal location. (Evans, 1982, p. 211) 
This is a roundabout way of saying that persons are physical objects8. Not such a 
controversial assumption but, to digress a little, it does serve to dispel one false 
impression that certain of Evans' remarks are liable to give rise to. For instance, it has 
been suggested by Brewer, 1995, that Ch. 7 of The Varieties of Reference constitutes, 
in part, an argument against Cartesian dualism. And this interpretation is not without 
plausibility. After all, Evans does speak of certain of his views as being "the most 
powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self' (Evans, 1982, p. 220). It is true 
to say that Evans' intentions are to give a firmly anti-Cartesian account of self- 
reference, self-consciousness and self-identification. It would be a mistake, though, to 
suppose that this is to be done by arguing against Cartesian metaphysics. There 
simply is no sustained argument against the view that the fundamental ground of 
difference for persons should be spelt out with reference to souls. No doubt Evans 
would argue against this. But he doesn't. And this isn't really so surprising, since Ch. 
7 isn't a work in metaphysics. Evans' isn't an anti-Cartesian argument, but an anti- 
9 
. Cartesian position 
Returning to the point at hand, persons are individuated by their spatio- 
temporal location and the fact that they are persons. So, having a fundamental Idea of 
oneself would involve thinking of oneself as the person at such and such a spatio- 
temporal location. Are our `I'-Ideas like this? Well yes, it would seem that in at least 
some cases they are. In particular, the special information channels mentioned earlier 
that give me knowledge of my bodily properties, namely bodily-awareness and my 
capacity to locate myself, are important here. For these are precisely the most 
8 Well, almost. I shall be suggesting in chapter six that a Cartesian dualist might want to claim that 
souls are individuated by the spatio-temporal location of the bodies to which they are connected. 
' One might try to squeeze an anti-Cartesian argument out of Evans in the following way: on Evans' 
view, if Cartesian dualism were true, our `I'-Ideas would be ill-grounded through there being too many 
objects, body and soul, (see the discussion of ill-groundedness in the following section), and so our 'I'- 
thoughts would fail to net any object. Thus, the subject would lack the ability to think `I'-thoughts. 
This might be taken to be an argument against Cartesian dualism (or maybe an, indirect, argument 
against Evans' account of singular thought! ). Of course, the dualist's reply will be that, contrary to 
appearances, we have two distinct types of `I'-Idea: `Is0 1'-Ideas, and `Ib '-Ideas. 
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immediate ways I have of coming to discover my location. When I judge, based on 
visual perception, that I am in front of a tree, I am thinking of myself as the person in 
such and such a location. So it seems open for Evans to say that, in thinking such a 
thought, I have a fundamental Idea of myself. 
But this won't work for all `I' -thoughts. For we can't forget about the 
Generality Constraint. In saying that `I'-thoughts conform to the Generality 
Constraint, we are saying that I must be able to entertain thoughts such as `I will die', 
and since these thoughts are not immediately controlled by the information channels 
that give me information of my own location, it is not obvious that these thoughts 
involve a fundamental Idea of oneself. At least this is what is suggested by Evans' 
treatment of this very example, 
It is not wholly inaccurate to say that I grasp such an eventuality by thinking of myself in the way that I 
think of others; this is just another way of saying that the fundamental level of thought about persons is 
involved. But it is of course essential that I am aware that the person of whom I am so thinking is 
myself; certainly I must have in mind what it is for r5 is dead-, to be true, for arbitrary ö, but I must 
also have in mind what it is for r8= I' to be true. My thought about myself does satisfy the Generality 
Constraint; and this is because I can make sense of identifying a person, conceived from the standpoint 
of an objective view of the world, as myself. (Evans, 1982, p. 210). 
This looks very much as though Evans is saying that in thinking thoughts such as `I 
will die' we employ non-fundamental Ideas of ourselves, for a fundamental 
identification (of the form rd = I") is only a requirement when non-fundamental Ideas 
are concerned. Possessing a non-fundamental Idea of an object does not require one to 
be in possession of the fundamental ground of difference of that object. So, if some 
`I'-Ideas are non-fundamental, they do not require one to be in possession of one's 
own fundamental ground of difference at that time. All one needs to know is what it 
would be for one to be identical with a person, thought of using a fundamental Idea, 
i. e. one must know what it would be for rS= 11 to be truelo 
10 It might be objected that `I'-Ideas must be either fundamental or non-fundamental, but we cannot 
pick and choose as we please. It is a misunderstanding of Evans' account to think that some `I'- 
thoughts could employ fundamental `I'-Ideas, and some not. But what is an Idea but an ability to think 
of an object? Since this is the case, we should not be surprised that an Idea will differ according to the 
different circumstances in which it is employed. Currently I can see Tiddles my cat and so 
have an 
ability to think about him. My Idea of him is fundamental. But, suppose he runs away and 
I no longer 
know where he is. Of course I can still think about him, but my Idea will no 
longer be fundamental. I 
am suggesting that the same is true of `I'-Ideas. 
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But now we arrive at a problem. How do non-fundamental `I' -Ideas conform 
to Russell's Principle? `I'-Ideas, based as they are on the model of demonstrative 
reference, satisfy Russell's Principle by being grounded in a perception of the object. 
In thinking of myself, I distinguish myself from all other things by my ability to locate 
myself in space. But if I have a non-fundamental Idea of myself, I need not be in 
possession of my actual fundamental ground of difference. But it is now difficult to 
see how I am able to distinguish myself from all other things. The only types of non- 
fundamental Ideas discussed by Evans are recognition-based Ideas and description- 
based Ideas. But Evans explicitly disavows a description-based account of `I' (Evans, 
1982, p. 206), and surely a recognition-based model would be hopeless. 
I take it that the answer to this problem is supposed to lie in the fact that, for 
many of one's `I'-thoughts, one can distinguish oneself from all other things. In actual 
fact, one can so distinguish oneself, and this somehow makes it possible for one to 
entertain thoughts about oneself involving non-fundamental `I'-Ideas. Evans tells us 
that, 
to know what it is for rS = I-1 to be true, for arbitrary 4, is to know what is involved in locating oneself 
in a spatio-temporal map of the world. (Evans, 1982, p. 211) 
But knowing what is involved in locating oneself does not entail that one can locate 
oneself, and so does not entail that one can identify oneself, i. e. distinguish oneself 
from all other things. Thus, it seems that if this is all one must be able to do to have a 
non-fundamental Idea of oneself, then such thoughts must conform to Russell's 
Principle by being dependent, in some respect, on thoughts which involve a 
fundamental Idea of oneself. But how this might be cashed out remains unclearl 
1. 
Another way of raising the same point, a way which will lead us naturally on 
to the next section, is to consider the possibility of one's having the various special 
ways of gaining knowledge of oneself blocked. That is, the possibility of total sensory 
deprivation. It is worth asking what happens to a subject's capacity to entertain `I'- 
thoughts when he or she is subjected to the sort of sensory deprivation discussed by 
Anscombe, 1975. This is a problem that O'Brien, 1995, has raised and she takes it 
" Essentially the same difficulty is raised by Peacocke, 1983, pp. 169-174, concerning perceptual 
demonstratives. For a discussion of both perceptual demonstratives and self-identification, see the 
exchange between McDowell, 1990, and Peacocke, 1991. 
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that Evans' position can't deal with the coherence of fist-person thought in the 
sensory deprivation tank. 
So here is the challenge to Evans: According to the theory, `I'-Ideas must 
conform to Russell's Principle, i. e. we must know which object we are thinking about. 
In the case of `I'-thoughts, this is achieved via our capacity to locate ourselves in a 
spatio-temporal map of the world. But we can imagine a subject in a sensory 
deprivation tank, with all relevant information channels blocked. It seems relatively 
plausible to think that this subject can think `I won't let this happen again' (to use 
Anscombe's example). But how, it can be asked, does this thought conform to 
Russell's Principle? This is precisely a case in which the subject can't locate 
himself12. So we might think that Evans is committed to saying that the subject in the 
sensory deprivation tank is incapable of first-person thought. Evans denies this, 
A subject may be amnesiac and anaesthetized, and his senses may be prevented from functioning; yet 
he may still be able to think about himself, wondering, for example, why he is not receiving 
information in the usual ways. But it would be... wrong to conclude from this that self-consciousness 
can be explained without reference to the various ways that subjects have of gaining knowledge about 
themselves... It is essential, if a subject is to be thinking about himself self-consciously, that he be 
disposed to have such thinking controlled by information which may become available to him in each 
of the relevant ways. (Evans, 1982, pp. 215-6) 
So, the anaesthetized subject can entertain `I'-thoughts just in case if he were to regain 
the use of the normal information channels, then his `I'-thoughts would be controlled 
by them. This move parallels one made in the case of `here'. For, admits Evans, a 
subject can think of a place as `here' whilst currently receiving no information from 
that place. In the case of `here' this is because places are "so much thicker on the 
ground than objects, a subject cannot fail to have a single place as the target of his 
'here'-dispositions" (Evans, 1982, p. 169). As a result of this, Evans claims that 
We have now what might be regarded as a limiting case of information-based thoughts: the subject's 
thinking is not necessarily controlled by a conception, but it rests upon an information-link in that the 
subject is so disposed that his thinking involving the Idea in question will be controlled by information 
yielded by the link if any emerges. (Evans, 1982, p. 153, n. 20) 
12 Would he be able to distinguish himself from all other things by thinking of himself as `here'? After 
all he still has a dispositional connection to a place. No, not if he's whizzing through space. 
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But whilst this may help in explaining how `here' can refer in the absence of 
information, it does not help with `I', for persons are objects. As O'Brien points out, 
it seems unclear how the fact that a subject is disposed to have their thinking controlled by information 
which may become available could explain how it is that they succeed in identifying themselves when 
no such information is available (O'Brien, 1995, p. 237) 
It seems to me that this is just the same problem that Evans faces in accounting for 
how it is that we entertain non-fundamental `I'-Ideas. For one might be tempted to say 
that the anaesthetized subject manages to entertain `I'-thoughts by being able to 
employ a non-fundamental `I'-Idea. That is, although he does not possess his own 
fundamental ground of difference, he does know what it would be for the propositions 
`S is P and `I =8 to be true. And this all seems fine, since there is no suggestion that 
the anaesthetized subject has forgotten that he is a person. If he had no idea that he 
was a person, and thus no knowledge as to what it would be for a fundamental 
identification of himself as a person to be true, then it becomes less plausible to think 
that he could entertain `I'-thoughts anyway. 
But this just brings us back to the problem of how it is that `I'-thoughts which 
employ non-fundamental Ideas of ourselves can conform to Russell's Principle. I do 
not see how Evans can answer this objection and so I think that there is a difficulty at 
the heart of Evans' theory of self-identification. The problem is that whilst we want to 
be able to say that a subject can entertain non-fundamental `I'-Ideas, it is difficult to 
see how such Ideas might conform to Russell's Principle. This difficulty comes to the 
fore in the following section's discussion of the possibility of massive reference 
failure. Evans' view that our `I'-thoughts might be subject to massive reference 
failure poses a serious threat to the tight connection between self-consciousness and 
self-reference that the defender of the Body Claim requires. 
3.5 The Possibility of Massive Reference Failure 
The reason why I have discussed Evans' account of `I'-Ideas, and the theory of 
singular thought, at such length is that if the theory is correct it opens up the 
possibility of a self-conscious subject who fails to satisfy the transcendental 
conditions of first-person reference. If such a possibility is allowed, the defender of 
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the Body Claim will be stopped in their tracks, for however convincingly he or she 
argues that embodied experience is a transcendental condition of self-reference, 
nothing will follow concerning self-consciousness. This section falls into three parts. 
First I will outline Evans' views concerning the possibility of reference failure for 
information-based thoughts in general. I will then illustrate how this impacts on the 
first-person case, generating the possibility of massive reference failure. Finally I will 
argue that there are problems with Evans' view. We have already seen that Evans' 
owes us an account of non-fundamental 'F-Ideas. This worry looms large in the 
present section also. The problems, I argue, are generated by Russell's Principle on 
the one hand, and by Evans' demonstrative model of `I'-Ideas on the other. 
Information-based thoughts are thoughts which must both satisfy Russell's 
Principle and which require an information-link. According to Evans, there are four 
different ways in which a subject can essay (in the sense of `attempt to think') an 
information-based thought yet fail, two of which correspond to each of these aspects. 
They are: (1) There is a unique object from which the information derives, but no 
unique object is identified by the subject's mode of identification, (2) There is a 
unique object from which the information derives, but a different unique object is 
identified by the subject's mode of identification, (3) There is no unique object from 
which the information derives, but there is a unique object identified by the subject's 
mode of identification, (4) There is no unique object from which the information 
derives, and there is no unique object identified by the subject's mode of 
identification. These four cases are represented by Evans as follows (unbroken lines 
represent derivation of information; broken lines represent purported modes of 
identification) 13: 
TTTT 
. 
1/t1 
X (-) XY (-) Y (-) (-) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
"See Evans, 1982, p 133. 
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An example of case (1) would be the following 14: there were two Polish grocers in my 
home town, but I only remember one of them. The information I retain is derived 
exclusively from grocer A, yet I cannot distinguish grocer A from grocer B. On 
Evans' view, I fail to think about grocer A. 
An example of case (2) would be the following: I appear to see a cat in front 
of me. But it is an hallucination, the information of which derives from a cat in 
another locality. However, there is an exactly similar cat just where I am hallucinating 
a cat. On Evans' view I fail to think about either cat. 
An example of case (3) would be the following: I seem to remember a friend 
of my parents called Doug. But my apparent memories derive from a dream I once 
had. However, my parents did have a friend called Doug, whom I never met. 
According to Evans, I fail to have a thought about Doug. 
Finally, an example of case (4) would be the following: I hallucinate a pink 
elephant. The information derives from nowhere, and there is no pink elephant. 
According to Evans I fail to have a thought about that pink elephant. 
Evans' view is that in these situations, whilst I believe myself to be thinking a 
thought, I have actually failed to do so. That is, I am subject to an illusion of 
thought 15. Furthermore, and this is important, precisely similar things can be said of 
`I'-thoughts. Evans writes, 
It seems to me a corollary of the reflections in this chapter that our ordinary thoughts about ourselves 
are liable to many different kinds of failings, and that the Cartesian assumption that such thoughts are 
always guaranteed to have an object cannot be sustained. (Evans, 1982, p. 249) 
Evans then goes on to list a variety of situations in which, he claims, a subject's 
essaying of an `I'-thought would fail. These situations include the following: 
(a) The information that feeds into one's 'F-Idea via one's special information 
channels may derive from more than one object (e. g. if one received kinaesthetic 
14 This example is from Evans, 1982, p. 78. 
15 Evans' view here is radical. To see this, it need only be pointed out that, 
if substantiated, it 
undermines the cogito. For one can no longer be certain, and 
hence it becomes possible to doubt, that 
one is thinking. However, since Evans is happy to allow that when one 
has an illusion of thought there 
is something going on in one's mind, we might rewrite the cogito as, 
`There is something going on in 
my mind, therefore I exist'. 
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information from another person's body as well as one's own) (See Evans, 1982, 
pp. 249-250). 
(b) One's dispositions to act may be manifested in an object other than that from 
which one's kinaesthetic etc. information derives (See Evans, 1982, p. 250). 
(c) One may be a subject with two `control centres' linked to a single body (See 
Evans, 1982, p. 255, n. 74). 
(d) One may be an organism with a `control centre' outside of one's body, and 
survive the destruction of one's body (See Evans, 1982, pp. 254-5). 
(e) The information that feeds into one's `I'-Idea may derive from nothing (e. g. if one 
were a (congenital) brain in a vat) (See Evans, 1982, p. 250). 
(f) One may be receiving no information, via one's special information channels, 
about one's position in space16 . 
These situations represent the possibility of massive reference failure. A subject in 
any one of these situations would be self-conscious, in that they would believe and 
subjectively feel themselves to be thinking first-personally. Yet they would not satisfy 
the conditions of self-reference. It follows that self-consciousness, even in the central 
cases, does not require self-reference. If this is the case, the defender of the Body 
Claim will be unable to mount a self-reference based argument for their view. 
I want to suggest that there are serious problems with Evans' position here. 
The culprits, so I shall argue, are his treatment of `I'-Ideas on the demonstrative 
(information-based) model, and his adherence to Russell's Principle. However, before 
I make good on these claims, I must address an objection to the way in which I have 
placed Evans within the dialectic of the Body Claim. I have represented Evans as 
supporting the view that self-consciousness is possible in the absence of the 
transcendental conditions of self-reference. But it seems that strictly speaking this is 
not correct. Evans believes that a subject can attempt to think an `I'-thought and fail, 
yet it seem to the subject as if the attempt had succeeded. That is, it can seem to a 
subject that he is thinking `I'-thoughts when, in fact, he is not. I have taken this as a 
challenge to the view that self-consciousness necessarily involves self-reference (for 
if there is no `I'-thought there is no self-reference). But one might well object that 
16 As should be clear from the previous section, I have added (f) to the list. Evans would not have 
placed it there, but I think that he should. 
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Evans' position does not really pose any such challenge. For, as I defined self- 
consciousness in chapter one, it is the ability to think first-personally; to think `I'- 
thoughts. Thus, a subject who failed to do so would not really be self-conscious. If 
such a subject is not self-conscious, this is no threat to the view that self- 
consciousness necessarily involves self-reference. 
My response to this is to define self-consciousness `phenomenologically'. 
Thus, if it seems to a subject that he or she is thinking `I'-thoughts, that is sufficient 
for him or her to be considered self-conscious. Indeed, I think that this is the intuitive 
view. `From the inside' such a subject may be entirely indistinguishable from a 
`properly' self-conscious subject. Any definition which admitted that one was self- 
conscious, and the other not would, I suggest, be deficient. Thus, it should be clear 
that the definition of self-consciousness given in chapter one is not quite correct. Self- 
conscious subjects are those who are in a position such that it seems to them that they 
can think first-personally. Given this definition of self-consciousness, what we might 
call phenomenological self-consciousness, Evans' position does indeed pose a threat 
to the claim that self-consciousness necessarily involves self-reference. Having made 
this qualification to the definition of self-consciousness, I will revert to the original 
turn of phrase, and continue to speak of self-consciousness as first-person thought; as 
a property of thoughts. 
With this objection out of the way we can take a closer look at the situations in 
which Evans thinks an essayed `I'-thought would fail. To begin with, I will assume 
that in all of the situations (a)-(f) there is no query as to which body is the subject's 
body. That is, there is exactly one body which is the subject's body. Specifically, in 
situation (a) the subject is receiving kinaesthetic information from a body which is not 
his or her own. And, in situation (b), the subject's dispositions to act are manifested in 
a body which is not the subject's own body. In situation (c), I take it that the 
suggestion is that there are two subjects here, both of whom `share' a body. The first 
question we must answer is how (a)-(f) relate to (1)-(4). That is, how the cases given 
by Evans of failed `I'-thoughts, map on to his schematic account of the possibility of 
ill-grounded information-based thoughts. 
It is not immediately clear how these situations relate to the four different 
kinds of ill-groundedness. Situations (a) and (b) are, I suggest, instances of either case 
(3) or case (4). In each situation we are told that there is no unique object that 
is the 
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source of the subject's information". Thus they are both either instances of case (3) or 
of case (4). However, we are not told of the subject's mode of identification, so we 
are unable to decide between the two cases. 
It seems to me that, as described, situations (c), (d), (e) and (f) are all either 
instances of case (1) or of case (4). The difficulty in situation (c) is that there are two 
subjects here and the mode of self-identification they employ is not uniquely 
identifying. Each subject's mode of identification nets two objects (the two subjects). 
Thus, we have an instance of either case (1) or case (4). Since we are not given any 
details concerning the subject's information links, we are not in a position to decide 
between the two. 
Situations (d), (e) and (f) are problematic not because of a lack of uniqueness, 
but because the subject's mode of identification fails to net an object at all. These 
subjects do not have uniquely identifying conceptions of themselves, as they are 
unable to locate themselves in space. Again, we do not have enough details 
concerning the subject's information-links to be in a position to decide whether these 
situations are instances of case (1) or of case (4). 
To complete the list, an instance of case (2) would be one in which a subject 
received information (or misinformation) from him or herself, yet which failed to 
identify him or herself and which, through chance, correctly identified another 
subject. 
Evans' claims that a subject in one of these situations essaying a first-person 
thought would fail. That is, a self-conscious subject would fail in his or her attempts 
to think first-person thoughts, and thus fail to self-refer. Hence, if Evans is correct, the 
Body Claim is in trouble since self-consciousness does not necessarily involve the 
capacity for self-reference. 
These cases can be divided into those in which something goes wrong on the 
information-link side and those in which something goes wrong on the mode of 
identification side18. In the remainder of the section I will argue for the following 
claims. First, those cases in which something goes wrong on the information-link side 
are not intuitively described as instances of reference failure. Evans' description of 
" It is easy to be misled into treating (b) differently from (a) due to its involving both input and output. 
This would be a mistake. Output is on the information-link side rather than the mode of identification 
side. 
18 And those in which something goes wrong on both sides. I shall not discuss such cases separately. 
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them as such is forced by his treating `I'-Ideas on the demonstrative model. If we 
abandon this model we enable ourselves to say what seems intuitively correct about 
these cases. Second, those cases in which something goes wrong on the mode of 
identification side are only correctly described as instances of reference failure if we 
accept Russell's Principle. It is tempting to describe such cases as perfectly 
acceptable, and self-referential, instances of subjects employing non-fundamental `I'- 
Ideas. What prevents us from saying this is Russell's Principle. If we were to reject 
Russell's Principle we could reject Evans' view that these are cases in which the 
subject does not meet the requirements of self-reference. Hence, if we reject both the 
demonstrative account of `I'-Ideas and Russell's Principle, we can rebut the 
possibility of massive reference failure, thus reinstating the tight connection between 
self-consciousness and self-reference. 
I shall begin with those cases in which something goes wrong on the 
information-link side. Case (a) is the simplest of these. Here the problem is that the 
information that feeds into one's `I'-Idea derives from more than one object. An 
analogous case for `this' supports the view that there is no reference here. "Suppose 
one uses the expression `this cup' when one is seeing a cup and feeling a cup (in fact, 
though one does not know it, two cups)" (Evans, 1982, p. 250, n. 67). In this situation, 
it is intuitive to say that the use of the expression `this cup' has failed to refer. But `I' 
is supposed to follow the model of `here' closer than the model of `this'. So, we 
should see whether we can construct an analogous case for 'here'. Suppose one is 
standing in a quiet room, but one's perceptual (visual and auditory) information 
derives from some other (noisy) place, and one utters `It is loud here'. In this situation 
we are less inclined to think that reference has failed, and more inclined to think that 
one has uttered something false. The reason for this is that there is a fact of the matter 
about which place the subject is at. This gives us a reason to privilege one place over 
the other as the reference of 'here'. But now we can see that exactly the same point 
applies to situation (a). In the envisioned situation, one's kinaesthetic information 
derives from someone else's body, as well as one's own. But, as I said above, there is 
no question as to which body is one's own (this is built into the description of the 
case). So we have a reason to privilege one person over the other as the referent of 
one's `I'-thought. Thus, it is plausible to say that one's thought is (presumably) false 
rather than a failure of reference. 
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Situation (b) is more complex, but essentially the same point applies. Whereas 
(a) involves input, (b) involves output. Situation (b) is seriously under-described: we 
do not know whether the subject is conscious of his or her dispositions to act being 
manifest in this other body. If so, there must be some deviant input as well. If not, 
then it is hard to see exactly how it is supposed to be problematic. For, suppose Bruce 
suffers from entire-body paralysis. We have yet to be given any reason to think that he 
is incapable of referring to himself with '1'19. What difference would it make that his 
dispositions to act are manifested in another body? Presumably none. We have 
created a deviant information-channel here but, as before, we have every reason to 
privilege the information channel which leads to the subject's actual body. So, we 
should assume that Bruce gets some feedback from this other body. And now the 
question must be whether there is any reason to think that Bruce's attempts to refer to 
himself with `I' would fail. Not intuitively, since situation (b) is now similar to 
situation (a), and it is not intuitively plausible to describe situation (a) as a failure of 
reference. 
The point that I have been pressing is that it is wrong to view `I'-thoughts as 
information-based, i. e. on the model of demonstrative thought. As Evans's himself 
notes, whilst demonstrative thoughts are "information-based thoughts par excellence, 
[`I'-thoughts] do not seem to depend necessarily either upon the subject's actual 
possession of information... or upon the actual existence of an information-link" 
(Evans, 1982, p. 152)20. But treating `I'-thoughts as information-based at all means 
that we have to say some highly implausible things concerning the cases just 
described. There are two aspects to information-based thoughts. First, such thoughts 
are governed by their relevant information channels. Second, those information 
channels are essential to those thoughts. Whilst it seems reasonable to think that the 
first aspect correctly applies to `I'-thoughts, it is not plausible to think that the second 
does. When the information channels go wrong, the intuitive view is that the subject's 
capacity for `I'-thoughts remain unaffected. This is why treating `I'-thoughts as 
demonstrative, information-based, thoughts is so counterintuitive. If we depart from 
Evans on this matter, as I believe we should, cases (a) and (b) no will longer be 
treated as cases of massive reference failure. 
19 But see my discussion of the action argument in chapter eight. 
20 Evans is actually talking about 'here'-thoughts at this point, but I presume that 
he would say the 
same of `l'-thoughts. 
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Let us move on to the situations in which something goes wrong on the mode 
of identification side. First, take situation (c). On the (questionable) assumption that 
this is a conceivable situation, it is at first difficult to see why there should be any 
failure of first-person thought. For there are two subjects here and each subject's `I'- 
thoughts will refer to that subject. But I take it that the problem, as noted above, is 
that neither of these subject's modes of self-identification will be uniquely 
identifying. Therefore, neither subject is in a position to distinguish themselves from 
all other things. Thus, by Russell's Principle, we must deny first-person thought to 
these subjects. In the next section I shall argue that Russell's Principle should be 
rejected, and therefore that this situation is not problematic in the way Evans claims. 
Situation (d) introduces rather more complications. Concerning situation (d), 
Evans asks us to imagine 
organisms whose control centre is outside the body, and connected to it by communication links 
capable of spanning a considerable distance. An organism of this kind could have an idea of itself like 
our own, but if it did, it would be unable to cope with the situation that would arise when the control 
centre survived the destruction of the body it controlled. Thinking like us, the subject would of course 
have to regard itself as somewhere, but in this case it would not make any sense to identify a particular 
place in the world as the place it thought of as here... Because its `here' picks out no place, there is no 
bit of matter, no persisting thing, which the subject's Idea of itself permits us to regard as what it 
identifies as itself. Here, then, we have a very clear situation in which a subject of thought could not 
think of itself as `I'; its `I'-its habitual mode of thought about itself-is simply inadequate to the 
situation. (Evans, 1982, pp. 254-5). 
This passage may seem rather strange. It seems clear that this organism (let's call her 
Shelia) does not have a fundamental Idea of herself, for she does not know her spatial 
location. But mightn't Shelia have a non-fundamental Idea of herself? For possession 
of a non-fundamental Idea of an object does not require one to be in possession of that 
object's fundamental ground of difference. To have a non-fundamental Idea of a 
(physical) object it is sufficient that one have a ability to conceive of the object of 
one's thought as located in such-and-such a place. But Evans provides us with no 
reason to deny that Shelia has this ability. And if this is the case, then there seems to 
be no reason to think that Shelia cannot perfectly well think `I wonder where I am', 
referring to herself in the process. 
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As I have already said, it is hard to see how non-fundamental `I' -Ideas 
conform to Russell's Principle. And it does look as though Shelia's thought would fail 
to so conform. This, no doubt, is the source of Evans' denial of Shelia's ability to 
think of herself as T. But here we just have a vivid example of the tension between 
Russell's Principle and the notion of a non-fundamental `I' -Idea. I shall argue below, 
that it is Russell's Principle that has to go. 
Situation (e) can be thought of as something like a combination of (a) and (d). 
In situation (a), the subject's information upon which physical self-ascriptions (but 
not his mental self-ascriptions) are based derives from another's body, here it derives 
from nothing. An analogous demonstrative case would be something like this: If I 
hallucinate a tennis ball, I cannot refer to anything using the demonstrative `this ball'. 
For there is no ball. But the analogy is not very close. Admittedly, for the brain in the 
vat, there is no body. But it is not the case that there is no subject. For, whilst it is true 
to say that a demonstrative (or any other expression, for that matter) will fail to refer 
if its intended object does not exist, this does not correctly describe case (e). 
I take it that the real problem that Evans finds with (e) is more like the 
problem we discerned with (d). That is, the brain in the vat does not have a 
fundamental Idea of itself, for it does not know its current location; all the information 
it has about its current location is illusory. But, if this is the problem, we can ask the 
same question as we asked about (d): mightn't the brain in the vat have a non- 
fundamental Idea of itself? That is, it knows what it would be for an arbitrary 
proposition of the form `S = a' to be true21. What could justify refusing to attribute 
this kind of Idea of itself to the brain in the vat? Presumably the claim that it would 
violate Russell's Principle. 
Finally, we come to case (f). It has already been admitted by Evans that it is 
intuitively plausible to view the subject of complete sensory deprivation as capable of 
first-person thought. I suggested above that Evans can allow first-person reference to 
the subject in sensory deprivation if he allows that the subject has a non-fundamental 
Idea of himself. But, again, this raises the difficulty of reconciling non-fundamental 
`I'-Ideas with Russell's Principle. We can see, then, that the situations described by 
Evans as involving something going wrong with the mode of self-identification are 
plausibly described as involving non-fundamental `I'-Ideas. If this claim could be 
21 Would `8 range over fundamental Ideas of persons or brains?. 
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made out, then such cases would not constitute examples of massive reference failure. 
Of course, the problem with the suggestion is that it is entirely unclear how non- 
fundamental `I'-Ideas conform to Russell's Principle. If we adhere to Russell's 
Principle, we seem forced to admit that there is reference failure here. It seems that 
the time has come to assess Russell's Principle itself. 
3.6 Against Russell's Principle 
If Russell's Principle is rejected we will have no reason to think that the subjects 
described in the previous section are incapable of self-reference. This will save the 
Body Claim from an early bath. In this section I argue against Russell's Principle22. 
To begin with it must be pointed out that Evans accepts Russell's Principle only at the 
level of thought, not at the level of language. Evans writes that, 
The abandonment of the principle of identification [Russell's Principle] at the level of saying is a trivial 
consequence of the distinction between what one says and what one intends to express. Its 
abandonment at the level of belief or thought would be an extremely significant move. What has 
happened is that the former has been mistaken for the latter. (Evans, 1982, p. 76, n. 18). 
This is important as it opens up a way of criticising Evans' position directly. For it 
would appear that any of the following views, in descending order of philosophical 
sophistication, would render Evans' position problematic: (i) The conditions of 
linguistic reference are identical to the conditions of reference in thought, (ii) The 
only way to analyse thought is via the analysis of language, (iii) That which I can 
speak about, I can think about. Of course, if one of these claims could be 
22 It is worth noting that rejecting Russell's Principle is not the only way to save the connection 
between self-consciousness and self-reference from Evans' attack. One could argue that subjects in the 
situations described in the previous sections are able to identify themselves descriptively as `the thinker 
of this thought', or `the subject of these conscious states'. If this were possible, one could reject the 
possibility of massive reference failure, whilst remaining neutral on the question of Russell's Principle. 
This strategy is well represented by Peacocke, 1983, Ch. 6. Whilst I am not at all convinced that this 
isn't a perfectly adequate response to Evans, I do not follow that route for a number of reasons. First, it 
is extremely controversial whether one really can identify oneself descriptively in this way. For one 
thing it is not absolutely clear that we can demonstrate our thoughts at all, and even if we can there is a 
highly influential line of thought, due to Strawson, 1959, p. 97, to the effect that the demonstrative 
identification of a thought is parasitic upon the demonstrative identification of the person whose 
thought it is. If this is correct, the proposed account would be circular. My second reason for pursuing 
the route of rejecting Russell's Principle is that it is useful for the discussion in the following chapters. 
Having rejected Russell's Principle here, I go on to make further use of that rejection. 
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substantiated, the proponent of Russell's Principle could move in either direction. 
That is, they could reject Russell's Principle at the level of thought, or they could 
adopt it at the level of language. 
I will not be arguing against Russell's Principle in this way. Rather, the case 
that I will put against Russell's Principle is indirect, and will come in two parts. First, 
I argue that the acceptance of Russell's Principle has some extremely counterintuitive 
consequences concerning what one is capable of thinking about. Second, I will 
undermine Evans' own theoretical arguments for the principle. Together these 
considerations lead us to a rejection of the principle, since a principle with 
counterintuitive consequences surely requires a strong theoretical backing, and this is 
something that Russell's Principle lacks. In an appendix to The Varieties of Reference 
Evans claims that the rejection of Russell's Principle amounts to the rejection of the 
Fregean notion of sense. At the end of the section I will argue that this need not be the 
case, and will sketch out some positions that could be taken by one who denies the 
principle. 
That Russell's Principle has counterintuitive consequences is something which 
should have become clear in the preceding discussion of reference failure. For 
instance, it is a consequence of Russell's Principle that a subject in the position of 
Shelia cannot think to herself `I wish my body hadn't just been destroyed'. For Shelia 
is unable to distinguish herself from all other things; she cannot locate herself 
spatially. But it is not only concerning `I'-thoughts that Russell's Principle has 
unwanted consequences. Much the same can be said for both demonstratives, and 
proper names. 
Suppose a subject sees an apple in a mirror at a fairground stand23. The mirror 
is part of a larger set-up of mirrors, the result of which is that the subject cannot locate 
the apple in space. If Russell's Principle is true, the subject cannot think the 
demonstrative thought `I wonder where that apple is', for the subject cannot 
distinguish the apple from all other things by locating it24. In a similar vein, since 
audition does not provide the requisite identification information, I cannot entertain a 
23 This example is from Peacocke, 1983, pp. 170-1. Campbell, 
2002, pp. ll1-112, offers a similar 
example. 
24 This may not be an ideal example, for the subject may still 
have the ability to locate the apple. See 
Peacocke, 1991, pp. 124-125. For the claim that it may be indeterminate whether a subject 
has such an 
ability, see Millikan. 2000, Ch. 13. 
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demonstrative thought about the drill outside my room on the basis of hearing it25. 
Again, suppose a subject is put inside a wooden box and taken on a long journey. If 
Russell's Principle is true, then that subject cannot think `I wonder what the weather's 
like here, wherever here is'. For, once again, he cannot distinguish the place where he 
is from all other places. 
In the case of names, adherence to Russell's Principle leads to many 
counterintuitive consequences. Due to my inexcusable lack of knowledge concerning 
the history of philosophy I cannot distinguish between Fichte and Schelling. All I 
know about either of these two men is that they were post-Kantian German 
philosophers. So, since I cannot distinguish Fichte from all other things it follows that 
I cannot entertain thoughts about Fichte, since I cannot distinguish him from all other 
post-Kantian German philosophers 26. This, I suggest, is more than a little surprising. 
So, Russell's Principle has consequences that strike us as counterintuitive. 
Some commentators have felt that simply pointing this out is all that one needs to do 
in order to reject the principle27. But this surely is not enough. For Evans provides 
arguments for Russell's Principle, and if the principle is to be rejected these 
arguments must be shown to be unconvincing. Evans deploys (at least) two distinct 
arguments for Russell's Principle. I shall argue that neither of these are compelling28. 
Evans' first argument utilises the Generality Constraint. Evans claims (1982, 
§3.3) that certain supposed counterexamples to Russell's Principle violate the 
Generality Constraint and so are unacceptable. The first supposed counterexample is 
of the same kind as my `Fichte' example above. We are asked to suppose a child to 
have been "introduced to the name `Socrates' by hearing simply that Socrates was a 
Greek philosopher" (Evans, 1982, p. 73). Now, 
If the ignorant child has got hold of the widely disseminated piece of information (or misinformation) 
`Socrates was snub-nosed', we might well be inclined to say that the child has a true or false belief 
about Socrates... But the inclination to say that the child has, and is expressing, a 
belief about Socrates 
is far less strong when we envisage the child not merely repeating the widely disseminated piece of 
25 See Campbell, 2002, p. 112-113. 
26 For simplicity I ignore the (real) problem concerning descriptions such as 
`the post-Kantian German 
philosopher who was called "Fichte"'. 
27 See, for example, Bach, 1987, pp. 41-5. 
28 My criticisms of Evans' arguments for Russell's Principle are greatly 
influenced by Rozemond, 
1992-3, and Sainsbury, 1985. Also see Loar, 1984. 
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information, but uttering the words `Socrates is fat' (say), perhaps as a result of some confusion. 
(Evans, 1982, p. 75) 
The question is whether the child in a position to entertain the thought, of Socrates, 
that he is fat. If the answer to this is no, then the supposed counterexample to 
Russell's Principle violates the Generality Constraint. We can, for the sake of 
argument, agree with Evans that anything which violates the Generality Constraint 
must be rejected. But I see no reason to think that this example does so. 
In what way is the child confused? Let us suppose that she wrongly supposes 
all philosophers to be fat29. She then, perfectly naturally draws the conclusion that 
Socrates is fat. Here there is no temptation to think that such a child is not in a 
position to entertain the thought that Socrates is fat. In a similar vein, I have no 
distinguishing knowledge of Fichte. It would, then, be a counterexample to Russell's 
Principle if it were correct to ascribe to me the belief that Fichte was a post-Kantian 
German philosopher. According to Evans' present argument, my supposed belief 
would violate the Generality Constraint, since I cannot be credited with the capacity 
to entertain the thought that Fichte loved his mother. But the claim that I cannot 
entertain such a thought is simply offered with little by way of justification. So, I 
think that Evans' first defence of Russell's Principle, using the Generality Constraint, 
is unconvincing. 
Evans' second argument for Russell's Principle involves the example of two 
identical steel balls30. Suppose that a 
subject briefly sees one ball rotating by itself on one day, and the other on a later day. And let us 
further suppose that the subject retains no memory of the first episode... Suppose, finally, that many 
years later our subject reminisces about `that shiny ball' he saw many years earlier. If asked which ball 
he is thinking about, our subject cannot produce any facts which would discriminate between the two. 
(Evans, 1982, p. 90) 
If it is correct to say that the subject is thinking about the second ball, then we have 
here a counterexample to Russell's Principle. But Evans does not think that 
it is 
correct to so describe the subject. The reason for this is that 
it would be wrong to 
29 This line of thought is filled out in Rozemond, 1992-3, §11. 
30 The steel balls example is analogous to the Polish grocers example mentioned 
in the previous 
section. 
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ascribe to this subject an Idea of the ball. For an Idea of an object is an ability to think 
about that object, but there is no ability that this subject has which would make his 
Idea an Idea of the second ball rather than the first, 
There is no question of his recognising the ball; and there is nothing else he can do which will show 
that his thought is really about one of the two balls (about that ball), rather than about the other. 
(Evans, 1982, p. 115) 
Therefore, the subject does not have an Idea of the ball, and so cannot entertain 
thoughts about it. There are two ways in which I want to object to this. First, I simply 
deny that there is no ability that the subject has, which would make his Idea an Idea of 
the first rather than the second ball. For the subject has the ability to remember, 
reason and deliberate about the second ball, but lacks the ability to remember, reason 
and deliberate about the first31. Thus, our subject can be distinguished from a subject 
who could think about the first, but not the second ball. Does this beg the question 
against Evans? I don't think so. Evans challenges his opponent to say what it is that 
the subject can do which makes his thought a thought about one ball rather than 
another. The subject's capacity to remember the ball, and so on, constitutes his Idea of 
the ball. True, we cannot distinguish the subject from another subject thinking about 
the other ball. But why should this matter? The capacities of the two subjects are 
different, since these capacities must be individuated with reference to their objects. 
The second objection is slightly different. It involves the thought that if Evans 
is right concerning the steel ball case, then this will lead to some extremely 
counterintuitive results. For suppose that, rather than see two balls and forget about 
one, the subject sees only one ball, since the other ball was hidden behind a curtain32. 
Now, if Evans is right to say that there is no ability that the first subject had that could 
show that he was thinking about the second rather than the first ball, then there can be 
no such ability in this new variation of the example. For, "There is no question of his 
recognising the ball; and there is nothing else he can do which will show that his 
thought is really about one of the two balls (about that ball), rather than about the 
31 See Rozemond, 1992-3, p. 288, Peacocke, 1983, p. 174, and Loar, 1984, p. 50. McDowell, 1990, 
260, claims that this objection misses the point but I don't see how. 
'` See Sainsbury, 1985, p. 133-4. 
76 
other" (Evans, 1982, p. 115) 33. But this conclusion is absurd. Thus, we should not be 
convinced by Evans' second defence of Russell's Principle. Since Russell's Principle 
has such counterintuitive consequences, and Evans' theoretical defence of the 
principle is unconvincing, we should not accept it. 
Before we leave the subject of Russell's Principle it is necessary to address 
one last issue. In an appendix (Evans, 1982, pp. 80-85), Evans suggests that the 
rejection of Russell's Principle is tantamount the rejection of the notion of sense for 
singular thoughts. If this were the case it would be disastrous to anyone who thinks 
that there are singular thoughts and is convinced by Frege's Puzzle. To support his 
suggestion, Evans points out that, "it is quite obscure how, if one mental state 
represents a particular object in virtue of one sort of causal relation to it, and another 
mental state (of the same subject) represents that object in virtue of another sort of 
causal relation to it, the sheer difference between causal relations could generate a 
difference in content between the two mental states, given that it need not in any way 
impinge on the subject's awareness. " (Evans, 1982, p. 83). Evans' point seems to be 
something like the following: Russell's Principle provides an epistemic constraint on 
the ascription of thought content. The only serious alternative to a theory of singular 
thought adhering to Russell's Principle is a causal account. But a causal account can 
have no place for sense, as sense is a cognitive notion, it is whatever it is that explains 
the cognitive significance of language and thought. The rejection of Russell's 
Principle would allow, to borrow Wettstein's useful phrase, `semantic action at 
epistemic distance' and this is entirely mysterious34 
Evans overstates his case here. Indeed, I submit that there are at least three, 
broadly outlined, positions that can be occupied by those who deny Russell's 
Principle: 
(A) One could reject Russell's Principle yet continue to maintain that there are non- 
trivial epistemic conditions on reference. I take it that the view proposed by Peacocke, 
1983, Ch. 7, falls into this category. The point is that one can continue to accept that 
33 One might be tempted to say that the ball can be distinguished as `the one that I saw', but Evans 
himself rules out such a move on the grounds that "thinkers... will not in general resort to this way of 
identifying the object of their thought" (Evans, 1982, p. 117). Indeed, it seems that if this is all that is 
required, there would never be any counterexamples to Russell's Principle, for a subject could always 
distinguish the object of his thought as `the object causally responsible for my current thought'. 
34 Wettstein, 1991, Ch. 1 l. Some discussion of the issues surrounding Russell's Principle can also be 
found in Chs. 8,9 and 10 of that collection. 
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reference requires something which can correctly be described as `knowing what one 
is thinking of , but maintain that such knowledge need not amount to anything so 
strong as Evans' discriminating knowledge3s 
(B) One could reject all epistemic conditions on reference, allowing semantic action 
at epistemic distance, but continue to insist that Frege's Puzzle can be solved by a 
causal account. For example, it might be argued that not only what one is thinking 
about, but also how one is thinking about it is determined causally. Thus, pace Evans, 
a difference in the causal ancestry of two thoughts about a will (sometimes) result in a 
difference in the way that one can think of a, and hence in a difference in content. 
(C) One could reject Russell's Principle, allow semantic action at epistemic distance 
and furthermore deny that Frege's Puzzle needs to be solved. This is the position 
adopted by Wettstein, 1991, Ch. 11. 
To my mind the first option is the most attractive, and whilst I do not pretend to have 
such an account readily available, I have some confidence that the notion of sense can 
be saved by producing an epistemic condition on reference which falls well short of 
Russell's Principle. My current point is simply that Evans has surely overstated the 
case for Russell's Principle in claiming that its rejection amounts to the rejection of 
sense. 
Given the rejection of Russell's Principle, we have no problem in allowing 
subjects to entertain non-fundamental `I'-Ideas. This allows us to account for all the 
supposed cases of reference failure mentioned in the previous section, and so the 
challenge posed by Evans' account of self-identification to the tight conceptual 
connection between self-consciousness and self-reference can be put aside. Evans has 
not managed to show that there could be a self-conscious subject who failed to satisfy 
whatever conditions there are on self-reference. 
35 In chapter six I offer an extremely weak epistemic condition on reference. 
This has nothing to do 
with the notion of sense however. 
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4. Embodied Experience 
4.1 Bodily-Awareness 
The Body Claim links self-consciousness and embodied experience. In the preceding 
chapters I have said a great deal about self-consciousness but very little about 
embodied experience. Common wisdom says that we have five senses; sight, hearing, 
smell, taste and touch. These senses provide us with a means of gaining information 
concerning the world around us. But in addition to these we possess certain means of 
gaining information about our own bodies. These include our awareness of the 
position, orientation, movement and size of our limbs (proprioception and 
kinaesthesia), our sense of balance, and our awareness of bodily sensations such as 
pains, tickles and sensations of pressure and temperature. We can group these together 
under the heading 'bodily-awareness'. In this section I will argue briefly for three 
claims concerning bodily-awareness. First, bodily-awareness is an awareness of one's 
own body. Second, bodily sensations are experienced as located in or on one's body. 
Third, in bodily-awareness one is aware of one's own body as one's own body. 
The first of these claims, may seem to be a truism, but I take it to be 
controversial in two respects. First, there are philosophers who would argue that 
bodily-awareness cannot be treated as a unitary phenomenon at all, and second there 
are those who would argue that bodily-awareness cannot be treated as a form of 
awareness of an objective part of the world. In support of the first of these objections 
it might be pointed out that the various phenomena that I have picked out as 
components of bodily-awareness are disparate in nature, and are subserved by a 
multitude of information processing systems. Furthermore, there is no organ of 
bodily-awareness. What sense is there, then, to speak of a unified phenomenon of 
bodily-awareness? This objection is easily met, however. For bodily-awareness is 
unified phenomenologically. The various ways of gaining information of our own 
bodies that I have grouped together are unified in their providing the subject with an 
awareness of the body `from the inside". I can be aware of my body through, 
for 
instance, vision but this awareness of the body is from the outside. The phenomena 
1 See Martin, 1993. 
79 
grouped together as bodily-awareness, on the other hand, do not provide an awareness 
of the body from a perspective external to the body itself. Thus, we are justified in 
speaking of the unified phenomenon of bodily-awareness. 
The second objection is that bodily-awareness does not constitute an 
awareness of the body2. Philosophers who have made this claim have tended to 
concentrate on bodily sensations. On this view bodily-sensations are subjective states 
which are located entirely within the mind. Bodily sensations do not represent, and so 
provide the subject with no access to, the objective world3. Further, the proponent of 
this view is likely to maintain that our judgements of our own bodily position and 
orientation are not based on an awareness of the body; that we have `knowledge 
without observation' of the position and orientation of our limbs4. This view is 
sometimes supported by the observation that we do not judge the position and 
orientation of our bodies via an awareness of bodily-sensations5. But it should be 
pointed out that even if this last observation were true, it would still be consistent with 
the view that proprioception is a non-sensational, or not purely sensational, awareness 
of the body. 
This objection to the view that bodily-awareness is an awareness of the body 
is not convincing. As has been argued by several philosophers, there are good reasons 
for thinking that bodily-awareness involves an awareness of the objective body6. The 
most compelling reason to adopt this view is that, as O' Shaughnessy, 1980, has made 
clear, bodily sensations are presented as located within one's body. When one has a 
sensation of pain, there is an answer to the question of where it is that one feels it. 
Furthermore, that answer can only be given by stating a location in or on one's felt 
body. This lends plausibility to the view that bodily-awareness is an awareness of 
one's body as being, say, painful or hot etc. As Armstrong points out, adopting the 
view of bodily-awareness as an awareness of the body, allows us to say that 
The locations of such sensations in the body is therefore an intentional location. To say that I have a 
sensation of pressure in the small of the back is to say that physical pressure seems to be occurring 
there. (Armstrong, 1968, p. 310). 
2 Some would allow that bodily-awareness is an awareness of the body but maintain that it is not a 
perceptual awareness. I remain neutral on this issue. 
See McGinn, 1982, pp. 8-9. 
4 This claim is particularly associated with Anscombe, 1957 & 1962. 
5 See Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. II, §viii. 
6 See Armstrong, 1962 & 1968, Ch. 14; O'Shaughnessy, 1980, Vol. 1, Ch. 5; and Martin, 1993 & 1995. 
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The view of bodily-awareness as purely subjective has a far more difficult time 
accounting for this felt location of sensation. If bodily sensations are purely 
subjective, qualitative states with no intentional content, it is difficult to see how one 
arrives at the bodily location of the sensation. The most natural suggestion seems to 
be that each bodily location is associated with a distinctive qualia, or qualitative feel. 
But this seems incredible. For if the location of sensation is to accounted for in this 
way it rules out the possibility of one's having phenomenologically identical 
sensations in two distinct bodily locations. But on having one's ears pierced, say, it 
would seem that the pain in each ear is exactly the same, differing only in felt 
location7. 
If this is right, we should admit that bodily sensations have spatial content. 
When one has a bodily sensation one feels as if something is happening in a particular 
part of one's body. Once this is admitted there is surely no objection to the claim that 
proprioception and kinaesthesia have spatial content also. Thus, the first two claims to 
be made out in this section are justified: first that bodily-awareness is an awareness of 
one's own body, second that bodily sensations have a felt location. The third of the 
claims to be made in this section, that in bodily awareness one is presented with one's 
body as one's body, is closely tied up with the first two. The idea is that bodily 
sensations are not simply presented as located in some body or other. Rather they are 
presented as located in one 's own body. If I feel a pain in a neck, I thereby feel that I 
have a pain in my necks. Through bodily-awareness whatever I am aware of appears 
to me to be (a part of) my own body. Martin understands this claim as the following, 
Any region in which it seems to one that one could now be feeling sensation will thereby feel to one to 
fall within one of one's boundaries (Martin, 1995, p. 271). 
Thus, bodily-awareness is an awareness of one's body which comes hand in hand 
with a `sense of ownership'. When I am aware of a body through bodily-awareness 
that body thereby feels to be my body. This is another way of saying that through 
bodily-awareness I am presented with my body as my body. This, then, is embodied 
experience. We, each of us, have an awareness of our own bodies through which we 
See Martin, 1993, p. 208- 
8 This claim does not conflict with Wittgenstein's claim that "It is conceivable that I feel pain in a tooth 
in another man's mouth" (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 49), so long as the tooth feels to be one's own. 
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are aware of sensations as located in or on what is presented as one's own body. This 
is the core sense that each of us has of his or her own embodiment9. 
4.2 Bodily Self-Awareness 
I have outlined an account of bodily-awareness, but it might be thought that bodily- 
awareness is more than simply an awareness of one's body. Bodily-awareness might 
be thought of as a form of self-awareness; as bodily self-awareness. In the 
introduction and chapter one I distinguished between two conceptions of self- 
consciousness: self-awareness and first-person thought. I also pointed out (see fig. I in 
the introduction) that bodily self-awareness can be thought of as both a form of self- 
consciousness and a form of embodied experience. The aim of the present chapter is 
to evaluate that version of the Body Claim which argues that bodily self-awareness is 
a transcendental condition of first-person thought. The most prominent defender of 
this version of the Body Claim is Cassam. In Self and World, Cassam distinguishes 
between what he calls `three grades of apparent presence in the world', 
The first grade involves intuitive awareness of oneself as present in the world only geometrically, as 
something bodiless. The second grade involves awareness of oneself as a point of view which `has' a 
body... The third grade of presence involves intuitive awareness of oneself qua subject as a bodily 
presence in the world (Cassam, 1997, p. 58) 
This is a useful distinction. In the current terminology, we can think of Cassam's 
`third grade of apparent presence' as being just the same as bodily self-awareness. 
Thus, the claim under investigation is whether this third grade of presence is a 
transcendental condition of first-person thinking. Cassam argues at length that it is. I 
shall be arguing against Cassam on this issue. Bodily self-awareness is not a 
transcendental condition of self-consciousness. Furthermore, bodily self-awareness is 
not something which ordinary human beings enjoy. Since we are self-conscious, in 
the relevant sense, it could not possibly be a transcendental condition of self- 
consciousness. Whether the second grade of apparent presence in the world, that one 
experience oneself as `having' a body, is a transcendental condition of self- 
consciousness is a question to which I shall turn in the subsequent chapters. In the 
9 Of course there are countless other fascinating aspects to embodied experience not discussed here. 
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present section I give a rough understanding of what bodily self-awareness is 
supposed to be. In the following sections I argue first against the view that bodily self- 
awareness is required for self-consciousness, then against the view that there is such 
thing as bodily self-awareness at all. 
The idea under consideration is that bodily-awareness, the awareness that we 
have of our bodies `from the inside', constitutes a bodily form of self-awareness. This 
claim has be explicitly endorsed by Ayers, 1991, Brewer, 1995, Cassam, 1995a, & 
1997, Bermudez, 1998, and de Gaynesford 200210. Hence, we find Ayers saying that 
the physical or material self is.. . neither simply.. . the postulated subject of experience, nor simply.. . an 
ever-present object of experience, but... the presented subject of experience and action (Ayers, 1991, 
Vol. 2. p. 286) 
The claim here is not just that the body and the self are identical so, in being aware of 
one's body, one is aware of oneself. For this would be to obscure the claim that self- 
awareness is a special form of awareness through which one can be aware only of 
oneself. The claim is that we have a special introspective awareness of ourselves as 
bodily beings. As Cassam puts the point, 
introspective self-awareness is not just awareness or consciousness of what is in fact the subject of 
one's thoughts and perceptions... Rather, introspective self-awareness must be understood as awareness 
of oneself `qua subject' (Cassam, 1997, p. 4) 
This description of self-awareness as introspective helps make clear the sense in 
which Cassam et al are in direct opposition to Hume's famous scepticism concerning 
self-awareness (quoted in chapter one). Hume denies that there is such a thing as 
introspective self-awareness, Cassam maintains that there is and that it is constituted 
by bodily-awareness. This strong grade of apparent presence in the world is an 
experience of oneself not only as embodied, but as a body. Bodily-awareness, on this 
view, is not just an awareness of one's body, it is an awareness of one's body as an 
object which presents itself as oneself. 
10 The idea is, arguably, also present in Strawson, 1966a, and Evans, 1982, Ch. 7. Compare also Sutton 
Morris' claim that, "Hume, looking into himself, is unable to discover any continuing 
datum. He 
overlooks the most obvious candidate, one's continuing sense of 
being an embodied experiencer" 
(Sutton Morris, 1982, p. 217). Finally, compare Freud's well known claim that, The ego is first and 
foremost a bodily ego" (Freud, 1923, p. 364). 
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43 Cassam's Identity Argument 
Cassam, 1997, puts forward several arguments for the claim that bodily self- 
awareness is a transcendental condition of self-consciousness but, in the end, the only 
one he finds convincing is what he calls `the intuition version of the Identity 
Argument'. Cassam's argument is a transcendental argument. In the introduction I 
made the point that such arguments face a difficulty concerning the controversial 
relationship between conceivability and possibility (or inconceivability and 
necessity). I suggested that transcendental claims should be thought of as of the form 
`y without x is inconceivable' rather than of the form `x is a necessary condition of y'. 
Taking this on board, we should think of Cassam's identity argument as concluding 
that self-consciousness without embodied experience is inconceivable. I also said that 
I would mark this point by speaking of transcendental conditions. This is fine, but 
there is another well known worry concerning transcendental arguments that has not 
yet been mentioned. Transcendental arguments take y to be some feature of 
experience that is beyond sceptical doubt (in our case, the existence of self- 
consciousness). As such, they have often been used as a way of countering scepticism 
about condition x, for if y is beyond sceptical doubt and is inconceivable without x 
then it would appear that scepticism about x is inconceivable. But the validity of using 
transcendental arguments against the sceptic in this way has come in for a great deal 
of criticism. In particular, Stroud, 1968, has influentially argued that the most that we 
could expect a transcendental argument to show is that a given phenomenon is 
inconceivable without the belief that condition x obtains, rather than its being 
inconceivable without condition x actually obtaining 
Whilst this objection, if sustainable, is a major difficulty for many 
transcendental arguments, it should not overly worry any proponent of the arguments 
which are to be discussed in the following sections and chapters. To see this it is 
useful to distinguish between different kinds of transcendental argument' 
2. A 
distinction can be made between truth-directed, belief-directed, and experience- 
directed transcendental arguments. These distinctions can be fleshed out with 
reference to the Body Claim. A truth-directed transcendental argument would claim 
Also see Körner, 1969. One philosopher who disputes Stroud's objection 
is Peacocke, 1989. 
12 Here I follow Stern, 2000, pp-10-1 1. His own categorization, in turn, borrows from Peacocke, 1989, 
pp. 4-5, and Cassam, 1997, p. 33. 
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that it is a transcendental condition of self-consciousness that one be embodied. A 
belief-directed transcendental argument would argue that it is a transcendental 
condition of self-consciousness that one believe oneself to be embodied. Finally, an 
experience-directed directed transcendental argument would argue that it is a 
transcendental condition of self-consciousness that one experience oneself as 
embodied. The present point is that it is only to truth-directed transcendental 
arguments that Stroud's criticisms apply. Belief-directed and experience-directed 
transcendental arguments are not affected. Since the arguments discussed in the 
following sections are either experience or belief-directed transcendental arguments, 
Stroud's well known criticism is irrelevant to their success or failure'3 
We can now return to the identity argument, which is an experience-directed 
argument. Cassam begins by pointing out that, "a self-conscious subject must be 
capable of thinking of her experiences as her experiences, that is, of self-ascribing 
them" (pp. 118-9). This is, he claims, "at least one important element of what might be 
described as our intuitive notion of self-consciousness" (p. 119). Of course, this self- 
ascription cannot be merely accidental, as in Perry, 1979, but must be `qua subject'. 
Cassam then claims that it, "is a quite general truth that the ascription of experiences 
to an identical subject turns on the existence of some means of distinguishing the 
subject of such ascriptions as one object among others, because it is an even more 
general truth that a thinker will not count as having latched on to a particular item in 
the world and predicated something of it unless she has a capacity to distinguish the 
object of her judgement from all other things" (pp. 122-3). One way of distinguishing 
oneself from all other things involves knowing "what sort of thing one has referred 
to" (p. 123). But this kind of knowledge does not appear to be a transcendental 
condition on self-consciousness, since we can consider, "the Cartesian dualist who 
regards the persisting subject of her thoughts as an immaterial substance. This belief 
may well be philosophically indefensible ... 
but this surely has no bearing on her 
ability to think first-personally" (p. 127). That is, both dualists and materialists are 
self-conscious, even though at least one of them does not appear to know what sort of 
thing she is. So there must be a way of distinguishing oneself from all other things 
that does not presuppose that one know what sort of thing one is. The answer is that, 
13 In fact, this is only partly true. It will emerge that due to the peculiarities of the notion of self- 
awareness, if Cassam's identity argument is successful it implies the success of the corresponding 
truth-directed argument. 
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"awareness of the object [oneself] as a shaped, located, and solid `articulated unity' is 
what puts S in a position to `isolate' it and predicate something of it" (pp. 136-7). So, 
"The dualist satisfies a substantive `knowing which' requirement on self-reference 
because and only because she is intuitively aware of that to which she ascribes her 
experiences as an articulated physical unity" (p. 140). Thus, "Awareness of the subject 
of one's experiences as something with a determinate shape, as well as solidity and 
location, is a transcendental condition of consciousness of self-identity because it is in 
being aware of one's spatial properties that one satisfies the discrimination 
requirement on self-reference" (p. 142). This argument is complex, but can be, I think 
faithfully, represented in the following way: 
1) Self-consciousness involves the self-ascription of mental predicates, qua 
subject. 
2) The self-ascription of mental predicates qua subject involves having thoughts 
about oneself qua subject. 
3) It is not possible to think about an object unless one knows what thing one's 
thought is about. 
4) Knowing what object one's thought is about is a matter of being able to 
distinguish it from all other things. 
5) It is possible to have thoughts about oneself qua subject even if one does not 
know (or truly believe) what sort of thing one is. 
6) The only way in which one can distinguish an object from all other things 
when one does not know what sort of thing it is, is through an experiential 
awareness of it as shaped, located and solid. 
7) Being experientially aware of something as shaped, located and solid is being 
experientially aware of it as a physical object. 
So, 
8) Being experientially aware of oneself qua subject as a physical object is a 
transcendental condition of self-consciousness. 
Each of these steps could use a little explanation. (1) is a consequence of the fact that 
self-consciousness is being understood as the capacity to think self-consciously. 
Thinking self-consciously is the capacity to think `I'-thoughts, and this means being 
able to ascribe mental predicates to oneself, as Cassam says, qua subject. (2) simply 
86 
makes the point that a subject who can self-ascribe predicates in thought is able to 
entertain thoughts about themselves. `I'-thoughts are thoughts about oneself. (3) 
expresses the seeming truism that there is a sense in which one must know what it is 
that one is thinking about. If one does not know what one is thinking about then one 
cannot be thinking about it. (4) gives a particular gloss on what it means to say that 
one knows what it is that one is thinking about. (5) appears to follow from the fact 
that both the dualist and the materialist, at least one of whom does not appear to know 
what kind of thing he or she is, can think self-consciously. (6) explains how it is that 
one is able to do this - via perceptual acquaintance. (7) gives a plausible sufficient 
condition of being aware of something as a physical object. (8) can clearly be read as 
the claim that bodily self-awareness is a transcendental condition of self- 
consciousness. Cassam's argument is, of course, deeply influenced by a line of 
thought found in Strawson, 
It is a quite general truth that the ascription of different states or determinations to an identical subject 
turns on the existence of some means of distinguishing or identifying the subject of such ascriptions as 
one object among others. Applying this general truth to the case before us, we may say, in Kant's 
terminology, that the possibility of ascribing experiences to a subject of experiences and hence the 
possibility of self-ascription of experiences requires that there be some "determinate intuition" 
corresponding to the concept of a subject of experiences (Strawson, 1966a, p. 102). 
Despite its heritage, there are serious problems with Cassam's identity argument. The 
first is that, taken together, (3) and (4) amount to an acceptance of Russell's Principle, 
about which I have already expressed serious doubts. Since I have already argued 
against Russell's Principle, I shall not labour the point here. It is, however, important 
to note that Cassam's position is peculiarly unstable in this respect. For, if Russell's 
Principle is correct, there is some reason for thinking that (2) will not follow from (1). 
For an acceptance of Russell's Principle can lead us, as we saw in the last chapter, to 
deny that self-consciousness requires the capacity for self-reference14. Thus, in 
Cassam's identity argument we see the ambiguous role of Russell's Principle in full 
effect. On the one hand, the argument explicitly relies on Russell's Principle, on the 
14 One might respond to this worry by claiming that Russell's Principle can be made consistent with a 
tight conceptual connection between self-consciousness and self-reference if one thinks that a subject 
can identify descriptively itself as the thinker of this thought' (see chapter three, n. 22). 
But this move 
would deprive Cassam's argument of premise (6). 
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other the proponent of the argument must feel some pressure to reject Russell's 
Principle. 
The second problem concerns the relationship between Cassam's argument 
and Cartesian dualism. Cassam's project is approached with a sharp distinction 
between metaphysics and epistemology. His view is that bodily-self-awareness is a 
transcendental condition of self-consciousness, and that this is a purely 
epistemological/conceptual claim. It neither rests on, nor entails, any substantive 
metaphysical doctrine. That is, the claim is experience-directed not truth-directed. 
However, it may well figure as one consideration in an argument against a dualist 
conception of the self. This is expressed in the following, 
The issue is not whether the subject is a physical thing but whether it is experienced as a physical thing. 
The claim that the bodily self is the presented subject of experience would be compatible with 
maintaining that the subject is in fact non-physical (Cassam, 1997, p. 58) 
The problem with this is that Cassam's argument tacitly relies on the claim that the 
self is a physical object. Being aware of oneself as shaped, located and solid could 
only be a way of distinguishing oneself from all other things if one is, in fact, shaped, 
located and solid. If, say, one is a non-physical soul, then being aware of something as 
shaped, located and solid, could not be a way of distinguishing oneself from all other 
things. But this means that, pace Cassam, the argument will fail if Cartesian dualism 
is true. Cassam raises what is essentially this objection himself but his reply is 
inadequate as it assumes that bodily-awareness is bodily-self-awareness. He writes, 
The point... is that the bodily self is not a `mere' object but a `subject-object'; it is the presented subject 
of perception and thought, so awareness of its boundaries is at the same time awareness of one's own 
boundaries qua subject of perception of thought. (Cassam, 1997, p. 142) 
That is, there are independently plausible reasons to think that bodily-awareness is 
bodily self-awareness, so awareness of the body is awareness of the presented subject. 
But this is, dialectically speaking, a dubious move. Cassam's argument is intended to 
show that bodily self-awareness is a transcendental condition of self-consciousness. 
Since this is the case, he is not at liberty to assume that the self-conscious subjects he 
takes his claim to be true of are such as to enjoy bodily self-awareness. For this is 
exactly what is to be shown. 
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Even if such a move were acceptable, it is quite unclear how it is relevant. For, 
supposing that the body is `the presented subject of perception and thought', the 
question remains as to whether things are as they are presented. If they are, then the 
self is a physical object. If they are not, then it is obscure how being aware of 
something which is presented as the self, but which is not in fact the self, could 
suffice as a way of distinguishing the self from all other things. For one is precisely 
not aware of the self. So, again, it seems that the argument will only convince those 
who believe that the self is a physical object. Not only that, since this is a 
transcendental argument attempting to spell out the transcendental conditions of self- 
consciousness per se, it will only convince those who believe that it is necessarily so 
that the self is a physical object. 
Another way of putting this point, is that whilst Cassam's argument is 
experience-directed, the peculiarities of the notion of self-awareness are such that this 
experience-directed argument could only be successful if the corresponding truth- 
directed argument were successful also. That is, experience of one's body as oneself 
could only be a transcendental condition of self-consciousness if one's body being 
oneself were such a condition. And it is this claim that has not been argued for. 
All in all it must be concluded that Cassam's Identity argument is a failure. 
The major flaw in the argument is its unquestioning reliance on Russell's Principle. 
Even if Russell's Principle is accepted, there is reason to think that the identity 
argument is not as straightforward as Cassam believes. In the following section I give 
another reason for thinking that Cassam's argument should be rejected. There I argue 
that bodily-awareness is not a form of self-awareness. Since we are self-conscious 
beings, and we do not enjoy anything that might be described as bodily self- 
awareness, any transcendental argument which concludes that bodily self-awareness 
is a transcendental condition of self-consciousness is bound to fail. 
4.4 Bodily-Awareness and Self-Awareness15 
The idea under consideration is that bodily-awareness is a form of self-awareness. 
This bodily-awareness as self-awareness claim can be evaluated independently of any 
transcendental arguments. What is required is a reasonably plausible set of conditions 
15 The arguments given in this and the following section owe a great deal to Martin, 1995 and 1997. 
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that a form of awareness must meet in order to count as a form of self-awareness. We 
can then go on to ask whether bodily-awareness is such as to satisfy these conditions. 
The best attempt to give such a set of conditions is made by Cassam, 
For a form of awareness to count as awareness of something qua subject is for it to be (i) awareness of 
it as one's point of view on the world, (ii) awareness of it as a bearer of sensations, and (iii) awareness 
on the basis of which it is possible to make first-person statements that are immune to error through 
misidentification relative to `I' (Cassam, 1997, p. 77) 
For the sake of argument, I grant that these three conditions are clearly specified, that 
they are necessary conditions of self-awareness, and that they are met by bodily- 
awareness. My claim is that these conditions are not jointly sufficient conditions of 
self-awareness. There is another necessary condition of self-awareness which is 
clearly not met by bodily-awareness. It follows from this that bodily-awareness does 
not qualify as a form of self-awareness' 6. 
I take, as my starting point, the claim that at least the central cases of self- 
consciousness involve self-reference. It is a priori that at least those central cases of 
`I'-thoughts refer to whoever produces them. Furthermore, this is no accidental 
feature of `I'-thoughts, rather it is part of the concept of the first-person. When I think 
about myself in the first-person it is both a priori and manifest to me that I am 
thinking about myself. Now, if there is such a thing as self-awareness it is compelling 
to think that it serves to ground at least some central first-person judgements. After all 
it is difficult to see what other reason one could have for postulating such a thing. But 
this means that self-awareness must ground judgements which have a priori 
guaranteed self-reference. It must ground judgements which are manifestly about 
myself. But if a form of awareness is to ground judgements which are manifestly and 
a priori about object 0, then that form of awareness must manifestly and a priori be an 
awareness of 0. Applying this in the present case, if bodily-awareness is to count as a 
form of self-awareness not only must it be true that the object of bodily-awareness 
(which we can assume is the body") is the self, but this must be a priori and manifest 
to the subject of such an awareness. Self-awareness is such that it should not be 
16 Cassam disagrees, writing "While the possibility that there are independently plausible further 
conditions cannot be ruled out, it would be unwise. . . to expect too much 
from this line of thought. " 
(Cassam, 1997, p. 77). 
17 But see Martin, 1995, and, 1997, for a note of caution on this point. 
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rationally open for the subject to wonder whether the object he or she is aware of is 
him or herself. 
The first thing to note here is that the bodily-awareness as self-awareness 
claim, pace Cassam, relies on an a priori identification of the body and the self. An 
object could only satisfy all the conditions on being presented as the self if it is, in 
fact, the self' 8. Thus, the claim rests on the denial of Cartesian dualism. It is no 
surprise then, that Cassam's argument for the version of the Body Claim which 
involves bodily self-awareness tacitly relies on the denial of dualism. Since Cartesian 
dualism isn't exactly a popular theory these days, this might not be thought to be a 
serious problem. But there is another, much more pressing, difficulty. 
If bodily-awareness is to count as self-awareness, it must be manifest to the 
subject of such an awareness that the object so observed is the self. But this condition 
is not met in the case of bodily-awareness. It is perfectly reasonable to wonder 
whether the object with which I am presented through bodily-awareness is the self, or 
something closely related but non-identical to the self. This is supported by the 
following observation. Self-ascriptions based on bodily-awareness can be expressed 
linguistically in two ways. One can say `I have crossed legs' or `I ache all over', but 
one can equally well say `My legs are crossed' or `My body aches all over'. This 
substitution is always possible19. The point is that it looks plausible to say that the 
content of the perceptions one has of one's own body in bodily-awareness are of the 
form `My body is F", rather than the form `I am F. That is, through bodily-awareness 
my body is presented to me as my body, but not as myself. 
A plausible account of what self-awareness must be tells us that when I am 
aware of myself, I know it is myself that I am aware of in this way. But this just isn't 
true of bodily-awareness. When I perceive my body, through bodily-awareness I do 
know that it is my body that I perceive. But it is clearly open for me to doubt that my 
body is myself. Bodily-awareness does not ground judgements which are manifestly 
and a priori about the self. Therefore, bodily-awareness does not constitute a form of 
self-awareness. 
18 It is a virtue of Bermudez, 1998, p. 135, and de Gaynesford, 2002, that they rest their arguments for 
the bodily-awareness as self-awareness claim on the premise that `the self is embodied'. As will 
become clear in the following discussion, this is not enough to save bodily self-awareness. 
19 Note that one can't do this for mental self-ascriptions or non-mental self-ascriptions that are not 
based on bodily-awareness. `My brain thinks it is going to rain' is as nonsensical as 
is `My body was 
born in 1976'. 
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It will be useful to return briefly to immunity to error through 
misidentification. Both Cassam and Bermudez claim that self-ascriptions based on 
bodily-awareness are immune to error through misidentification. Furthermore they 
think that this fact is strong evidence for their view that bodily-awareness is a form of 
self-awareness. Whilst they do not claim that it is a sufficient condition of the doctrine 
of bodily self-awareness, both do tend to suppose that it is the most important claim to 
make out in a defence of that view. For example, Bermudez says that, 
the fact that somatic proprioception [bodily-awareness] is itself immune to error through 
misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun provides vital support for the claim that somatic 
proprioception counts as a genuine form of self-consciousness [self-awareness] (Bermudez, 1998, 
p. 144) 
The point of the present considerations is to show that this is not the case. I argued in 
chapter two that a judgement will be IEM if it is based on a single-object faculty. It 
may well be that bodily-awareness is a single-object faculty. But this is perfectly 
compatible with the claim that the body and the self are distinct. This point is 
particularly clear when we notice that even the Cartesian dualist can admit that self- 
ascriptions based on bodily-awareness are immune to error through misidentification. 
For the dualist can happily allow that bodily-awareness is necessarily an awareness of 
one's own body only. That does not contradict Cartesian dualism. The dualist will 
simply go on to claim that the single object in question is not identical to the self. But, 
of course, the dualist will strenuously deny that bodily-awareness is a form of 
introspective self-awareness. 
The temptation to argue from the fact that self-ascriptions based on bodily- 
awareness are immune to error through misidentification is simply a new application 
of a temptation noted by both Wittgenstein, 1958, and Strawson, 1966a, and dubbed 
`the Cartesian Illusion'20. In The Bounds of Sense Strawson wrote, 
And now we come to the fact that lies at the root of the Cartesian illusion. It may be put as follows. 
When a man (a subject of experience) ascribes a current or directly remembered state of consciousness 
to himself, no use whatever of any criteria of personal identity is required to justify the use of the 
pronoun `I' to refer to the subject of that experience. It would make no sense to think or say: 
This inner 
20 See chapter two, n. 9. 
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experience is occurring, but is it occurring to me? (This feeling is anger; but is it I who am feeling 
it? )... It is easy to become intensely aware of the immediate character, of the purely inner basis, of such 
self-ascription... Thus there arises a certain illusion: the illusion of a purely inner and yet subject- 
referring use for T. (Strawson, 1966a, pp. 164-6). 
Here Strawson suggests that it is a misunderstanding of the IEM of mental self- 
ascriptions which tempts philosophers towards the view that we are introspectively 
aware of the soul, i. e. the claim that there is such a thing as mental self-awareness. 
But there is a more economical explanation available of the IEM of introspection- 
based self-ascriptions. This is the, extremely plausible, claim that introspection is a 
single object faculty. In a similar vein the fact that self-ascriptions based on bodily- 
awareness are IEM does not show that bodily-awareness is a form of self-awareness. 
All we need to allow is that bodily-awareness is a single-object faculty; that it is 
necessarily an awareness of only one object, one's own body. Thus the Cartesian 
illusion diagnosed by Strawson has a parallel Anti-Cartesian Illusion. Consideration 
of the notions of self-awareness, bodily-awareness and immunity to error through 
misidentification tells us to avoid both in equal measure. 
4.5 Bodily Sensations 
There is another argument for the bodily-awareness as bodily-self-awareness claim 
which, if sound, should lead us to re-evaluate the considerations of the previous 
section. This argument concerns the nature of bodily sensations, and is due to Brewer, 
1995. In a way, Brewer's argument is more ambitious than Cassam's, in that it 
attempts to derive the metaphysical conclusion that the body is the self. His argument 
is summarized in the following, 
In bodily-awareness, one is aware of determinately spatially located properties of the body that are also 
necessarily properties of the basic subject of that very awareness ... a psychological property of oneself 
is physically located in or on the body, as a property of the body. Therefore... the animal body is the 
conscious mental subject of bodily awareness (Brewer, 1995, p. 300) 
The idea in play here is that bodily sensations are intrinsically spatial in character 
since they are perceived as located. They are perceived as located properties of the 
body. This idea is familiar, and I offered a brief defense of it above. Furthermore, 
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claims Brewer, bodily sensations are mental properties. They are necessarily 
properties of the subject of experience. It follows that the body is the subject of 
experience, and in bodily-awareness one is aware of the body as the subject of 
experience. 
The argument is strikingly simple, but what are we to make of it? I have 
already defended the first claim, and so do not intend to challenge it on that account. 
The question to answer is whether bodily sensations (conceived of as located, 
subjective and mind-dependent properties) are necessarily properties of the subject of 
experience. The problem for Brewer is that we have yet to be given a reason to 
answer this question in the affirmative. As Martin, 1997, p. 135, has pointed out, there 
is an analogy to be drawn here with colours. On certain views of colours, to perceive 
an object as red is to perceive redness in that object. Furthermore, an object is red if 
and only if it is being perceived as red. That is, according to some philosophers, we 
attribute subjective, mind-dependent, properties to objects distinct from ourselves. So, 
the fact that we attribute subjective properties to our bodies does not show that the 
body is, or is experienced as, the self. The claim that Brewer has not made out is that 
it is impossible for the body to be the possessor of subjective properties without it 
thereby being the self. As Gardner writes, in a slightly different connection, 
Although sensation may be taken to show the existence of a point at which the inner touches the outer 
and, perhaps, the existence of irreducibly psycho-physical phenomena, it does not supply the idea of 
mind as incarnate in and, as Descartes put it, coextensive with body (Gardner, 1994, p44) 
4.6 Experience and Belief 
I have been arguing against the claim that bodily self-awareness is a transcendental 
condition of self-consciousness. Not only have I been arguing that experiencing 
oneself as a body is not a transcendental condition of self-consciousness, I have 
maintained that experience of oneself as a body is not something that we actually 
enjoy. All this might be accepted and yet it be thought that something akin to the 
strong (bodily self-awareness) version of the Body Claim is correct. That is, it might 
be claimed that it is a transcendental condition of self-consciousness that one believes 
that one is a physical object. Whilst one is not required to have experience of oneself 
as a body, one must believe oneself to be so. The quick response to this belief- 
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directed argument is to point out that there are, and have been, actual people who are 
self-conscious in the relevant sense, but who do not believe, or have not believed, 
themselves to be physical objects. We should not want to prove a priori that the 
Cartesian Meditator lacks the resources to think his famous `'-thoughts 2 1. 
But maybe a more subtle approach can be taken. Campbell suggests that his 
own position entails that to be self-conscious you must "think of yourself as a 
physical thing" (Campbell, 1997, p. 660). If this means believing yourself to be a 
physical thing I think it is false for the reason given above. But I think it doubtful that 
this is what Campbell does mean. In Campbell's view, `thinking of oneself as a 
physical object' is a matter of having a conception of oneself as a physical object. 
And this may well be compatible with failing to believe that one is a physical object. 
Especially given that such a conception may be very much implicit22. Campbell's 
view is that self-consciousness requires that one grasp, 
one's own causal structure... [this involves] grasp of the idea that one's later states causally depend, in 
part, on one's earlier states... [and] the idea that one can function as a common cause of various 
correlated events around one (Campbell, 1994a, pp. 1-2) 
This kind of causal structure, according to Campbell, is "characteristic of physical 
objects" (Campbell, 1993, pp. 92-3). More than this, to be thinking of something as a 
physical object, one must think of it as having this kind of causal structure. But it 
should be noted that even if we accept that to think of something as a physical object 
one must think of it as causally structured, it is not obvious that thinking of something 
as causally structured means that one must be thinking of it as a physical object. Thus, 
to show that self-consciousness requires one to think of oneself as causally structured, 
is not yet to show that self-consciousness requires one to think of oneself as a physical 
object. It is not obviously incoherent to claim that thinking of oneself as causally 
structured could be a matter of thinking of oneself as being mentally causally 
structured, and also as `having' a body through which one can function as a common 
cause of events around one. Thinking of oneself as causally structured in Campbell's 
sense would appear to be perfectly compatible with thinking of oneself as a Cartesian 
soul. Thinking of oneself as causally structured may be thinking of oneself as a thing, 
21 See Cassam, 1997, p. 128. 
22 See Campbell, 1997, p. 662. 
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but it need not be thinking of oneself as a physical thing. Thus, I don't think that 
Campbell's view should be regarded as an attempt to put forward a belief version of 
the Body Claim23. 
4.7 Interlude 
We have arrived at a point at which it is convenient to stop and take stock of the 
situation. The fact that there is a tight conceptual connection between self- 
consciousness and self-reference implies that a self-conscious being must satisfy 
whatever conditions there are on self-reference. Cassam has argued that a 
transcendental condition of self-reference is that one is experientially aware of oneself 
qua subject as a physical object. If this were true, it would show that the third, 
strongest, form of apparent presence in the world is a transcendental condition of self- 
consciousness. However, Cassam's argument fails. Experience of oneself qua subject 
as a physical object is not even something that we enjoy, and so it cannot be a 
transcendental condition of self-consciousness. Furthermore, there is reason to think 
that it is not a transcendental condition of self-consciousness that one believe oneself 
to be, or think of oneself as, a physical object. 
But all is not lost for the proponent of the Body Claim. Even if the third grade 
of apparent presence in the world cannot be established, maybe the second grade can. 
That is, maybe it is a transcendental condition of self-consciousness that one 
experiences (or believes) oneself to `have' a body. The remainder of the thesis will be 
concerned with arguments that attempt to show that everyday bodily-awareness is a 
transcendental condition of self-consciousness. I begin with considerations that can be 
drawn from the work of Strawson. I argue that although Strawson's own arguments 
are not successful, they point us in a fruitful direction. I go on to formulate `the self- 
location argument', which does manage to find an acceptable transcendental condition 
on self-consciousness, albeit a rather minimal one. However, the self-location 
argument does not get us so far as the Body Claim. Before we can endorse the Body 
Claim we need to supplement the self-location argument. I consider what I take to be 
23 Campbell often appears to offer transcendental arguments. However I think that this appearance 
is 
somewhat misleading. His work seems to me to be better thought of as mapping out relations 
between 
concepts given certain empirical assumptions. For instance he writes, "Those who 
have experiences of 
which we know nothing may be able to think in ways of which we 
know nothing", (Campbell, 2002, 
p. 1). 
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the two most plausible ways of doing this. These are `the solidity argument' and `the 
action argument'. However, it will be shown that if the self-location argument is 
extended into either the solidity argument or the action argument, it fails. 
Something of positive value can be salvaged out of these negative results, 
however. For, unlike the third grade, the second grade of apparent presence in the 
world is one that we ourselves actually enjoy. And both the solidity and the action 
arguments, if supplemented with certain empirically grounded truths about our own 
situation, have some merit. This is, I suggest, what accounts for their initial attraction. 
Of course, taken in this way, the arguments no longer count as properly 
transcendental. They no longer map out strictly transcendental connections between 
concepts or conceptual capacities. But, it will be argued, they are still of interest, both 
in the journey they take us on, and in the more modest conclusions they reach. 
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5. Strawson 
In the previous chapter I argued against the strong version of the Body Claim, which 
states that bodily self-awareness is a transcendental condition of self-consciousness. 
The weak version of the Body Claim states that bodily-awareness is a transcendental 
condition of self-consciousness. The aim of the present chapter is to unearth and 
critically evaluate those arguments for this view that can be found in the work of 
Strawson. This is appropriate, since it was the publication of Strawson's Individuals 
and The Bounds of Sense which did much to popularise the use of transcendental 
arguments, particularly those which aim to state transcendental conditions of self- 
consciousness. There are at least three arguments to be found in Strawson's work 
which might be used by the proponent of the Body Claim. A related argument is put 
forward by Bennett, 1966. I shall be arguing that none of these are convincing. 
However, as we shall see in the next chapter, one of Strawson's arguments contains 
some materials which can be reused in a better argument: the self-location argument. 
5.1 The Objectivity Condition 
Strawson, 1966a, Pt. 2, Ch. 2, offers at least two arguments for the claim that a self- 
conscious subject must satisfy what he calls `the objectivity condition'. Strawson, 
1959, Ch. 2, argues that a subject can only satisfy the objectivity condition on the 
supposition that that subject enjoys spatial experience. If these claims can be 
sustained we are, it might be thought, well on our way to establishing the Body Claim. 
For there are arguments (specifically, the action argument, and the solidity argument, 
to be discussed in chapters seven and eight respectively) which purport to show that 
any self-conscious subject that enjoys spatial experience is such as to enjoy embodied 
experience. We must, then, enquire into this argument. In fact, we shall only here be 
concerned with the first step. For, as I shall be arguing, Strawson fails to make a 
convincing case for the claim that satisfaction of the objectivity condition is a 
transcendental condition of self-consciousness. 
The first task is to clarify the objectivity condition itself. Strawson actually 
defines the objectivity condition in two non-equivalent ways. The first of these is in 
terms of a `non-solipsistic consciousness'. A subject satisfies the objectivity condition 
98 
if it has a non-solipsistic consciousness. Strawson describes the relevant notion as 
follows, 
I shall mean by a non-solipsistic consciousness, the consciousness of a being who has a use for the 
distinction between himself and his states on the one hand, and something not himself or a state of 
himself, of which he has experience, on the other (Strawson, 1959, p. 69) 
So, on this reading of the objectivity condition (OC 1), the claim is that self- 
consciousness requires that one have a use for the distinction between oneself and 
one's states, and that which is not oneself or one of one's states'. Two things should 
be noted about this reading. The first is that the phrase `must have a use for the 
distinction' is rather vague, and could be cashed out in a variety of ways. On a strong 
reading, it might mean `must actually (and correctly) apply the distinction'. 
Alternatively it could mean `must believe there to be such a distinction'. Third, it 
might mean `must have experience such as to justify the application of such a 
distinction'. Finally, it could mean `must have the conceptual resources required to 
understand/make the distinction'. I will not, here, adjudicate between these readings, 
but simply suggest that something like a combination of the third and fourth readings 
is what Strawson has in mind. The idea is that if one is self-conscious one must have 
the conceptual sophistication to make judgements which involve the self/world 
distinction. Furthermore, one could only have this capacity if one's experience were 
such as to justify judgements that involve that distinction. Strawson's view seems to 
be that one's conceptual repertoire is constrained by one's experiential situation. The 
range of one's conceptual repertoire cannot vastly outstrip one's experience. We can, 
for the sake of argument, accept this as a premise2. 
The second point to bear in mind is that OC 1 seems to be concerned with 
mental self-ascription rather than both mental and physical. The states to which 
Strawson is referring are experiential states, belief states etc. The idea is that a self- 
conscious subject must be able to distinguish between its experiences and what those 
experiences are experiences of (or between its beliefs and what those beliefs are 
beliefs about). For example, the capacity to entertain the self-conscious thought `I can 
' This also appears to be the understanding of the objectivity condition in play in Bennett, 1966, §§32, 
33 & 51. 
2 This hierarchy of levels at which OC 1 can be pitched is also discernable with regards to OC2. I will 
refrain from making the same point again. 
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see an ostrich' presupposes the capacity to distinguish between one's experience of an 
ostrich and the actual ostrich. 
Strawson's second way of understanding the objectivity condition (OC2) is as 
follows: a subject who satisfies the objectivity condition is one who's experience is 
more than just a `pure sense-datum experience'. On this reading Strawson's claim is 
that a self-conscious subject cannot have a purely sense-datum experience. A purely 
sense-datum experience is characterised as one in which there is, 
no distinction to be drawn between the order and arrangement of the objects (and of their particular 
features and characteristics) and the order and arrangement of the subject's awareness of them 
(Strawson, 1966a, p. 99) 
A purely sense-datum experience is entirely subjective in character. We might think 
of it as consisting in nothing but a series of auditory and olfactory experiences3. The 
important point is that a purely sense-datum experience is one which does not allow 
for conceptualisation in terms of the seems/is distinction. On this reading, Strawson's 
claim is that a self-conscious subject could not have experience of just this type. 
Another way of putting OC2 is that a subject who satisfies the objectivity condition 
must have a use for the notion of existence unperceived. This is a construal of the 
objectivity condition which has been picked up by both Evans, 1980, and Cassam, 
1997. For example, Cassam writes that for one to satisfy the objectivity condition, 
is for one to be in a position to think of it [one's experience] as including perceptions of objects in the 
`weighty' sense, that is, particular items which are capable of being perceived and of existing 
unperceived (Cassam, 1997, p. 28) 
The notion of existence unperceived comes in a package with the seems/is distinction. 
If one is in a position to think of the objects of one's experience as having an order 
and arrangement different to the order and arrangement of one's experiences, then one 
must be in a position to think of the objects of one's experience as enjoying some sort 
3 Strawson includes "red, round patches, brown oblongs, flashes, whistles, tickling sensations, smells. " 
(Strawson, I966a, p. 99). This list is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, as I argued in chapter four, 
bodily sensations are felt as located and are not entirely subjective states. Second, since the aim is to 
argue for the thesis that a self-conscious subject must have spatial experience, it begs the question to 
assume that the subject has (spatial) visual experience. One should not start one's journey from the 
place at which one wishes to arrive! 
100 
of unperceived existence. For instance, if one experiences the temporally ordered 
series of smells {nice-nasty-nice}, and one has the capacity to conceive that the 
objects of experience might actually have been ordered {nice-nice-nasty}, then 
one must be in a position to think of {nice} as having existed unperceived. The 
converse also holds, since if something exists unperceived, its order and arrangement 
will necessarily differ from the order and arrangement of one's experience of it. 
Strawson and his commentators tend to treat OC 1 and OC2 as equivalent, but 
they are wrong to do so. The equivalence of OC 1 and OC2 is something which is far 
from obvious, and would therefore need to be argued for. To see that OC2 does not 
entail OC 1 one can suppose that one has experience solely of oneself and one's states, 
and that one can conceive of one's own states existing unperceived (e. g. a not- 
presently-conscious belief), or even of oneself existing unperceived (e. g. when one is 
asleep). Here, although one satisfies OC2, one does not satisfy OC 1, i. e. one can 
distinguish between the order and arrangement of one's experience of oneself and the 
order and arrangement of oneself. But since one's experience is solely of oneself and 
one's states, one has no use for the distinction between oneself and one's states and 
that which is not oneself or one's states. Thus, one can have a use for the seems/is 
distinction without having a use for the self/world distinction. Nor does OC 1 entail 
OC2. One might have a use for the self/world distinction, and yet be in no position to 
conceptualise the possibility that that which is other than oneself could exist whilst 
unperceived. One's experience might be so meagre as to fail to `make room for' the 
distinction between seeming and being. Thinking of something's existence as 
dependant upon one's perception of it is not the same as thinking of it as a state of 
oneself (consider, for example, the case of colour). So, having a use for the self/world 
distinction does not entail having a use for the seems/is distinction. 
Of course if Strawson is correct in claiming that a non-solipsistic 
consciousness (or a purely sense-datum experience) is not possible for a self- 
conscious subject, we will have to revise these claims. For such a subject could not 
have the sorts of experiences that I have just assumed are possible. Any experience 
would have to make room for the self/world (or the seems/is) distinction. But this is 
Strawson's conclusion and cannot be assumed at the outset. Since these different 
versions of the objectivity condition are in play, we must be careful in evaluating any 
argument for the claim that self-consciousness requires satisfaction of the objectivity 
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condition. We must be clear as to exactly which version of the objectivity condition, if 
any, is established. 
5.2 Sketch of an Over Hasty Argument 
It might be thought that there is a simple way of establishing that self-consciousness 
requires satisfaction of the objectivity condition (OC 1). Self-consciousness involves 
the thinking of 'F-thoughts. As such, self-conscious thoughts involve the concept I. 
That is, any self-conscious being can be attributed the concept myself. But a concept 
serves as a way of dividing up the world into two: that which falls under the concept 
and that which does not. Thus, if I possess the concept I, then I ipso facto possess the 
(complex) concept not-I. But if one is in possession of these two concepts then one 
satisfies the objectivity condition (OC 1). If one is in possession of the concepts 1 and 
not-I one has a use for the distinction between oneself and one's experiences, and that 
which is not oneself or one's experiences, of which one has experience (i. e. one is a 
subject with a non-solipsistic consciousness). Thus, a self-conscious subject must 
satisfy the objectivity condition. 
But the last step of this argument is too quick. Satisfaction of the objectivity 
condition (OC 1) does not follow from a subject's possession of the concepts I and 
not-I. A non-solipsistic consciousness is defined as one which has a use for the 
distinction between itself and its experiences and that which is not itself or its 
experiences. All we have secured is that a self-conscious being must have a use for 
the distinction between itself and that which is not itself. But a subject's experiences 
are not (are not identical to) itself. Thus, the use a subject has for the distinction 
between I and not-I may be exhausted by its capacity to distinguish between itself and 
its experiences. That is, having the capacity to make judgements using the concept 
not-I is not yet to have the capacity to make judgements involving that which is 
neither oneself nor any of one's experiences. 
5.3 Strawson's Objectivity Argument 
In presenting his objectivity argument Strawson claims to be offering a reconstruction 
of Kant's transcendental deduction and the related refutation of idealism. Whether 
Kant can really be interpreted in this is way is doubtful, but the objectivity argument 
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is very much interesting enough in its own right to be studied independently of its 
supposed Kantian heritage4. 
Strawson's objectivity argument attempts to show that any self-conscious 
subject must satisfy the objectivity condition. Strawson begins by making the 
connection, with which we are familiar, between self-consciousness and self- 
ascription. This he does via the notion of the unity of consciousness, "The condition 
under which diverse representations may be said to be united in a single 
consciousness is precisely the condition, whatever that may be, under which a subject 
of experiences may ascribe different experiences to himself, conscious of the identity 
of that to which these different experiences, at different times, belong. " (Strawson, 
1966a, pp. 95-6). Now, in order to self-ascribe experiences, one must be able to think 
of experiences as experiences. Strawson makes this claim by asserting that experience 
is necessarily self-reflexive, "What is meant by the necessary self-reflexiveness of a 
possible experience in general could be otherwise expressed by saying that experience 
must be such as to provide room for the thought of experience itself. " (Strawson, 
1966a, p. 107). Finally, Strawson claims that possessing this capacity to think about 
experience presupposes the satisfaction of the objectivity condition, "For `This is how 
things are (have been) experienced by me as being' presupposes `This is how things 
are (have been) experienced as being'; and the latter in turn presupposes a distinction, 
though not (usually) and opposition, between `This is how things are experienced as 
being' and `Thus and so is how things are"'. (Strawson, 1966a, p. 108). Strawson links 
this explicitly to the objectivity condition in the following, "The point of the 
objectivity-condition is that it provides room for this thought. It provides room, on the 
one hand, for `Thus and so is how things objectively are' and, on the other, for `This 
is how things are experienced as being'; and it provides room for the second thought 
because it provides room for the first. (Strawson, 1966a, p. 107). Thus, we have 
moved from the bare possibility of self-consciousness to the notion of a unified self- 
conscious subject satisfying the objectivity condition. We can reconstruct this 
argument as involving three central steps5: 
4 See Aquila, 1979, for doubts about the Strawsonian interpretation of Kant's transcendental deduction 
and, in particular, the refutation of idealism. 
5 It will be noticed that the following reconstruction makes no reference to the unity of consciousness. 
Indeed, I suggest that the unity of consciousness is a red herring in the context of the objectivity 
argument. This point is recognized in Rorty, 1970, p. 214. For different conceptions of, and attitudes 
towards, the unity of consciousness, see Brentano, 1973, Nagel, 1971, Henrich, 1989, Hurley, 1994, 
and Dainton, 2000. 
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(1) Self-consciousness involves the self-ascription of experiences. 
(2) The self-ascription of experiences is possible only because experience 
necessarily makes room for the thought of experience as experience. 
(3) Thinking of experience as experience requires satisfaction of the objectivity 
condition. 
This argument for the objectivity condition relies, claims Strawson, on less than it 
might. That is, it does not take advantage of the full transcendental conditions of self- 
consciousness. Strawson makes a distinction between personal and transcendental 
self-consciousness. Transcendental self-consciousness is identified with the necessary 
reflexiveness of experience and is, 
Something less than, though entailed by, the satisfaction of the full conditions of the possibility of 
empirical self-ascription of experiences... which yet really does constitute the essential core of personal 
self-consciousness. (Strawson, 1966a, p. 107) 
That the argument relies on transcendental self-consciousness, rather than personal 
self-consciousness, means that there are more resources available for a defence of the 
claim that self-consciousness requires the objectivity condition. We shall come back 
to this point in a discussion of another defence of the objectivity condition, offered by 
Strawson, which takes as its starting point personal rather than merely transcendental 
self-consciousness. 
There are a host of things that can be said with regards to Strawson's 
objectivity argument. As it stands it is far from transparent, and there are a variety of 
objections that might be raised. The first thing to note, however, is that the objectivity 
condition that is being argued for here is OC2. The conclusion is that a self-conscious 
subject must be able to make the distinction between `this is how things are' and `this 
is how things are experienced as being', that is they must be in possession of the 
seems/is distinction. But, as we have seen, it is not obvious that possession of this 
distinction entails possession of the self/world distinction. This is for the reason that 
one's experience might be solely of oneself and one's states, and whilst one can 
distinguish in thought between the way things are and the way things are experienced 
as being, this distinction could be exhausted by one's being able to distinguish in 
thought between how ones is and how one experiences oneself as being. Thus, the 
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objectivity argument as presented is an argument from transcendental self- 
consciousness to the objectivity condition, conceived of as OC26. 
The first objection to Strawson's objectivity argument is that the abstraction 
from personal to transcendental self-consciousness is an illegitimate move. This 
objection has been made by Cassam, 1997, Ch. 3. Cassam's concern is that Strawson's 
own view of the conditions of reference to experiential states undermines the very 
notion of transcendental self-consciousness. Strawson's view on experiences is the 
following, 
states of consciousness, or private experiences... cannot be thus identifyingly referred to except as the 
states or experiences of some identified person. States, or experiences, one might say, owe their identity 
as particulars to the identity of the person whose states or experiences they are. (Strawson, 1959, p. 97) 
Strawson takes it that this means that in order to know which experience one is 
referring to one must know which person that experience belongs to. Cassam now 
states his objection, 
To suppose that transcendental self-consciousness can be abstracted from personal self-consciousness 
is... to suppose that the thought of experiences as experiences is intelligible independently of the 
thought that they belong to a subject who is an object among others in the world. This `independent 
intelligibility thesis' is, however, precisely what Strawson's own conception of the identity of 
experiences appears to call into question. (Cassam, 1997, p. 107). 
This objection is misguided, for the following reason. Strawson's position on the 
identity of experiences involves, at least, two claims: (i) experiences are necessarily 
owned by subjects of experience, and (ii) in order to refer to an experience one must 
refer, or be in a position to refer, to the subject whose experience it is. The reason why 
the objection is misguided is that at no point does the proponent of Strawson's 
objectivity argument need to reject either of these two claims. The notion of 
transcendental self-consciousness merely represents an argumentative strategy. The 
6 There is another central aspect of Strawson's objectivity argument that I have not mentioned. For 
Strawson sometimes tends to argue from the possibility of experience, rather than self-consciousness. 
Such an argument would be far stronger than that presently reconstructed. For obvious reasons I have 
restricted myself to those of Strawson's claims which seem to take self-consciousness as their premise. 
Those aspects of Strawson's argument that concern experience simpliciter are discussed in Sacks, 
2000, pp. 222-228. I also ignore issues surrounding the clear anti-sceptical intent of Strawson's 
argument. On this see Stern, 2000, pp. 137-142. 
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idea is that it is possible to give some of the transcendental conditions of self- 
consciousness without making use of all of our resources. Strawson does not imply 
that we can make sense of the idea of unowned experiences, or of referring to 
experiences without referring to their owners. Rather Strawson claims that self- 
conscious experience involves a certain feature, "a certain character of self- 
reflexiveness" (Strawson, 1966a, p. 107), and that the satisfaction of the objectivity 
condition is a transcendental condition of this rather than any other feature of self- 
consciousness7. 
Whilst step (1) of the objectivity argument is both familiar and highly 
plausible, steps (2) and (3) both require some explication. Concerning step (2), we can 
ask both what it means to say, and why we should believe, that `experience must be 
such as to provide room for the thought of experience itself. Concerning step two we 
can ask why being able to think of experiences as experiences means that a subject 
must grasp the seems/is distinction. 
In fact we already have the materials with which to answer the first part of the 
first of these questions. In the previous section I distinguished different levels at 
which the objectivity condition could be pitched. There I said that it was best seen as 
meaning that to satisfy the objectivity condition one must have the conceptual 
capacity to employ the self/world (or seems/is) distinction, and that one's experience 
must be such as to justify the application of that distinction. I take it that we can read 
`experience must be such as to provide room for the thought of experience itself in 
the same way. That is, as being the claim that a self-conscious subject must have the 
concept experience in his or her conceptual repertoire, and that the experience of such 
a self-conscious subject must be such as to justify the application of that concept in 
judgements. This then is the second step of the argument: a self-conscious subject 
must have, and be justified in using, the concept of experience. 
It remains to be seen what reasons there are to accept this claim. The 
following passage helps us to see why Strawson thinks the concept of experience 
indispensable, 
It was agreed at the outset that experience requires both particular intuitions and general concepts. 
There can be no experience at all which does not involve the recognition of particular items as being of 
As Bennett rightly says, Strawson does not claim, "that self-reflexiveness could occur in the absence 
of personal self-consciousness" (Bennett, 1968, p. 342). 
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such and such a general kind. It seems that it must be possible, even in the most fleeting and purely 
subjective of impressions, to distinguish a component of recognition, or judgement, which is not simply 
identical with, or wholly absorbed by, the particular item which is recognized, which forms the topic of 
judgement... Recognition implies the potential acknowledgement of the experience into which 
recognition necessarily enters as being one's own (Strawson, 1966a, p. 100) 
The idea central to this passage is, I suggest, the following. Experience is always 
experience as. Strawson construes this as the claim that experiences involves the 
recognition (or judgement) of itself as falling under some general concept (hence his 
calling it self-reflexive). Furthermore, this recognition of the experience as falling 
under a general concept implies the possibility of self-ascription. Recognising an 
experience as one's own involves making use of the concept of experience. Thus, 
experience must justify the application of the concept of experience. 
If this is Strawson's argument, there are several concerns which must be 
addressed. To begin with it is left entirely obscure what is meant by experience 
involving a judgement, or having a judgement as a component. Second, it is not 
obvious that the conceptualisation of experience need involve the conceptualisation of 
experience as experience. The subject could conceptualise his or her experiences as 
loud or as nasty, and this would appear to satisfy the demand that they involve a 
conceptual component. As Harrison writes, 
we would be perfectly satisfied if such an experiencer could describe his experiences, even if he were 
perfectly incapable of classifying them as experiences (Harrison, 1970, p. 221) 
If this objection is along the right lines, it is difficult to see how Strawson could 
substantiate his claim that experience must provide room for the thought of 
experience itself g. In my view this objection highlights one of the serious problems 
with Strawson's tendency to make claims concerning the transcendental conditions of 
bare experience, rather than of self-consciousness (see n. 7). In several places 
Strawson makes the claim that experience requires the possibility of self- 
consciousness and thus self-ascription, for example he writes, "the possibility of 
experience requires the satisfaction of the basic condition of self-consciousness" 
(Strawson, 1966a, p. 110). Commentators have been quick to point out that this would 
8 Cassam, 1997, pp. 103-5, argues that this objection is unsuccessful. But his reply relies on Russell's 
Principle and so is not available to me. 
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appear to deny experience to animals9. But it must be remembered that our present 
concern is with the transcendental conditions of self-consciousness. We are free to 
assume that the only experience with which we are concerned is that enjoyed by self- 
conscious subjects. As such it is not clear that Harrison's objection is convincing. For 
self-consciousness requires the self-ascription of states. Let us take as an example, the 
self-ascription of auditory experiences. The subject hears a sound and thinks `I am 
hearing a sound'. Now, whilst this does not explicitly employ the word `experience', 
surely such a subject has a grasp of the concept of experience. Hearing is nothing if 
not a way of experiencing. It would seem that if the subject is a self-ascriber, then that 
subject must not only be able to conceptualise the sound heard as, say, loud. The 
subject must also be able to conceptualise the sound as a sound, that is, as an 
experience. Thus, we have rather a quick route to step (2) of Strawson's objectivity 
argument. Self-consciousness requires a grasp of the concept of experience. 
We can now move on to Strawson's claim, in step (3), that being able to think 
of experience as experience requires that one satisfy the objectivity condition (OC 1). 
In support of this claim Strawson tells us that, 
"This is how things are (have been) experienced by me as being" presupposes "This is how things are 
(have been) experienced as being"; and the latter in turn presupposes a distinction, though not (usually) 
and opposition, between "This is how things are experienced as being" and "Thus and so is how things 
are". (Strawson, 1966a, p. 108) 
Is this convincing? To begin with, we can agree that, experience is necessarily of 
something. The proponent of the hypothesis of a purely sense-datum experience will 
argue that, grasping the concept of experience requires a grasp of the idea that 
experience is of something, but this does not amount to a grasp of the idea that 
experience is of objects which could either exist unperceived or differ in order and 
arrangement from experience of them. Rather, the grasp of the concept of experience 
that the purely sense-datum experience will involve, is a grasp of the notion of a 
subjective object. Subjective objects are things of which one can be aware but for 
9 See, for example, Harrison, 1970, p. 215. Also see Sacks, 2000, p. 227. The tendency to claim that 
consciousness required self-consciousness is, of course, already present in Kant. See Bennett, 1966, 
p. 105-6, for reasons why we should not be overly worried about this. Rorty goes even further than 
Strawson, claiming that, "unless we restrict the application of the term `experience' to language 
users... we will have no basis whatever for offering transcendental arguments about the possibility of 
experience. " (Rorty, 1970, p. 224). 
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which there is no seems/is distinction. Consider the putative subject solely aware of 
sounds and smells. We can agree that this subject must be able to think of its 
experiences, otherwise it would not be able to self-ascribe them. But we have not yet 
been given a compelling reason to think that the sense in which such a subject grasps 
the concept of an experience, as something of which it is aware, entails that it has any 
grasp of the seems/is distinction. The point is that thinking of something as an 
experience can fall short of thinking of something as a seeming, if thinking of 
something as a seeming involves this rich conceptual background of the seems/is 
distinction. 
Of course Strawson would deny all of this. Approaching the same point from 
another direction, Strawson would point out that such an awareness of subjective 
objects that I have been maintaining is possible would fail to satisfy the requirement 
that there be a distinguishable recognitional aspect to all experience. That is, the 
recognition (or judgement) would be "identical with, or wholly absorbed by, the 
particular item which is recognised" (Strawson, 1966a, p. 100). His point is that 
judgments of, that is self-ascriptions of, subjective objects would fail to be distinct 
from the subjective object itself. But it is hard to find, in Strawson's remarks, any 
compelling reason to accept this. Unless we can find such a reason, we must conclude 
that Strawson's objectivity argument has failed to show that a self-conscious subject 
must have some grasp either of the seems/is distinction or the self/world distinction. 
5.4 Empirically Applicable Criteria of Identity 
If the argument from transcendental self-consciousness to the objectivity condition 
fails, maybe Strawson's argument from personal self-consciousness to the objectivity 
condition will fare better. This argument turns on Strawson's view that experiences 
`owe their identity to the person whose experiences they are'. The idea is this: self- 
consciousness entails the unity of consciousness (consciousness of the possibility of 
self-ascribing diverse experiences), the unity of consciousness requires that different 
experiences could be ascribed to the self same subject, this requires that the subject 
has some way of distinguishing himself from other things, and this entails the 
objectivity condition. The vital claim is the following: 
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It is a quite general truth that the ascription of different states or determinations to an identical subject 
turns on the existence of some means of distinguishing or identifying the subject of such ascriptions as 
one object among others. Applying this general truth to the case before us, we may say, in Kant's 
terminology, that the possibility of ascribing experiences to a subject of experiences and hence the 
possibility of self-ascription of experiences requires that there be some "determinate intuition" 
corresponding to the concept of a subject of experiences; or, substituting another terminology for 
Kant's, we may say that this possibility requires that there be empirically applicable criteria of identity 
for subjects of experience. (Strawson, 1966a, p. 102) 
It should be clear from the preceding chapters that Strawson's `quite general truth' is 
a substantive and highly controversial thesis. First, it appears to simply be an instance 
of Russell's Principle, second it is far from clear that there is, or even could be, such a 
thing as an intuition as of the subject of experiences. Even if Strawson could steer 
clear of these problems, however, it remains an open question as to whether the 
objectivity condition follows. The claim is that the self-ascription of experiences 
requires that the subject conceive of himself qua subject as having empirically 
applicable criteria of identity. Assuming that we know what it means to have 
`empirically applicable' criteria of identity, it still does not seem that the subject 
satisfying this condition must have a use for the self/world distinction. What the 
criteria of identity might serve to do would be to enable the subject to distinguish 
himself from his experiences; himself from what are merely states of himself. If so, 
OC 1 would not be entailed. 
What about OC2? Does the claim that the self-ascription of experiences 
requires that the subject conceive of himself qua subject as having empirically 
applicable criteria of identity entail that he could understand the notion of existence 
unperceived? An argument for this claim might proceed as follows: a subject can only 
think of his experiences as belonging to a person (with empirically applicable criteria 
of identity) if he thinks of them as belonging to a physical object. He can only think of 
them as belonging to a physical object if he has the concept of a physical object, and 
the concept of a physical object necessarily involves the notion of existence 
unperceived. I don't think that this argument is very convincing. It 
is true that 
possession of the concept of a physical object necessarily involves the notion of 
existence unperceived; this step of the argument seems fine. The problematic step 
is 
the first, that in order to think of one's experiences as belonging to something with 
empirically applicable criteria of identity, one must 
be thinking of them as belonging 
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to a physical object, with `physical object' understood as involving such a rich 
conceptual background. It is certainly not obvious that there is no room for the 
thought that one's experiences are had by a subject with empirically applicable 
criteria of identity but which falls short of being thought of as a physical object which 
can exist unperceived. Such a line of thought it suggested by remarks made by 
Campbell, albeit in a rather different context, 
there seems to be a level of thought more primitive than our thought about physical objects... This 
primitive level of thought is perhaps exemplified by the way in which we ordinarily think about the 
stars. If we are asked, as we look at the night sky and try to identify constellations, whether we think of 
the stars as physical objects or as points of light with no more causal significance than shadows, we 
may have no immediate answer. We are not really thinking of them as either (Campbell, 1994a, p. 29) 
The idea is that although we think of shadows or stars as having empirically 
applicable criteria of identity, we need not think of them as physical objects, and we 
need not think of them (although we in fact do) as being capable of existing 
unperceived. But could all of our experience be as of these `features'? There is some 
reason to think that if it were, we could no longer talk of empirically applicable 
criteria of identity. Whilst we do think of features as having empirically applicable 
criteria of identity (we can think of a shadow as the same shadow as before) it is 
plausible to think that the identity of features is dependent on the identity of physical 
objects (it is the same shadow because it is being cast by the same building)10. If this 
is the case, thinking of the subject of experiences as having empirical criteria of 
identity would appear to bring with it some notion of a physical object. Specifically, it 
would bring with it the notion of an object which is, in Campbell's phrase (see chapter 
four) internally causally connected. That is, objects whose later states are causally 
dependent on their earlier states. Only with such a notion in play can criteria of 
identity be empirically applied. So, this objection to Strawson's argument does not 
succeed. 
The real problem with the argument is that we have not bridged the gap 
between thinking of something as internally causally connected, and thinking of it as 
capable of existence unperceived. We think of physical objects as possessing both of 
these features, but there seems no obvious reason why one could not think of an 
10 1 present this argument in more detail in chapter seven. 
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object as being internally causally connected and yet as incapable of existing 
unperceived. Maybe we could think of Cartesian souls in this way. The present 
condition of Cartesian soul would partly depend on its condition at an earlier time, but 
its existence is dependent on its being perceived (by itself, or by God perhaps). The 
problem is that the rich conceptual background of existence unperceived is not 
required for the empirically adequate criteria of identity condition. All that is required 
is that the subject have experience as of objects that are internally causally connected. 
For this reason, Strawson's argument from personal-self consciousness to OC2 fails 
even if the concerns about Russell's Principle and self-awareness can be sidestepped. 
So Strawson's objectivity argument is unsuccessful: we have not yet been given a 
strong enough reason to accept the claim that self-consciousness requires satisfaction 
of the objectivity condition (however that is understood). 
5.5 Bennett's Realism Argument 
Another argument for the claim that the self-consciousness requires satisfaction of the 
objectivity condition appears in Bennett, 1966, Ch. 1411. Bennett's argument is related 
to the two of Strawson's arguments just discussed in that both claim to be inspired by 
Kant's transcendental deduction and refutation of idealism. Bennett's argument 
differs from Strawson's objectivity argument, in that it makes essential use of the 
notion of the unity of consciousness and that it centres not on the concept of 
experience or the concept of a physical object, but on the concept of the past. Briefly, 
the argument can be stated as follows: self-consciousness requires that one has the 
concept of the past, and having the concept of the past would be impossible unless 
one satisfied the objectivity condition. 
Why should we think that self-consciousness requires that one has the concept 
of the past? Bennett says surprisingly little in defence of this claim. The best defence 
of it, however, must surely come in the form of the unity of consciousness. Bennett's 
reading of the unity of consciousness amounts to the constraint that it must be 
possible for one to be conscious of the identity of the subject of actual diverse 
experiences, so that the subject must be able to think `I am now F and I was then G'. 
"A discussion of Bennett's realism argument, and how it fits into the main thread of Bennett's 
interpretation of Kant, can be found in Strawson, 1968, pp. 336-8. 
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Let us accept this, for the sake of argument12. There does seem to be some intuitive 
plausibility in the claim that self-consciousness as we know it would not be possible 
without a grasp of the concept of the past 13. The hypothetical subject for whom the 
world is continually present, who has no conception of its past seems barely 
intelligible. The consciousness of a subject with the capacity to think `I exist' but 
without the conceptual resources to judge `I existed before', would be radically unlike 
the sort of temporally sensitive self-consciousness that we enjoy. As Heidegger puts 
it, "I am-as-having-been" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 376). 
What should we make of the second step of the argument? The second step 
must justify the claim that having the concept of the past would be impossible unless 
one satisfied the objectivity condition. The argument runs as follows. A subject can 
only be credited with possession of a concept if they have a use for that concept. If 
one did not satisfy the objectivity condition one would only have access to oneself 
and one's states (Bennett's version of the objectivity requirement is OC 1). 
Judgements about the past can only be based on present data. So, any judgement 
about a past state of the subject must be based on a present recollection of that state. 
So, there will be a one-one mapping of judgements of the form `I was F with 
judgements of the form `I recollect being F. But this makes the judgement `I was F, 
and thus the concept of the past, redundant. So, the subject does not have the concept 
of the past. On the other hand, if one does satisfy the objectivity condition one has 
access to objective states of affairs (that which is not oneself or a state of oneself). 
This means that one can bring to bear several present data on a single judgement 
about the past. Thus, one has a complex relation between one's concept of I was F 
and one's concept of I recollect being F. So his concept of the past is not redundant. 
The argument is rather compressed, but the basic idea should be clear. I want 
to make two points. The first is that it rests on a controversial principle of concept 
possession. I do not wish to argue against the view that a subject can only be credited 
with possession of a concept if he has a use for that concept, merely point out that it 
requires justification 14. The second point is to question the claim that for a subject 
12 Although there is a worry about regress. If, to be counted as a self-conscious subject, one must be 
able to judge `I was G at t' does this not mean that it must have been possible for me to judge, at t, `I 
am now G'? In other words, does it not mean that the subject must have been self-conscious at t? If so, 
it seems impossible for a subject to ever become self-conscious. 
13 Campbell, 1994b, makes a similar claim. 
14 G. Strawson, 1999, §VI1I, argues against this principle. 
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who only has access to his own states, there will be a one-one mapping of judgements 
of the form `I was F with judgements of the form `I recollect being F. Might it not 
be that such a subject could bring many present recollections to bear on a past 
judgement? He might have the thought `I recollect being F, and I recollect many 
instances of being F and then G in quick succession' and on this basis form the 
judgement `I was G'. This seems to describe a possible situation. If it does, then there 
is no one-one mapping, and the subject's concept of the past is not idle. Thus, there is 
no reason to deny that the subject has such a concept. 
If this is correct, the realism argument fails to establish that a self-conscious 
subject must satisfy OC 1, but might it succeed in establishing that a self-conscious 
subject must satisfy OC2? I don't think so. There seems to be no more reason for 
saying that a subject with a purely sense-datum experience and no conception of 
existence unperceived must lack the concept of the past, than there is for a subject 
who fails to satisfy OC 1. The sense-datum experiencer could bring several present 
experiences to bear on judgements about the past, and so could have a complex 
relationship between I was F and I recollect being F. So it appears that Bennett's 
realism argument fails to establish either objectivity condition. 
It was claimed that a self-conscious subject must be such as to satisfy the 
objectivity condition. However, consideration of the objectivity condition, in all of its 
forms, has failed to yield the promised results. Since we have not been given a 
satisfactory argument from self-consciousness (via the unity of consciousness) to the 
satisfaction of any version of the objectivity condition, there seems little reason to 
look at the second premise of the argument (the claim that satisfaction of the 
objectivity condition requires a subject to enjoy spatial experience). It will be more 
fruitful to move on to another argument, also due to Strawson, which might be more 
successful in supporting the Body Claim. For this, we must move back from The 
Bounds of Sense to Strawson's earlier work, Individuals. 
5.6 Strawson Against Dualism 
In Chapter 3 of Individuals, Strawson presents an argument against Cartesian dualism. 
This argument could be used to motivate the, weak version of, the Body Claim. For, if 
it can be shown that self-consciousness demands that Cartesian dualism is false, then 
it seems reasonable to think that it can be shown that we are necessarily embodied and 
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presumably must experience ourselves as such. In this section I will present and 
critically evaluate Strawson's argument. The argument can be summarised as 
follows, 5: 
(1) One can self-ascribe P-predicates only if one can ascribe them to other subjects16 . 
(2) To ascribe a P-predicate to another subject, one must be able to identify that 
subject. 
(3) Subjects cannot be identified by others purely as subjects of experience' 7. 
(4) If subjects are Cartesian egos then they can only be identified as subjects of 
experience. 
(5) So, if subjects are Cartesian egos, they cannot identify other subjects. 
(6) So they cannot ascribe P-predicates to others. 
(7) So they cannot ascribe P-predicates to themselves. 
(8) Since we do ascribe P-predicates to ourselves, we are not Cartesian egos. 
Since we are not Cartesian egos, it seems that we must be embodied. And for us to be 
able to identify other subjects and ourselves, we must experience others and ourselves 
as such. Thus, Strawson's argument would appear to support the Body Claim. 
But this is not entirely convincing. The first thing that must be said with 
regards to this argument is that (1) is open to a number of different interpretations. At 
one stage, Strawson writes that, "One can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself 
only if one can ascribe them to others" (Strawson, 1959, p. 100). The use of the word 
`can' here suggests that what Strawson has in mind is the dependency of one sort of 
ability, or capacity, on another. However, one page previously, Strawson offers a 
rather different formulation, claiming that "it is a necessary condition of one's 
15 See Strawson, 1959, p. 100. Strawson's argument is read in this way by Crowley in his doctoral 
dissertation, Crowley, 1980, pp. I l 1-113. Also see Williams, 1961, p. 121. 
16 P-predicates are `Person-predicates'. They are to be distinguished from M-predicates, which are 
predicates that are, "properly applied to material bodies to which we would not dream of applying 
predicates implying states of consciousness. " (Strawson, 1959, p. 104). Ishiguro, 1980, p. 66, fn. 2, 
points out that Strawson seems to be suggesting that only persons have states of consciousness. This 
problem is relevant in what follows. Williams, 1961, pp. 122-126, has worries concerning the coherence 
of the distinction between P-predicates and M-predicates. 
17 "Can we not identify such a subject as, for example, `the subject that stands to that body in the same 
special relation as I stand in to this one'...? But this suggestion is useless. It requires me to have noted 
that my experiences stand in a special relation to body M... But what 
is the word "my" doing in this 
explanation? " (Strawson, 1959, p. 101). The word `my' cannot occur, since the aim 
is to give an 
account of the conditions under which we can self-ascribe P-predicates, 
i. e. it would be circular. 
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ascribing states of consciousness, experiences, to oneself, in the way one does, that 
one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not 
oneself. " (Strawson, 1959, p. 99). Here, we have no talk of capacities but rather of 
actual behaviour. The qualification made by Strawson (being `prepared to ascribe 
them') seems to suggest a willingness to so ascribe, or maybe that one is epistemically 
justified in so ascribing. It should be clear that the `capacity version' is the weaker 
claim. For, whilst it might be true that one can only have the capacity to self-ascribe 
or other-ascribe states of consciousness if one actually does self-ascribe or other- 
ascribe states of consciousness, this is not immediately obvious. It seems that one may 
have the capacity to do something yet simply refuse to do so. Taking him to have the 
capacity version in mind, how does Strawson defend this dependence claim? It is 
based on a perfectly general thesis about the nature of predicates. In an important 
footnote, Strawson writes, 
The main point here is a purely logical one: the idea of a predicate is correlative with that of a range of 
distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be significantly, though not necessarily truly, 
affirmed. (Strawson, 1959, p. 99, fn. 1) 
The idea is that unless one has grasped the possibility of affirming a predicate of a 
range of individuals, one has not grasped that predicate. This might be read as the 
claim that one does not have the capacity to think that a is cp unless one has the 
capacity to think that b is cp. But it cannot be read as the claim that one cannot actually 
think that a is 9 unless one has actually thought that b is cp, for then one would never 
be able to think that anything is cp! Thus it only supports the capacity version. 
We have encountered this principle before, in Evans' Generality Constraint 
(see chapter three). Indeed, Evans took himself to be elaborating and expanding upon 
the point made already by Strawson' 8. If we accept the Generality Constraint, is it 
possible to show that `one can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one 
can ascribe them to others'? The questions arises, `Other what? '. Would it constitute a 
grasp of the predicate `is in pain' if one were able to ascribe it to both oneself and the 
various non-human animals one might have experience of? It seems difficult to see 
why not. So, it seems that a self-conscious subject need not ever meet any other 
18 See Evans, 1982, pp. 103-104, and p. 209. 
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people, just animals. And, following the rest of the argument through, we can then say 
that these other animals cannot be Cartesian egos, otherwise we would not be in a 
position to identify them. So far so good, but the point of this argument was, surely, to 
show that the self-conscious subject himself cannot be a Cartesian ego, and it is not 
clear how we are supposed to arrive at that conclusion. 
This points us towards a serious defect with the argument, which can be 
pointed out in another way. For suppose the subject does make contact with other 
people. The argument, if sound, would show that they cannot be Cartesian egos. But 
from this claim, we cannot move to (5) which states that `if subjects are Cartesian 
egos, they cannot identify other subjects'. What it should say is that `if subjects are 
Cartesian egos, they cannot be identified by other subjects'. But a self-conscious 
subject, happily ascribing P-predicates to himself and to others, cannot infer from this 
proposition that he cannot be a Cartesian ego. To reach this conclusion, it would be 
necessary to add the premise that he and the others are of the same kind, or rather 
must be identified in the same way. But this, of course, is implausible. I identify 
others primarily by sight, but this not the way in which I primarily identify myself. 
Furthermore, since we are interested in Strawson's argument insofar as it lends 
support to the Body Claim, this consequence is disastrous. For, we want to get to the 
conclusion that any self-conscious subject must experience himself as embodied. But 
we have not even been given the materials to conclude that the subject must be 
embodied. There seems little hope of securing the further claim. 
Let us suppose, however, that the proponent of the Body Claim can somehow 
diffuse this objection. There is another difficulty with the argument. For, we need to 
know how we are supposed to understand the word `identify' as it occurs in steps (2)- 
(5). Strawson describes the notion of identification as follows, 
It seems that the general requirements of hearer-identification could be regarded as fulfilled if the 
hearer knew that the particular being referred to was identical with some particular about which he 
know some individuating fact, or facts, other than the fact that it was the particular being referred to. 
To know an individuating fact about a particular is to know that such-and-such a thing is true of that 
particular and of no other particular whatever... This, then, is the general condition 
for hearer- 
identification in the non-demonstrative case; and it is obvious that, if a genuine reference is being 
made, the speaker, too, must satisfy a similar condition. (Strawson, 1959, p. 
23) 
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This description of identification is framed explicitly in terms of language. But 
Strawson sees no problem in transferring the basics of his account to the domain of 
thought. He claims that, "Each of us can think identifyingly about such particulars 
without talking about them". (Strawson, 1959, pp. 61). 
Returning to the argument against dualism then, step (2) tells us that to ascribe 
a P-predicate to another subject, a subject must be able to identify that subject (with 
`identify' understood in the way just described). A brief consideration of Strawson's 
gloss on identification will show us that we should not accept this step. For 
Strawson's general condition for identification is none other than Russell's Principle. 
The condition for identification, or reference, is that the subject is able to distinguish 
the object of reference from all other things19. I argued in chapter three that this is too 
strong a condition on reference. If the argument given in that section against accepting 
Russell's Principle is sound, then we should not accept step (2) of Strawson argument 
against dualism. We find that, once again, Russell's Principle is being used to support 
an argument for the Body Claim20. However, as I have pointed out in previous 
chapters, Russell's Principle is not something that the defender of the Body Claim can 
simply help themselves to. 
It might be wondered whether Strawson's argument could be reformulated 
without the aid of Russell's Principle. It is difficult to say without knowing more 
about what notion of reference is in play. If, however, one were to endorse some form 
of causal account on which, to put it crudely, one can refer to an object if one is 
appropriately causally related to it, then it seems that we will have trouble supporting 
step (3). For, we no longer have to make sense of the idea that the subject knows 
some individuating description of the Cartesian ego in question21. It seems, then, that 
we cannot utilize Strawson's argument against dualism in Chapter three of Individuals 
to support the Body Claim. With this negative conclusion I leave Strawson's remarks 
on the conditions of self-consciousness. These considerations have not been entirely 
negative, however, since, as we shall see in chapter six, a line of thought can be 
19 In Part Two of Individuals, Strawson writes that, "in order for an identifying reference to be made, 
there must be some true empirical proposition known, in some not too exacting sense of this word, to 
the speaker, to the effect that there is just one particular which answers to a certain description. " 
(Strawson, 1959, p. 183). 
20 I am not saying that Strawson was using it to support the Body Claim. 
21 Of course, this presumes that the dualist can solve the problem of mental causation. But, if 
successful, that problem scuppers Cartesian dualism all by itself. Strawson's argument would be otiose. 
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developed which, whilst it owes much to Strawson's argument against dualism, rests 
on nothing so implausibly strong as Russell's Principle. 
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6. Self-Location 
The self-location argument begins with self-reference. The starting assumption is that 
self-consciousness necessarily involves thinking about oneself. The argument 
proceeds as follows: First-person thoughts are thoughts about oneself. In thinking 
such a thought one thinks of oneself as a particular. Thinking of something as a 
particular involves thinking of it as in principle distinguishable from other particulars 
of the same sort. In order to think of oneself as in principle distinguishable from other 
things of the same sort, one must think of oneself as, in some sense, spatially located. 
6.1 Thinking of Oneself as a Particular 
The first step of the argument is the claim that first-person thoughts are thoughts 
about oneself as a particular. If one thinks that abstract objects are objects, then the 
class of particulars is a subclass of the class of objects. Thinking of a as a particular is 
to be distinguished from thinking of a as a property or as an abstract object'. 
Particulars might include physical objects like rocks and non-physical objects like 
souls. My claim is simply that in thinking the first-person thought `I am FI am 
thinking of myself as a particular in this sense. I will treat it as an assumption. I take it 
that the really controversial claim is that thinking of something as a particular 
involves thinking of it as in principle distinguishable from other particulars of the 
same sort. I will explain how I understand and support this claim. 
Particular things have, what Evans calls, a fundamental ground of difference2. 
The fundamental ground of difference of an object at a time is that which 
differentiates it from other objects of the same kind. So, for instance, the fundamental 
ground of difference of a physical object at a time is its position in space (plus, 
possibly, its sort). As Evans puts it, the fundamental ground of difference of an object 
at a time will be an answer to the question `What differentiates that object from 
others? ', of the kind appropriate to objects of that sort. 
As we have seen, Evans himself thought that to be able to think about an 
object, one must be able to distinguish it from all other things. This means that one 
'I think it would probably also be reasonable to exclude thinking of oneself as an event. 
2 Evans, 1982, p. 106-7. See chapter three. 
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must either be in possession of its fundamental ground of difference, or one must 
know what it would be for an identification of the object via its fundamental ground 
of difference, to be true. This is Russell's Principle. I argued in chapter three that 
Russell's Principle, as understood by Evans, is unacceptably strong. 
Whether or not Evans' theory is ultimately acceptable, I think that the 
following aspect of it is surely correct: that to think of something as a particular (and 
hence as an object) one must think of it as having some fundamental ground of 
difference or other. That is, one must think of it as in principle distinguishable from 
other things of the same kind. To think of something without thinking of it as the 
possessor of a fundamental ground of difference at all, would not to be thinking of it 
as an object (and hence a particular) at all. 
What does this mean? It obviously must not mean that to think of something 
as an object one must have the concept of a fundamental ground of difference. 
Presumably, however, it does mean that one must have the concept of something 
being distinct from another. Thinking of something as an object requires that one 
think of it as distinct from all other things, even if it does not require knowing that in 
virtue of which it is so distinct. 
Furthermore, it seems likely that in thinking of something as a particular one is 
not required to know what kind of thing it is. It seems intuitively correct to suggest 
that one can think of oneself even though one does not know, or truly believe, what 
kind of thing one is (physical object, non-physical soul etc. )3. Whilst I think that this 
is probably correct, it is controversial and I don't really require it for my purposes. 
What I need to claim is that in order to think of a as a particular one need not know 
what sort of fundamental ground of difference is relevant to objects of its kind. This 
falls short of the claim that in order to think of something as a particular I need not 
know what kind of thing it is. For, whilst I am pretty sure what sort of thing I am (a 
person), I am not entirely confident that I know what the relevant fundamental ground 
of difference for persons is (is it bodily or psychological? ). Thus, my claim is that 
thinking of something as an particular means thinking of it as having some 
fundamental ground of difference or other, but one is not required either to know what 
that fundamental ground of difference is, or even what kind of fundamental ground of 
difference it has. 
3 This intuition did some work in Cassam's Identity Argument, see chapter four. 
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What is required, however, is that one think of it as in principle distinguishable 
from other things of the same kind. That is, to think of something as a particular, one 
must have the conceptual capacities to recognise that there could be two objects of 
that kind. This does not mean that one must have seen or otherwise experienced 
another object of that kind. Neither must one have even entertained the thought that 
there could be such a thing. All that is required is that one not be conceptually 
debarred from entertaining the thought that there could be another such object. The 
point is that thinking of something as having a fundamental ground of difference must 
be thinking of it in such a way as to leave room for the thought that there could be 
another such thing4. Unless one's way of thinking leaves room for this thought, one is 
not thinking of the object of one's thought as a particular at all. 
I take these remarks to specify something like a necessary condition on 
thinking of something as a particular. It is, however, not a sufficient condition. 
Properties and abstract objects have fundamental grounds of difference also, and 
thinking of something as a property or an abstract object (arguably) requires that one 
think of it as the possessor of some fundamental ground of difference or other. But 
one is obviously not thereby thinking of it as a particular. 
6.2 Thinking of Oneself as Spatially Located 
The next step in the self-location argument is the claim that in thinking of oneself as 
in principle distinguishable from other things of the same sort, one must think of 
oneself as, in some sense, spatially located. The idea is that without possessing spatial 
concepts and thinking of oneself as located in space, one does not have the resources, 
and so cannot be in a position, to think of oneself as a particular. The motivation for 
this claim is the well known problem that the Cartesian dualist faces in giving a 
coherent account of how it is that souls are individuated5. 
Physical objects are individuated by their spatial location (plus, possibly, their 
sort). That is, the fundamental ground of difference at a time for a physical object is 
4 An objection: Surely we can think of the universe (everything that actually and possibly exists) as a 
particular, but such a thought does not leave room for the thought that there could be another such 
thing. My reply is that if my view entails that we cannot think of the universe (conceived in such a 
broad way) as a particular, this is an interesting consequence, rather than an objection. 
5 This problem is one of Strawson's favourite objections to dualism, see Strawson, 1959, Ch. 3,1966b, 
and Strawson's remarks at the end of Swinburne, 1987. Also see Sosa, 1987. It is at this point that the 
similarity between the present argument and Strawson's attack on dualism is most clear. 
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its location in space. This is a metaphysical point, it concerns what it is that makes it 
the case that there are two physical objects rather than one (or three rather than two). 
But there is an epistemological analogue. We can distinguish between distinct 
physical objects. In fact, if what I said in the previous section is correct, in order to 
think of something as a particular, one must be thinking of it as being in principle 
distinguishable from other things of the same kind. In the case of physical objects this 
constraint is easily met. In thinking of a physical object, I think of it as being located 
somewhere in space. This is not to say that I must know what its location actually is, 
just that I am thinking of it as having some location or other. 
The difficulty arises for the dualist when we ask in virtue of what are non- 
physical souls individuated? What makes it the case that there are two souls rather 
than one? There are, as far as I can see, three answers the dualist could give to this 
question, each of which is problematic in its own way. The first would be to say that 
souls are individuated by the position in space of the bodies to which they are 
`attached'. The second would be to claim that souls are individuated by their position 
in logical space. The third would be to say that there is just a brute relation of 
distinctness which holds between souls and which cannot be further analysed6. 
Now, the claim I am arguing for in this section is that without spatial concepts, 
and the ability to think of oneself as located, one could not think of oneself as a 
particular at all. So, let us imagine a subject with no spatial experience and no spatial 
concepts (supposedly) entertaining the first-personal thought `I am happy'. This 
subject, call him Vernon, must be thinking of himself in such a way that he is in 
principle distinguishable from other objects of the same kind (other subjects). By 
definition, Vernon cannot be thinking of himself as a physical object, since he has no 
spatial concepts. Similarly, he cannot be thinking of himself as a soul `attached' to 
some physical object. Thus the first option that is open to the dualist is not an option 
of which Vernon can avail himself. So how is Vernon thinking of himself? Might 
Vernon be thinking of himself as individuated by his position in logical space? We 
can surmise that Vernon has certain beliefs (and other attitudes), and that these serve 
to pick out a `logical position'. Since two persons tend to have different overall belief 
structures, they will occupy different such positions. In this way, we might try to 
6 Swinburne's dualism coupled with his claim that "personal identity is something ultimate, 
unanalysable" (Swinburne. 1984, p. 26), suggests that 
he may hold such a view. 
123 
individuate souls. And some things (which may be objects of some sort) evidently are 
individuated in similar ways. For instance, Fregean thoughts are individuated by their 
contents, numbers are individuated by their position relative to the other numbers, and 
so on. 
The problem with this idea is that it doesn't provide for qualitative identity 
with numerical diversity. If we individuate souls by their position in logical space it 
will follow that there simply could not be two souls which occupy the same logical 
location. It would be impossible for two subjects to have exactly the same overall 
belief structures. So it seems that this view is a non-starter as an account of the 
individuation of souls. Still, might Vernon still not think of himself in such a way? I 
find it difficult to form an opinion here. But I will say that if Vernon can think of 
himself in this way, and therefore as in principle distinguishable from different objects 
of the same sort, then Vernon is thinking of himself in a way which is radically 
different from the way in which we actually do think of ourselves. On this 
supposition, Vernon is thinking of himself as something akin to an abstract object. 
But the premise of the self-location argument is that self-consciousness involves 
thinking of oneself as a particular. If our premise is acceptable, Vernon cannot be self- 
conscious subject thinking of himself as an abstract object individuated by his 
position in logical space. 
Could it be that Vernon is thinking of himself as something which could be 
distinguished from another by a brute, unanalysable, distinctness relation? I suggest 
that the answer to this should be no. The point of calling this distinctness relation 
`brute' is that nothing more can be said about it. But surely unless one can offer an 
answer to the question `In virtue of what are a and b different things? ' then one 
cannot be thinking of them as distinguishable. It was agreed that to think of something 
as a particular one must not be conceptually debarred from entertaining the thought 
that there could be another such thing. But this suggestion endangers that claim. To 
think of something as in principle distinguishable from other things of the same kind, 
it seems that one must not be conceptually debarred from saying in virtue of what two 
such objects are distinct. The idea that two particulars, not thought of as located in 
space, might share all their properties and yet be distinct is not a thought that we can 
grasp. But this is precisely what the brute distinctness view must deny. The result, I 
think, is that Vernon cannot be thinking of himself as individuated by such a brute 
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distinctness relation7. This claim is closely related to that made by Strawson in the 
previous chapter, that subjects of experience must think of themselves as having 
empirically adequate criteria of identity. 
My conclusion, then, is that to think of oneself as in principle distinguishable 
from other objects of the same kind, requires that one think of oneself as located 
spatially. But this is not an argument against dualism. I am not claiming either that 
one must be, or that one must think of oneself as, a physical object. I do not want to 
rule out the possibility that one could think of oneself as merely `attached' to a located 
physical object; or as part physical object, part non-physical object; or as a 
geometrically located point of view. The point is that thinking first-person thoughts, 
thinking of oneself as a particular, requires that one have spatial concepts and that one 
use them in so thinking. The only way in which we could in principle distinguish 
between different subjects, is by their having diverse spatial locations. 
Before I move on, I should say a few words concerning the relation between 
the arguments of the previous two sections, and some claims made by G. Strawson, 
1999a, who claims that "many popular claims about the conditions of self- 
consciousness are too strong" (1999a, p. 310). He defends the view that the notion of a 
self-conscious subject in the position I have assigned to Vernon is perfectly coherent. 
Obviously I disagree. I want only to point out that what one might think are two of the 
most controversial claims I make during the course of my argument he actually 
endorses. These are the claims that first-person thought is thought about oneself as a 
particular (1999a, p. 314), and that a first-personal thinker must not be conceptually 
debarred from forming and entertaining thoughts of a subject of experience other than 
himself (1999a, p. 310). I thus claim to be giving an argument which contradicts G. 
Strawson's view, using materials that he himself accepts. 
8.3 Spatial Concepts and Spatial Experience 
The self-location argument concludes that a self-conscious subject must think of him 
or herself as spatially located, and thus be in possession of spatial concepts. Both the 
This view is defended in Sosa, 1987. He writes, "entities x and y cannot possibly be related simply bi' 
diversity 
... 
The problem with supposed nonspatial particulars like souls is simply that no pure relation 
can be found to play the role that spatial apartness plays for spatial particulars. We have no inkling of 
any relation that can help us grasp the diversity of two souls alike in every qualitative respect" (Sosa, 
1987, p. 69). 
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solidity and the action arguments, however, start from the premise that a self- 
conscious subject must enjoy spatial experience. Can we forge the necessary tight 
connection between spatial concepts and spatial experience? 
It seems clear that we will not get a firm answer to this question by perfectly 
general considerations on the nature of concepts. One might think that a 
thoroughgoing empiricism or maybe some defence of the claim that `concepts without 
intuitions are empty' might help us here. But it is entirely reasonable to point out that 
there are a range of different kinds of concepts. On the one hand we have 
observational concepts such as red. It would not be surprising to find that the concept 
red cannot be grasped by a subject without the subject having undergone some 
experiences as of red things. Call these concepts experience-dependent. On the other 
hand, we have theoretical concepts such as electron. No-one has ever experienced an 
electron (except indirectly), or had any experience as of an electron, and yet it is a 
concept which many of us have. Call these concepts experience-independent. The 
questions we need to answer in the present context are these: What are the spatial 
concepts that the self-location argument shows are required for self-consciousness? 
And, are these concepts experience-dependent or experience-independent? 
Here is a simple argument for the claim that the concepts involved are 
experience-dependent. The self-location argument concludes that, if one is self- 
conscious, one must be able to think of oneself as spatially located. That is, one must 
be able to think, `there is some place where I am'. We can call this place P. P is either 
a descriptive names, or an abbreviation of a definite description. The description in 
question being `the place where I am'. Thus, one must be able to think, `I am at F. 
But, the argument continues, there is no difference between thinking `I am at P' and 
thinking `P is here', or even `I am here'. The reason for this is that `P = here' is surely 
uninformative, as uninformative as is `the place where I am = here'9. 
If this is correct, then a self-conscious subject must be able to think 'here'- 
thoughts. Now, thinking a 'here'-thought means thinking a thought that refers to the 
place at which the thinker is. But, for such a 'here'-thought to refer, the subject must 
know which place it is to which he or she is referring, or, at least, he or she must be 
disposed to find out which place it is. This means that a self-conscious subject must 
8 See Evans, 1982, § 1.7. 
9 This is why `Here' is such an unhelpful answer to the question `Where are we? 
'. 
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be, at least disposed to, experience the place to which he or she refers with `here'. So, 
a self-conscious subject must have some kind of spatial experience. 
It should be immediately clear what is wrong with this argument. The 
argument relies entirely on Russell's Principle10. Having rejected Russell's Principle 
in the case of `I' -thoughts it would be strange to offer such strikingly different 
account of 'here'-thoughts. Rather, we should agree that `here' refers to the place of 
utterance. Furthermore, in thinking a `here' thought I am thinking of a place as a 
place, but this does not require me to be able to distinguish that place from all other 
places. 
Maybe I must be disposed to treat any information I receive from the place at 
which I am as germane to my 'here'-thoughts, and such information might also 
dispose me to act in relevant ways' 1. But it would take a further argument to show that 
these dispositions must become manifest at some point. So this point should not be 
taken to imply that I must at some time actually receive some information from, or 
have experience of, the place where I am. This line of thought is rejected by Evans, 
who writes that 
Where there is no possibility of action and perception, 'here'-thoughts cannot get a grip. Consider the 
philosopher's fantasy of a brain in a vat: a person's thinking organ kept alive and capable of sustaining 
thoughts, yet with no avenue of perception or mode of action. We can perhaps imagine being the 
person whose thoughts are sustained in this way; but in the perceptual darkness and silence of our 
existence, we could surely have no use for `here'. If we knew what had become of us, we could 
certainly think of a place as the place where the brain which sustains our thoughts is located - but this 
is a mode of identification of a place quite unlike that expressed by `here'. (Evans, 1982, p. 153) 
If the self-location argument is acceptable, then the brain in the vat must be thinking 
of himself in such as way as to make room for the thought that he is located 
somewhere in space. So, he must be able to think that there is some place where he is. 
The argument above suggested that this is equivalent to saying that there is some 
place where the brain in a vat can think of as `here'. But even if Evans is right, and 
this mode of thinking of a place is unlike the way in which we think of places as here, 
10 Actually, it relies on a `knowing which' condition on reference. And it might be that an account of 
`knowing which' can be given which falls short of Evans' `discriminating knowledge'. If such an 
account can be given, there may be a more direct route than that presented from spatial concepts to 
spatial experience. 
11 These aspects of 'here'-thoughts are central to Evans' account, see Evans, 1982, §6.3. 
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why should this matter? All that is required is that the brain in the vat can have a 
thought about a place, and this does not seem to be in question. 
But this is not the end of the matter. For the self-location argument establishes 
that a self-conscious subject must be thinking of himself as spatially located. But 
thinking of oneself as spatially located is not just a matter of thinking a thought which 
is, as a matter of fact, about a place. If one's thought is to count as genuinely spatial, 
one must be thinking about a place as a place (or about a spatial property as a spatial 
property). And this means that one must have an understanding of what a place is. 
And now the thought is that it is highly plausible to suggest that one cannot have a 
full grasp of the notion of a place unless one has had some experience as of places. A 
subject who has had absolutely no experience as of places cannot really be said to 
know what places are. This seems right even if such a subject can entertain thoughts 
which are about places. A reason for thinking that this is correct is that it is difficult to 
imagine being able to explain what places are to a subject who lacked any spatial 
experience. In this respect `here' is more like `red' than `electron'. To repeat, thinking 
about what is in fact a place is not sufficient for one's thought to be genuinely spatial. 
One must be thinking of a place as a place. And it is this which only seems possible 
on the assumption that the subject has had some kind of spatial experience. 
If this is correct, then the self-location argument establishes more than just that 
a self-conscious subject must be capable of thinking of himself as spatially located. It 
actually establishes the further conclusion that a self-conscious subject must have, or 
have had, experience which counts as genuinely spatial. That is, he must have had 
experience of places as places (or spatial properties as spatial properties). This is 
important, since both the solidity argument of chapter seven and the action argument 
of chapter eight begin from the assumption that self-consciousness requires spatial 
experience. Both of these arguments claim that bodily-awareness is a transcendental 
condition of spatial experience, and it is to these arguments that I now turn12. 
12 It is plausible to think that once we have established that a self-conscious subject must enjoy spatial 
experience, we can establish the objectivity condition (both OC I and OC2). Although I will not attempt 
such a feat, it seems reasonable to think that in order to perceive spatially one must be able to employ 
both the seems/is distinction and the self/world distinction. Evans writes, "The idea that there is an 
objective world and the idea that the subject is somewhere in the world cannot be separated" (Evans, 
1982, p. 222). 
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7. Solidity 
The solidity argument takes as its starting point the assumption that self- 
consciousness requires spatial experience. Taken independently of the self-location 
argument it can be thought of as an attempt to spell out the transcendental conditions 
of self-conscious subjects who, like us, have some kind of spatial experience. The 
idea driving the argument is that spatial experience is necessarily tied up with the 
experience of solidity, and that the experience of solidity is something which requires 
bodily-awareness'. 
7.1 Spatial Experience and Physical Objects 
The solidity argument can be stated as follows: 
(1) Spatial experience requires experience as of physical objects. 
(2) Experience as of physical objects is only possible if one has experience as of 
solidity. 
(4) Experience as of solidity is only possible for a subject with a sense of touch. 
(5) Touch requires bodily-awareness. 
So, 
(6) Spatial experience is only possible for a subject with bodily-awareness. 
A subject with bodily-awareness is clearly a subject who satisfies Cassam's `second 
grade of apparent presence in the world', i. e. who experiences himself as having a 
body. Therefore, if the solidity argument is sound, the weak version of the Body 
Claim is true. 
Let us begin with the first premise. A line of thought which can lead one to 
accept this claim is to be found in Ch. 1 of Strawson's Individuals. The idea is that, 
if we are to operate the scheme of a single unified spatio-temporal system or framework of 
particulars... we must have criteria or methods of identifying a particular encountered on one occasion, 
Arguments which resemble the solidity argument, as presented below, are given in Joske, 1967, Ch. 2, 
O'Shaughnessy, 2000, Ch. 23, and Cassam, 2002. 
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or described in respect of one occasion, as the same individual as a particular encountered on another 
occasion, or described in respect of another occasion... The necessity may be brought out in the 
following way. It is not the only way. Evidently we can sometimes referentially identify a member of 
the spatio-temporal framework by giving, or being given its position relative to others. No less 
evidently we cannot make the identification of every element in the system in this way relative to that 
of other elements. An immediate answer is that we have no need to, because we can identify some 
elements by direct location. But this answer, by itself, is insufficient. For we do not use a different 
scheme, a different framework, on each occasion. It is the essence of the matter that we use the same 
framework on different occasions... We cannot attach one occasion to another unless, from occasion to 
occasion, we can reidentify elements common to different occasions. (Strawson, 1959, pp. 31-2) 
To summarise, our spatial experience is an experience of a single unified spatio- 
temporal system. But in order for this to be the case, different `occasions' must be 
`attached' to one another. That is, each stretch of continuous observation must be 
attached to another. But this is possible only on the assumption that we can sometimes 
regard two experiences as experiences of one and the same thing. Therefore, spatial 
experience is necessarily such as to support the possibility of the reidentification of 
particulars. 
Why does the possibility of the reidentification of particulars require 
experience as of physical objects? To be able to attach together different stretches of 
continuous observation, I must be able to think of two experiences of places as 
experiences of the same place. We can, for the time being, take this much as having 
been established. The important claim, now, is that the ability to do this presupposes 
the ability to reidentify not only places, but physical objects. This dependence goes in 
both directions, 
the identification and distinction of places turns on the identification and distinction of things; and the 
identification and distinction of things turns on the identification and distinction of places (Strawson, 
1959, p. 37) 
For instance, we know that we are once again in the same place, say Trafalgar Square, 
because we know that the object we now perceive is the very same object that we 
perceived when last in Trafalgar Square, say Nelson's Column. And conversely, we 
know that we are seeing Nelson's Column, because we know that we are once again 
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in Trafalgar Square2. All this means that if we had no experience as of physical 
objects, we would have no way to reidentify places, and thus no way in which to 
attach together different stretches of continuous observation. 
There are, at least, two objections to this argument. First, it will be pointed 
out that although our spatial experience is of a single unified spatio-temporal system, 
we have not been shown why this is necessarily so. And it is this latter claim which is 
needed if the solidity argument is to be genuinely transcendental. Indeed, this latter 
claim is not at all obvious, since we appear to be able to imagine experience as of two 
spatially unrelated spaces3. If we can do this, it seems that we can imagine experience 
as of many spatially unrelated, but qualitatively identical spaces (maybe changing 
each time we blink). There is no reason to think that such an experience would not be 
spatial. And it would appear to satisfy the demands of the self-location argument -a 
subject in this situation would be able to locate themselves at any given time. The 
very first step in this transcendental argument fails. 
A reply to this objection might proceed as f llows4: 0 the subject of such 
experience must think of him or herself as unified and, in particular, causally 
connected over time. But, this amounts to thinking that the spaces experienced are 
unified and causally connected. The unity of the subject requires the unity of the 
spaces the subject experiences. Thus, the spaces are not experienced as entirely 
spatially unrelated. But, in the present context, this is unconvincing. First, whilst it 
may be true that one must think of the spaces one experiences as causally connected, 
it does not automatically follow that one must think of them as spatially related. It 
may not be possible, but science fiction seems to have got us used to the idea of 
causal relations in the absence of spatial relations. The reasons why the unity of the 
subject might be thought to require the unity of the spaces experienced is that the 
subject is thought of as tracing a continuous path over time. But we need only think of 
the subject in this way if we think of it as a physical object, or at least behaving in the 
same way as physical objects behave. The point is that at this stage in the argument, 
this is not something that we are allowed to assume. 
2 Williams, 1961, p. 108, suggests that this amounts to accepting a relational view of space. Even if 
Strawson does have something like this in mind, which seems somewhat doubtful, nothing I say 
commits me to such a view. 
3 Maybe as in Quinton, 1962. 
4 Eilan, 1993, puts this line of thought to a slightly different use. 
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It seems to me, then, that this is a perfectly valid objections. And this is a point 
at which we must add in an empirical assumption if we are to give the solidity 
argument the chance to fly. The assumption we must add is that the self-conscious 
subjects which we are discussing are such as to enjoy experience as of a single unified 
spatio-temporal system. And this is not such a huge problem. For, even with this 
assumption made, we might still come up with some philosophically interesting 
claims. If it turns out, as the solidity argument claims, that it is a necessary condition 
of self-consciousness with experience as of a single unified spatio-temporal system, 
that one experience oneself as having a body, then we will have established something 
of real interest. So, even though we do not seem to be able to rule out a priori the 
possibility of a self-conscious subject who does not enjoy experience of a single 
unified spatio-temporal system, this should not worry us to much. 
Another objection has been raised to this argument by Campbe116. Campbell 
argues that the reidentification of (and thus experience as of) physical objects is not 
required for the reidentification of places. For places can be reidentified on the basis 
of the reidentification of `located features'. Features are something less than physical 
objects, the relevant difference being that physical objects, but not features, display 
`internal causal connectedness'. So, 
In contrast to features, the condition of a thing at any one time is thought of as being causally 
dependent upon its condition at earlier times. One of the determinants of its properties at a given time is 
which properties it had earlier, and this is so no matter how much it has moved around. It might, 
indeed, be held that internal causal connectedness is more basic than spatio-temporal continuity, in our 
notion of objecthood... We can certainly make sense of someone finding their way around using stably 
located features, or groups of features, which they do not think of having that internal causal 
connectedness over time (Campbell, 1993, p. 67) 
If place reidentification is possible on the basis of feature reidentification, and feature 
reidentification does not require experience as of physical objects, this objection is a 
serious one. But let us look more closely at this supposed reidentification of features. 
Clearly we can reidentify places by reidentifying features. For 
instance, I can 
reidentify a place by "the pool of light thrown by a projector onto a wall" 
(Campbell, 
1994b, p. 8). But this is not yet to show that a subject who 
has no experience 
5 But see Strawson's reaction to this kind of worry, 1959, pp. 
32-6. 
6 See Campbell, 1993,1994a, and, 1994b. 
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whatsoever as of physical objects could reidentify places purely by reidentifying 
features. A subject who only has experience as of features ex hypothesi does not think 
of their present state or location as in any way dependent upon their former state or 
location. But how, then, can such a subject think of a currently perceived feature as 
the very same feature as was perceived before? This subject would have no reason to 
think of the currently perceived feature as numerically, rather than just qualitatively 
identical. But it is numerical identity that is required for reidentification. 
Of course, for us, there is a distinction between the qualitative and numerical 
identity of features. But it is plausible to think that this is a result of our thinking of 
them as, in some way, dependent upon physical objects. Take the pool of light thrown 
out by the projector. What licenses us to treat a currently perceived pool of light as 
numerically rather than just qualitatively identical to a remembered one? Arguably, it 
is the knowledge that it is being thrown out by the very same projector and that the 
projector has not been switched off in the meantime7. And the projector is something 
that is being thought of as internally causally connected, and thus as more than just a 
feature. 
My suggestion, then, is that a subject for whom everything is perceived as a 
feature is not in a position to grasp the distinction between qualitative and numerical 
identity. And this is a subject for whom there is no possibility of reidentification of 
features, and correspondingly of places. So, I think, Campbell's objection is 
unsuccessful. We can, then, provisionally accept that spatial experience requires 
experience as of physical objects. 
7.2 Solidity and Force 
The second step in the solidity argument is that experience as of physical objects is 
only possible if one has experience as of solidity. An argument for this claim can be 
formulated in, roughly, the following way: physical objects are essentially solid 
therefore, to experience something as a physical object is to experience it as solid. A 
proper assessment of this argument requires us to first of all say something about the 
notion of solidity. 
An alternative answer might be, `that there is no evidence to the contrary'. 
But what could possibly 
count as evidence to the contrary for a subject who 
did not have the concept of a physical object? 
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Let me suggest three uses of the word `solid' (there are undoubtedly more). 
First, `solid' may be contrasted with `liquid' and `gas', these terms denote three 
distinct states of matter in physics. Second, `solid' is often used as roughly 
interchangeable with `hard', as when one says, `this chair is certainly a solid one'. 
Third, `solid' can be used to mean something that is closely related to impenetrable, 
meaning that solid things cannot penetrate or be penetrated by each others. 
Taken in either of the first two senses, it is clearly not the case that experience 
as of physical objects requires experience as of solidity. A ball of mercury is 
experienced as a physical object even though it is experienced as a liquid, and so not 
solid in the first sense. Again, a jelly is experienced as a physical object even though 
it is obviously not experienced as solid in the second sense. If we are to lend 
plausibility to this step of the solidity argument, then, I think it would be useful to turn 
to the understanding of solidity in terms of impenetrability. 
Solidity is listed by Locke as a primary quality9, but what is solidity? There is 
clearly a very close connection between solidity and impenetrability but Locke 
suggests keeping the two notions separate, 
That which thus hinders the approach of two bodies, when they are moving one towards another, I call 
solidity ... 
if anyone think it better to call it impenetrability, he has my consent. Only I have thought the 
term solidity the more proper to express this idea... because it carries something more of positive in it 
than impenetrability; which is negative, and is perhaps more a consequence of solidity, than solidity 
itself. (Locke 1975, Bk. II, Ch. IV, §1) 
Locke has more to say about solidity, 
This, of all others, seems the idea most intimately connected with and essential to body... [it is] 
inseparably inherent in matter... This is the idea which belongs to body, whereby we conceive it to fill 
space. (Locke 1975, Bk. II, Ch. IV, § 1-2) 
Here Locke claims that all material stuff has the property of solidity, and further that 
all physical bodies/objects have the very same property (remember, not all material 
stuffs are objects). What's more, the solidity of physical objects might well 
be said to 
constitute their essence. Solidity (space-fillingness) is what 
is essential to the 
8 This is how Locke, 1975, Bk. II, Ch. IV, views solidity. 
9 Locke, 1975, Bk. 11, Ch. VIll, §9. 
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physical, and it gives rise to impenetrability (the power to entirely exclude other 
space-filling objects)'o 
Is it correct to say that physical objects are absolutely impenetrable, i. e. have a 
property which, "excludes all other solid substances" (Locke 1975, Bk. II, Ch. IV, §2)? 
Two objections to this claim present themselves, one easily dealt with, the other less 
obviously so. The first is that such things as swarms of bees, or clouds, by no means 
exclude other such things. Two swarms of bees, or clouds, may pass through each 
other. There are a variety of responses to this objection. First, it might be held that, 
although swarms of bees and clouds are composed of physical objects, they are not 
themselves physical objects. Bees and water particles are physical objects, swarms 
and clouds are not. Second, since no two bees or water particles occupy exactly the 
same space, the swarms, or clouds, are not in exactly the same places. Each resides 
within the other's gaps. Third, it could be argued that the two swarms, or clouds, 
momentarily become one swarm. Since any one of these replies seems unproblematic, 
the objection is unconvincing. 
The second objection to the claim that physical objects are necessarily 
impenetrable is that, contrary to the present hypothesis, it is perfectly possible for two 
solid objects to be in the same place at the same time. This will be the case with 
statues and lumps of bronze, and maybe even people and their bodies11. Objects may 
very well be solid, in some sense, but they are not impenetrable. Thus, whatever 
solidity is, it cannot be the same as absolute impenetrability. Some will argue that this 
objection is misconceived, and that the language of `material constitution' is not the 
right way to think about physical objects 12. But, at the very least, we should be 
worried about equating the solidity of physical objects with the impossibility of two 
13 
such objects occupying the same place at the same time 
10 A nice discussion of Locke's notion of solidity can be found in Alexander, 1991. Locke's views on 
solidity are vigorously disputed in Hume, 1978, Bk. I, Pt. IV, §4. That all physical objects are 
impenetrable is accepted by Quinton, 1964. Impenetrability also makes it on to Bermudez's list of 
`object properties', 1998, pp. 72-73, although it is unclear how this relates to a specifically Lockean 
understanding. 
See Wiggins, 1968. 
12 See, for example, Burke, 1994. 
13 It is true that, in his discussion of impenetrability, Locke seems to be making the point that body's 
being impenetrable just amounts to the claim that one cannot simply squeeze it out of existence. Or, 
rather, that one cannot compress the matter of one object into exactly the same place as that of another. 
Does the example of material composition not somehow bypass this aspect of Lockean solidity? 
Possibly, but I think that the language of compression is inessential. Lockean solidity prohibits that 
passing of one object through another. But thought experiments concerning memory-transfers and so 
on may well lead us to think that a person could pass through a body. 
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The way forward, I suggest, is to weaken the notion of solidity that is in play. 
We need an essential property of physical objects which falls short of solidity 
conceived as impenetrability. We might turn, in this vein, to Peacocke's, 1993, 
discussion of the property of being subject to mechanical forces, 
I suggest that for something to be a quantity of matter is for changes in its state of motion to be 
explicable by the mechanical forces acting on it, and for its changes in motion to exert such forces 
(Peacocke, 1993, p. 170) 
If this is correct, then since physical objects are quantities of matter, physical objects 
are essentially subject to mechanical forces. Peacocke treats this claim as an 
assumption. As there seem to be no obvious counterexamples (physical objects not 
subject to mechanical forces), I will follow his lead. It looks as though we are now in 
a position to claim that experience as of physical objects requires experience as of 
force. For, since the notion of force is so `intimately connected' with that of a 
physical object, if we experience something which we do not experience as solid, we 
are not experiencing it as a physical object at all. Thus, we turn the solidity argument 
into the mechanical forces argument. 
But we have moved rather quickly here. First, it is not clear why the fact that 
physical objects are necessarily subject to force means that to experience something 
as a physical object is to experience it as being subject to force. Second, it might be 
held that all that is required to experience something as subject to force is that it be 
thought of as being subject to force. But this need not require that one has experience 
as of force. I take each of these difficulties in turn. 
Let us suppose, for a moment, that the laws of nature are necessary' 4. If so, it 
will be the case that physical objects are necessarily subject to Newton's law of 
cooling, which states that the rate of cooling of a hot body which is losing heat both 
by radiation and by natural convection is proportional to the difference in temperature 
between it and its surroundings 15. But, we should not infer from this that in order to 
experience something as a physical object one must experience it as subject to 
Newton's law of cooling. Since this is the case, we should not move from the fact that 
physical objects are necessarily subject to mechanical forces, to the conclusion that to 
14 As is argued in Shoemaker, 1998. 
15 Ignore the fact that this law does not hold for large temperature excesses. 
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have experience as of physical objects, one must have experience as of things which 
are subject to mechanical forces. Even if physical objects are necessarily F, it does not 
follow that to have experience as of physical objects one must have experience as of 
Fness. This runs counter to Peacocke's own view. He claims that the following is a 
"general principle governing the ascription of content" (Peacocke, 1993, p. 169), 
If an account of what is necessarily involved in something's having a certain property makes reference 
to some substantial condition which must be met by things which have it, a thinker's mental 
representations of that property must be suitably sensitive to the existence of this substantial condition. 
(Peacocke, 1993,171) 
The relevant property is that of being a physical object, and the substantial condition 
is that of being subject to mechanical forces. If what I have said about Newton's law 
of cooling is correct, this principle is not entirely general. However, the particular 
application of it to the substantial condition of being subject to mechanical forces 
does command some intuitive plausibility. As Peacocke writes, 
Consider a case in which (say) a creature is in fact surrounded by holograms, which come into 
`contact' with one another... This subject is unsurprised when these objects exert no force on him when 
they `touch' his surface, and does not expect to have to exert any force to `move' one of them out of his 
way. I have no objection to saying that this subject conceives of these things in his environment as 
objects. But... I do not think that he conceives of them as material objects. (Peacocke 1993, p. 174) 
What presumably explains the difference in our intuitions about the two different 
substantial conditions is that being subject to mechanical forces is far more central to 
our concept of a physical object than is being subject to Newton's law of cooling. 
Since being subject to mechanical forces does appear to be central to our concept of a 
physical object, the relevant instance of Peacocke's application seems correct16. It is 
no objection to this that there could be counter instances to the principle. 
The second objection maintains that all that is required to have experience as 
of physical objects is that one think of them as being subject to mechanical force. One 
16 Other substantial conditions central to our concept of a physical object include being internally 
causally connected, and being an occupier of space. I would claim that Peacocke's principle holds true 
of these substantial conditions also. That is, unless one has experience as of internally causally 
connected space occupiers (that are subject to mechanical forces), one does not have experience as of 
physical objects. 
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need not experience them as such. It is clearly the case that we experience some 
things as physical objects without ever experiencing them as being subject to 
mechanical force. Maybe this is the case with the moon (for all but those lucky few 
who have been there). But for this to be an objection to the relevant step of the 
solidity argument, it must be maintained that a subject could have experience as of 
physical objects without ever having experience as of mechanical force. Consider a 
subject whose experience consists entirely in visually perceiving two moving spheres 
which never come into contact with each other. This subject has no experience 
whatsoever of mechanical force. The objection is that he might still be thinking of the 
spheres as subject to mechanical force, and thus able to experience them as physical 
objects. He might think that if they were ever to touch each other, then they would 
resist each other's movement, thus his mental representations are `suitably sensitive'. 
One way to counter this objection would be to claim that thinking of an object 
as subject to mechanical force is only possible if one has had some experience as of 
mechanical force. In the terminology of chapter six, this is the claim that the concept 
of mechanical force is experience-dependent. Earlier I claimed that it is plausible to 
think that some spatial concepts are, in an important sense, experience-dependent. But 
can we say the same thing about the concept of mechanical force? Certain remarks 
made by Peacocke, and expanded upon by Cassam, suggest that the answer to this 
question should be yes. Peacocke writes that, 
someone capable of experiences of force may have available ways of thinking of that magnitude which 
are unavailable to someone who does not have experiences of the same general kind. (Peacocke, 1993, 
p. 1 73) 
Cassam concurs, 
like other concepts of primary qualities, these are concepts which someone who has them must be in a 
position to apply on the basis of experience ... 
A thinker who has never had any experience of shape or 
force is one who has no proper conception of shape or force. (Cassam, 2002, pp. 328-329) 
Unfortunately, we are offered little by way of argument for this claim. Maybe the 
claim does have some intuitive force, but it seems a great deal less convincing than 
the claim made in chapter six about the experience-dependence of spatial concepts 
such as here. In that case, we were considering a subject with no spatial experience 
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and asking whether he or she could be in possession of spatial concepts. As such, that 
hypothetical subject was in a far more attenuated experiential situation. Lacking all 
spatial experience, it seemed plausible to think that he or she lacked spatial thought. 
But the present hypothetical subject is in an experientially richer situation. True, there 
is no experience as of mechanical forces, but we as yet have no reason to think that 
the content of the relevant visual experience would differ in any significant way from 
ours. Removing all spatial experience seems more likely to deprive us of ways of 
thinking than does removing all experience as of mechanical force. 
Of course, these remarks are highly speculative. It might turn out that this 
apparent gap in the solidity argument can be filled by some plausible general principle 
governing the ascription of conceptual capacities. It is advisable, then, to look at the 
remainder of the solidity argument to see whether or not it is worth searching for such 
a principle. 
7.3 Touch and Bodily-Awareness 
What are the transcendental conditions of the experience as of mechanical force? 
There are two steps to be looked at in this section. One is the claim that experience as 
of mechanical force necessarily requires the sense of touch. The second is that the 
sense of touch comes hand in hand with bodily-awareness. Together, these amount to 
the claim that only a subject with bodily-awareness could experience objects as being 
subject to mechanical forces. For ease of presentation it will be useful to take the two 
claims in reverse order. 
So, what is the relationship between touch and bodily-awareness? Following 
O'Shaughnessy, 200017, we can distinguish between six principle types of tactile 
perception: momentary point contact, extensive contact, passive touch involving 
movement, guided but passive touch involving movement, active exploratory 
movement, and tactilely led circumambulation. O' Shaughnessy makes three major 
claims concerning these types of tactile perception, two of which I take to be rather 
implausible. The first is that the complex cases are `built out of the simple case of 
momentary point contact. The second is that it is not until limb-movement is 
17 The relevant chapters (23 and 24) of this book follow, almost word for word, his two earlier papers, 
1995, and, 1989.1 refer to the more recent version since, where small changes have been made, I 
assume this represents O'Shaughnessy's current view. 
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introduced into the tactile project that we are able to perceive the shapes of objects 
(according to O' Shaughnessy, this occurs to a limited extent in guided but passive 
touch involving movement, but is only fully apparent in active exploratory 
movement). Finally, O' Shaughnessy claims that the sense of touch is dependent on 
bodily-awareness. 
The implausibility of the first claim can be seen by considering the simple 
case. The information gained in momentary point contact is `something solid here' 
(O'Shaughnessy, 2000, p. 662). One of the interesting features of this simple case is 
how the `here' is specified. It seems to be something like end-of-finger-attached-to- 
hand-attached-to-arm-etc-stretched-out-in-front-of-body. The `here' is specified as a 
body-relative point and the information includes both the point on a particular limb 
and the general orientation of the entire body. The properties of the object which are 
disclosed are solidity and here (understood as body-relative position). In line with the 
previous discussion, this solidity should not be conceived as `absolute 
impenetrability', but as `subject to, and exerting mechanical force'. I will adopt this 
usage for the remainder of the chapter. In the awareness of the `here' aspect, I am 
aware of the orientation of my own body through bodily-awareness. My attention can 
be directed either inward towards my body or outward towards the object. In fact it 
seems plausible to say that my attention is always both inward and outward, one 
focally and one peripherally. When I switch perspective from inward to outward (or 
vice versa) I am shifting the balance between focal and peripheral awareness 
e provides (Bermudez, 1998, pp. 138-9)18. In O'Shaughnessy's opinion this simple cas 
the material out of which the complex cases of tactile perception are constructed. So, 
for instance, active exploratory movement is built out of lots of related `something 
solid here's. 
There are several reasons for thinking that the simple case fails as an adequate 
building block for complex perceptions. First, the idea that solidity is perceived in 
momentary point contact is highly implausible. The solidity of an object is only really 
discoverable given the action or movement of the perceiver 
19, for we perceive that an 
18 In his classic text on touch, the psychologist David Katz writes, "A subjective component which 
refers to the body seems inescapably linked with a second component that refers to the properties of 
objects. We therefore describe tactual phenomena as bipolar... At any moment either the subjective or 
objective side of tactual perception may be dominant, but this bipolarity nevertheless exists" (Katz, 
1989, p. 41). 
19 Or, possibly, the movement of the object one is in contact with. 
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object is solid through its offering resistance to movement20. Even if this claim is 
rejected it is certainly convincing to think that the perception of something as solid 
requires the possibility of movement, and that this requires the temporal dimension 
lacking in momentary point contact. So, maybe the information of point contact is just 
`some sensation here'. But if this is the case, it becomes difficult to see how the 
information given in complex tactile perceptions, which includes more than just 
sensations, can be built out of the purely sensational simple case. 
The second reason for suspicion is a general mistrust of such atomistic 
accounts of perceptual experience. The idea that the perception of an object is 
composed of lots of perceptions, one of each of its parts, just grossly misrepresents 
the phenomenology of perception, tactile or otherwise. Perceptual experience doesn't 
seem to be like that, so we would need good reason to believe that the structure of 
tactile perception is actually of this form. As far as I can see, O' Shaughnessy gives us 
no such reason. 
What about the second claim, that it is not until limb-movement is introduced 
into the tactile project that we are able to perceive the shapes of objects? 
O'Shaughnessy's claim is that neither momentary point contact nor extensive contact 
provide us with any determinate information concerning the shape of the object 
perceived. Such shape properties are only perceptible once the element of limb- 
movement has been introduced (O'Shaughnessy, 2000, p. 665). So, resting my hand 
against an object does not reveal the shape properties of that object to me. On the 
other hand, if someone guides my passive hand around the edges of the same object I 
will gain that information (even more so if I actively feel the object). Thus, 
O' Shaughnessy makes limb-movement a condition of the tactile perception of shape 
properties. But this seems false. Extensive contact is not so poor in spatial 
determinations as O' Shaughnessy would have us believe. Rather, we are to some 
extent able to discern the shapes of objects in this way. For instance, Martin's 
suggestion that we can imagine someone who could tell the difference between a 50- 
20 This claim has been disputed by Fricke and Snowdon, forthcoming. They point to experiences such 
as moving down a slide in which solidity is perceived but not as offering resistance to the movement of 
the perceiver, quite the opposite. This is, in a sense, correct but it is not damaging to the claimed 
relation between solidity and resistance. Of course, the solidity of the slide facilitates the movement of 
the perceiver, but it is also experienced as preventing the perceiver from 
falling immediately 
downwards. As Locke says, "Whether we move, or rest, in what posture soever we are, we always feel 
something under us, that supports us, and hinders our farther sinking 
downwards. " (Locke, 1975, Bk. ll, 
Ch. IV, § 1). This is no less true when one is, for instance, on a slide. 
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pence and a 10-pence piece by having them pressed against their skin, seems perfectly 
reasonable21. The point remains, however, that shape properties are much easier to 
perceive tactilely when limb-movement is introduced. It is just that some shape 
properties can be perceived with stationary limbs. As I suggested above it is 
perception of the property of solidity that requires some movement (or at least the 
potential for movement) on the behalf of the perceiver. 
These considerations highlight the major divergences of O'Shaughnessy's and 
my own views of touch and its phenomenology. This said, I think that the most 
important aspect of O'Shaughnessy's account of touch (and its relation to bodily- 
awareness) is substantially correct. His idea is that we come to know the spatial 
properties of tactilely perceived objects through coming to know the spatial properties 
of the bodily movements involved in the perceptual project. Thus, in (active) touch, 
we know the perceived object to be round because we know that our hand has traced a 
circle22. There is a match between the spatial property of the perceived object and of 
the perceiving bodily movement. The awareness we have of the spatial properties of 
our bodily movements is not prior to the awareness we have of the spatial properties 
of the objects perceived. On the contrary, for the most part our attention is directed 
outwards towards the object. Nevertheless, an awareness of the bodily movements of 
the perceiver is a necessary mediator in tactile perception. Since this awareness of 
one's own bodily movements etc. is an exercise in bodily-awareness, this shows an 
important sense in which tactile-sense depends on bodily-awareness23. 
I suggest that we accept this third claim of O'Shaughnessy's. That is, we 
should accept that without an awareness of the spatial properties of body parts, bodily 
movements, or bodily sensations, there would be no tactile awareness of objects. That 
this is the case can be seen from the preceding considerations. For the content of, both 
simple and complex, tactual perception includes a body-relative location. Awareness 
21 Martin, 1992, p. 208. 
22 O'Shaughnessy, 2000, p. 676. 
23 This claim has recently been rejected by Scott, 2001. Scott offers three groups of counterexamples to 
O'Shaughnessy's account of this close relation between the content of tactual perception and the 
content of bodily-awareness. These are; the perception of non-spatial properties such as oiliness and 
stickiness, dynamic tactile perception with held objects such as pencils or metal rods, and certain tactile 
illusions. Scott claims that in each of these cases, there can be tactile perception without the 
corresponding state of bodily-awareness. However, I don't think that these supposed counterexamples 
are particularly damaging to the solidity argument, for even if Scott has managed to come up with 
individual counterexamples, he has not shown (nor, I imagine, would he wish to claim) that a subject 
could enjoy tactual perception whilst entirely lacking any kind of bodily-awareness. 
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of sensations or felt properties at a body-relative location is an exercise in bodily- 
awareness. Furthermore, the tactile perception of all but the most basic of shape 
properties is only perceptible given bodily-movement. We know that the object is 
round because we know we have traced a circle. We know that through bodily- 
awareness. So, touch is dependent on bodily-awareness. 
We now come to the other (postponed) step in the solidity argument. This is 
the contention that solidity (being subject to, and exerting mechanical forces) is only 
perceptible to a creature endowed with a sense of touch. We have seen that solidity is 
perceptible through touch, but not yet that a creature capable of perceiving solidity 
must be equipped with a sense of touch. Someone sceptical of this claim might hold 
that a subject without a sense of touch could perceive solidity, possibly through visual 
perception24. If this represents a possibility, then the solidity argument is in trouble. 
Such a possibility is denied by Joske, 1967. In what is, effectively, his own version of 
the solidity argument, he claims that, 
A purely contemplative being could observe visual objects behaving like solid objects behave. Thus, he 
could observe them moving, falling apart or changing their shape when coming into contact with other 
objects, and he could also observe that moving objects stopped or veered when they encountered 
immobile objects. He might describe all objects which behaved in this way as, say, `apenetrable'. But 
this concept of apenetrability would not be the same as our concept of impenetrability or solidity (Joske 
1967, p. 19) 
Joske takes solidity to be impenetrability but we can read our own version of solidity 
into his claim. His claim might be rewritten as being that visual perception could, of 
itself, only provide an experience as of shmecanical forces, but not mechanical forces. 
But the passage is less an argument than a statement of the conclusion. The question 
which immediately arises is, why could this purely contemplative being not possess 
the concept of mechanical force? The answer given by Joske is that he would not be 
able to tell the difference between impenetrable and apenetrable objects. He claims 
that such a subject, "would never be in a position to know that any particular object 
was itself a solid" (Joske, 1967, p. 20). But this point is not enough to show that he 
could not possess the concept of mechanical force. Being unable to tell the difference 
'' Bennett, 1971, p. 93, interprets Hume as claiming that solidity can be both tactually and visually 
perceived. 
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between Fs and Gs does not entail that one does not possess the concept of a G. Not 
being much of a zoologist I cannot perceptually distinguish between ferrets and 
weasels, but this does not prevent me from possessing the relevant concepts25. 
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to think that I can have an experience as of a ferret. 
If this is correct, we have no reason to think that the purely contemplative being could 
not have experience of mechanical force, and thus experience as of physical objects. 
Pace Joske, it is highly intuitive to think that one can perceive mechanical 
force visually, as when one sees a car crash, or a game of snooker. And this point tells 
against the solidity argument. For the claim that the perception of solidity requires the 
sense of touch is simply offered with little in the way of justification. Since this is the 
case, it is of no help to the proponent of the solidity argument that the sense of touch 
requires bodily-awareness. 
Cassam, 2002, offers two replies to the current objection to the solidity 
argument, the first of which comes in two parts. First, he claims that the fact that a 
subject can visually perceive mechanical force is not enough to sink the argument, 
since visual perception itself requires bodily-awareness. He claims that, "Visual 
experience involves visual sensations, and visual sensations are, like all sensations, 
bodily occurrences" (Cassam, 2002, p. 325). Furthermore, visual experience is 
integrated with the awareness that we have of the position of the head and its relation 
to the rest of the body. But this, as far as I can tell, is not to the point. The fact that 
visual sensations (if such things there be) are bodily occurrences is neither here nor 
there. Visual sensation does not thereby become a form of bodily-awareness. 
Furthermore, it is uncontroversial that our visual experience is integrated with bodily- 
awareness is a variety of ways. What the proponent of the solidity argument must 
claim, however, is that visual experience is necessarily integrated with bodily- 
awareness. And we are not offered any reason to believe this26. 
The second of Cassam's replies to the purely contemplative being objection is 
best seen, I suggest, as a way of bolstering the first reply. He writes, 
25 This point relies on the rejection of something like Russell's Principle, thought of as applying to 
properties. I am denying the claim that to think of something as F one must have discriminating 
knowledge of Fness. 
26 Cassam draws on points made by Ayers, 1991, Vol. I, p. 187. But Ayers takes himself to be merely 
describing the character of our actual experience. 
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only a creature with a sense of touch and the ability to exert force with its own body can properly be 
said to see other bodies as exerting and being subject to mechanical forces. The suggestion here is that 
were it not for one's own bodily engagement with he world, there would be nothing in virtue of which 
it would be correct to say that force enters into the content of visual experience. (Cassam, 2002, p. 325) 
Here Cassam suggests that the reason why visual perception is necessarily integrated 
with bodily-awareness is that visual perception is necessarily bound up with the 
capacity for action, and that this capacity requires bodily-awareness. I leave 
discussion of this argument to the following chapter, where I evaluate the merits of, 
what I call, the action argument. 
7.4 Objections 
I have already discussed several objections to the solidity argument. First, it was 
pointed out that there seems nothing incoherent about the possibility that a subject 
might enjoy spatial perception but not of a single unified spatio-temporal system. 
Second, it was objected that place reidentification could occur on the basis of feature 
reidentification. Neither of these objections, it was argued, poses much of a threat to 
the solidity argument. However, it was then objected that one might think of objects 
as subject to mechanical force even though one had never had any experience as of 
mechanical force. And, finally, even if this objection could be met, it has been 
suggested that the perception of mechanical force might be available purely visually. 
Unless it rests on the, hitherto unexplored, action argument, the claim that perceiving 
mechanical force is only possible for a subject equipped with touch was found to be 
unjustified. Before I leave the solidity argument, I want to mention two more 
objections that will, no doubt, have been in the minds of some readers throughout the 
previous sections. 
The first objection is an extremely natural one, and can be raised against any 
argument which purports to establish that bodily-awareness is a transcendental 
condition of self-consciousness (or pretty much anything else). The person who 
makes this objection simply points out that there are living breathing and, most 
importantly, self-conscious people who lack bodily-awareness. There are people 
unfortunate enough to have lost the majority of what I have been referring to as 
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bodily-awareness27. These people can, of course, still see their bodies, but they can no 
longer feel them from the inside. The most striking thing about such people is the 
amount that they can do rather than what they cannot. In particular, they can think of 
and experience objects as solid, reidentify places, think of themselves as spatially 
located, and think first-person thoughts. Does the existence of actual cases of body- 
blindness not show that any argument which attempts to show that bodily-awareness 
is a transcendental condition of self-consciousness must fail? 
The answer to this question must be no. The actual cases of people who have 
lost their faculty of bodily-awareness have done precisely that, lost it. Throughout the 
discussion of the solidity argument we should be careful not to stretch the conclusion 
beyond the claim that a self-conscious subject must have had experience of 
embodiment at some point. It is consistent with this claim that a subject might lose 
their capacity for bodily-awareness and yet remain self-conscious, that mode of 
thought having already been made available to them. Thus, these actual cases do not 
show that the solidity argument is bound to fai128. 
Let us suppose that all of the objections considered thus far can be answered. 
There remains one last serious objection. The final worry concerning the solidity 
argument involves the charge of equivocation. Recall that the first step in the 
argument involved the claim that the reidentification of places involves the 
reidentification of things, or physical objects. This claim was defended through a 
defence of the claim that the reidentification of places necessarily rests on the 
reidentification of things that are thought of, or experienced, as internally causally 
connected. But, as I pointed out in chapter four, although it may well be that thinking 
of, or experiencing, something as internally causally connected is a condition of 
thinking of, or experiencing, something as a physical object, it does not appear to be a 
sufficient condition. For one may be thinking of, or experiencing, something as 
internally causally connected, and yet thinking of, or experiencing, it as a Cartesian 
soul, for instance. Thus, the most we should conclude from this defence of the first 
step of the solidity argument is that the reidentification of places necessarily rests on 
the reidentification of things. 
27 See Sacks, 1985, Ch. 3; Cole, 1991; and Cole and Paillard, 1995. 
28 Bermudez, 1995, gives an interesting account of the sort of interplay one can expect between actual 
cases and transcendental arguments of this type. 
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But, now, when we turn to the next step of the argument, we can see a much 
richer conception of physical object in play. For here, the argument rests on the claim 
that being subject to mechanical force is a necessary property of physical objects. But 
unless this is to count as an equivocation over two notions of object, we would need a 
linking premise to the effect that thinking of, or experiencing, something as internally 
causally connected means thinking of, or experiencing, it as a physical object in this 
strong sense. But this premise is not defensible. For it seems as though the 
reidentification of places need not employ the notion of mechanical force at all. As 
long as the subject thinks of, or experiences, the reidentifiable particulars as having 
their later states dependent on their earlier states, nothing more is required. And this 
appears to be possible. Consider a subject orienting himself by observing a series of 
holograms which he explicitly takes to be subject only to schmecanical force. There 
appears to be nothing preventing that subject from thinking of, or experiencing, those 
as things, i. e. as internally causally connected. But he is by hypothesis not thinking of, 
or experiencing, them as physical objects, i. e. as being subject to mechanical force. 
Given this long list of objections to the solidity argument, it would seem wise 
to move on. For we are not really able to make any empirical assumptions with which 
to bolster the argument, without rendering the conclusion trivial. The first empirical 
assumption which we made at the beginning was that we are only to consider those 
self-conscious subjects who have experience as of a single unified spatio-temporal 
system. This seemed innocent enough. But, if we were to patch up every hole in the 
argument, we would need to assume that the self-conscious subjects that are covered 
by this argument have experience as of solid objects, and have tactile experience as of 
solidity. But this is to assume so much as to make the conclusion trivial. 
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8. Action 
Q: Why didn't the ghost go to the Halloween Ball? 
A: Because he had nobody to go with. 
There are two versions of the action argument; an experience-directed and a belief- 
directed version. Both claim that there is a tight connection between spatial perception 
and the capacity for spatial action. The experience-directed version then goes on to 
claim that experience as of having a body is a transcendental condition of the capacity 
for spatial action. The belief-directed version, on the other hand, claims that thinking 
of oneself as having a body is a transcendental condition of spatial action. I shall 
begin by examining the claim that spatial perception requires the capacity for spatial 
action. 
8.1 Perception and Action 
Several philosophers have claimed that there is a conceptual connection between 
spatial perception and action. The central claim tends to be, 
(Act) Spatial perception would not be available to a subject in the absence of any 
capacity for (spatial or bodily) action. 
Philosophers who have endorsed claims very much like Act include Schopenhauer, 
1966, Merleau-Ponty, 1962, Taylor, 1978-91, Hampshire, 1959, Evans, 1982, Brewer, 
1992, and Campbell, 1993. Act is an intriguing claim and has some intuitive 
plausibility, yet this is marred by the obscurity of the arguments which have been 
offered in its defence. My aim is to offer a defence of Act which, so far as is possible, 
avoids such unclarity. The topic is deep, and the waters murky. But I hope to move 
2 some way in the direction of making Act look as plausible as possible. 
1 Taylor never makes it clear whether he endorses Act or whether he is simply offering an 
interpretation of Merleau-Ponty. I shall speak as though the former were true, referring to it as 
`Taylor's argument'. 
2 One philosopher who explicitly rejects Act is G. Strawson, 2003, p. 228. 
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In considering the views of both Schopenhauer and Merleau-Ponty, special 
interpretational difficulties arise. Since this is the case I take, as my point of 
departure, an argument offered by Taylor. This seems like a sensible place to begin, 
since a direct line of influence can be traced from Taylor to Evans, and from Evans to 
both Brewer and Campbell. 
Taylor's argument for Act can be summarised as follows: To begin with, "our 
perceptual field has an orientational structure, a foreground and a background, an up 
and down. And it must have; that is, it can't lose this structure without ceasing to be a 
perceptual field in the full sense" (Taylor, 1978-9, p. 154). The particular feature of 
the perceptual field that Taylor concentrates on is the up/down dimension3. According 
to Taylor, the perceptual field has the structure it has (i. e. has an up/down dimension) 
"because it is experienced as a field of potential action" (p. 155). That is, the 
perceptual field has its up/down dimension because the world is experienced through 
perception, as a place in which we can act. Why is this? The answer, says Taylor, is 
that "up and down are related to how one would move and act in the field. For it is 
only as a bodily agent functioning in a gravitational field that `up' and `down' have 
meaning for me. " (pp. 154-5)4. Thus, we come to the conclusion that "our perception 
of the world is essentially that of an embodied agent, engaged with, or at grips with 
the world. " (p. 154). 
We can go through this argument step by step. First we must ask whether it is 
plausible to say that the perceptual field necessarily has an up/down dimension. It 
might seem so. If there were no experienced up or down, then the field of perception 
would lack one of its dimensions, and that does not appear to make sense. We simply 
can't imagine what it would be like for our perceptual field to lack the up/down 
dimension. The absence of the up/down dimension, as it were, shrinks out the other 
dimensions. Think of the image of the television screen thinning to a horizontal line 
before finally vanishing. If this is right, then we might be persuaded to agree with 
Taylor, and say that if our perceptual field lost its up/down dimension, it would 
indeed cease `to be a perceptual field in the full sense'. 
3 Use of the phrase `perceptual field' should not be thought to imply a sense-data theory of perception. 
See Martin, 1992. 
4 Compare, "there is no way of specifying what `left' say, means, except by pointing to the left. " (Eilan, 
1997, p. 237). 
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But we have moved too quickly here. Certainly it is difficult, perhaps 
impossible, to imagine visual perception without the up/down dimension, but what of 
hearing? Hearing is a form of spatial perception, but we do not seem to have much 
difficulty in imagining ourselves lacking the up/down dimension in auditory 
perception. It will immediately be objected that hearing only gives us spatial 
information because it is so intimately related, in our own cases, with tactile, 
kinaesthetic and visual perceptions. It would follow that the possibility of imagining 
auditory perception lacking the up/down dimension is of little importance, since it 
only qualifies as spatial perception in some derivative sense. This may well be true, 
but there is, in any case, a stronger objection to Taylor's claim that if our perceptual 
field lost its up/down dimension, it would cease `to be a perceptual field in the full 
sense' . 
The objection is that Taylor's view is anthropomorphic. Consider the case of 
Eyeball. Eyeball is an intelligent creature inhabiting some, not so remote, possible 
world. Eyeball is rather like a slug, with the major difference being that his body 
consists in a giant, perfectly spherical eyeball, through which he can see in every 
direction at once. Eyeball is able to perceive his environment, and move around in it 
accordingly. Eyeball has the advantage that no-one can ever sneak up behind him, but 
the disadvantage that he can never turn his back on anybody. I have no hesitation in 
saying that none of us can know, or even imagine, what it is like to be Eyeball. We 
simply have no way of imagining what Eyeball's visual experiences are like. But we 
should not doubt that Eyeball has visual experiences. The question is whether 
Eyeball's visual field is structured with an up/down dimension. I see absolutely no 
reason to think sob. The point is that even though we cannot imagine what visual 
experience would be like without the up/down dimension, we have reason to think 
that it is at least possible. And if this is right, Taylor's claim cannot be accepted7. 
5 As is claimed by Strawson, 1959, p. 65. 
6 Won't Eyeball still feel the pull of gravity and so orientate his world into an up and down? No - 
Eyeball lives in space. But doesn't Taylor admit that, "it is only as a bodily agent functioning in a 
gravitational field that `up' and `down' have meaning for me" (Taylor, 1978-9, p. 154-5, emphasis 
added). Well, if he really thinks that, he must think that perceptual experience is only possible for 
creatures that have grown up with gravity. This is implausible. 
It might be suggested that Taylor's argument is not drastically undercut by this objection. For it may 
be that Taylor is interested in the necessary conditions of having spatial perception of the kind we have. 
For we have allowed that any spatial perception imaginable by us has an up/down dimension. This 
reading is supported by Taylor's claim that "we couldn't have a subject with a field articulated like 
ours who as a matter of contingent fact, might not be an embodied agent" (Taylor, 1978-9, p. 156, 
emphasis added). 
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This objection, which I believe to be a good one, is an application of a more 
general point made by Campbell. Campbell's aim is to define the notion of an 
egocentric frame of reference. In this connection, he writes that "an approach which 
tries to define what it is for a frame to be egocentric by simply listing a set of axes 
will not work. Again, there is no reason to suppose that all species will use the same 
egocentric axes" (Campbell, 1993, p. 74). Campbell's alternative to this `extensional 
approach' to defining the notion of an egocentric frame of reference is to consider 
"how the subject is apprehending those axes" (p. 74). That is, what is distinctive of an 
egocentric frame of reference is not the axes used, but the way in which those axes are 
apprehended by the subject. 
We might make a similar point as regards Taylor's argument. Instead of 
claiming that the perceptual field necessarily has a certain orientational structure (i. e. 
an up/down dimension), we should consider the possibility that the orientational 
structure of the perceptual field, whatever that may be, is necessarily apprehended in a 
particular way. We might, then, try to salvage the bones of Taylor's argument by 
claiming that: (1) the perceptual field necessarily has an orientational structure, (2) 
this orientational structure is necessarily apprehended by the subject as a `field of 
potential action', for (3) it is only `as a bodily agent functioning in a gravitational 
field' that the structure of the perceptual field has `meaning for the subject'. 
Therefore, (Act) spatial perception would not be available to a subject in the absence 
of any capacity for (spatial or bodily) action. 
All this is still rather obscure, but if it can be made satisfactorily transparent, at 
least we will have managed to evade the charge of anthropomorphism. Eventually, I 
want to endorse something very much like this defence of Act. Clearly this can't be 
done until we have some elaboration on the enigmatic (3). Before I get on to (3), 
however, I want to say something in explanation and defence of (1). 
I take (1) to mean, roughly speaking, that perception is necessarily from a 
particular point of view. Perception is perception from somewhere. Furthermore, the 
content of perception is, what we can call, self-locating. That is, in perceiving the 
world I am simultaneously made aware of where worldly objects are and where I 
myself am. As Brewer puts it, "perception places us in the perceived world" (Brewer, 
1992, p. 17). This seems right. If to perceive something is to perceive it from 
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somewhere, some of the content of any perceptual state will represent the spatial 
relations which hold between the perceiver and the objects perceived; it is 
'egocentric'. If perception is always perception from somewhere, it seems 
inconceivable that the content of a perceptual state could fail to include some 
information as to the position of the perceiver. So, we should agree with Taylor that 
the perceptual field necessarily has an orientational structures. 
What remains to be seen is whether any sense can be given to the claim that it 
is only `as a bodily agent functioning in a gravitational field' that the structure of the 
perceptual field has `meaning for the subject'. In giving a sense to this claim we will, 
I suggest, be answering the question, `In virtue of what is perception self-locating? ' 
or, in Taylor's terms, `In virtue of what does the perceptual field have its orientational 
structure? '. We must approach these questions carefully, through a proper 
understanding of the notion of a frame of reference. For, yet another way to ask what 
is the question is, `What is it for a frame of reference to be egocentric? '. To answer 
these questions, we must look at the notion of a frame of reference. In the following 
two sections we will see that Campbell is right to say that listing a set of axes will not 
help us here. What is more, we shall see that listing particular types of frames of 
reference will not help us either. Rather, we need to look at how a particular set of 
axes, or type of frame of reference, is apprehended by the subject. 
8.2 Frames of Reference 
The idea that spatial representations (be they linguistic, pictorial, perceptual or 
whatever) employ Frames of reference (FoRs) is a common one. The notion of a FoR 
is best approached by example. Consider the following perceptually presented scene 
showing a man and an ambulance: 
8 There is a question as to whether perceptual content is self-referential or self-indicating, i. e. is the 
content of perception `door ahead of me' or `door ahead'? On the self-referential view, perceptual 
content contains the 1 concept. On the self-indicating view, perceptual content does not contain the 1 
concept, but has content which justifies the corresponding I judgement. This 
is thought to be so 
because the perceptually presented `door ahead' a priori entails `door ahead of me' for those with the 
relevant concepts. For the self-referential view, see Peacocke, 1999, p. 
264. For the self-indicating 
view, see Campbell, 1994a, p. 119. 
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Here we can say that the man is to the left of the ambulance. However, we can also 
say that the man is in front of the ambulance, without implying that either has moved. 
The reason is that in each case we are employing a different FoR. We might think of a 
FoR as a way of specifying the spatial relations between objects. More specifically, a 
FoR is an origin and set of axes which define a direction system. Thus, relative to one 
origin and set of axes, the man is to the left of the ambulance, relative to another he is 
in front of it. When we say that the man is in front of the ambulance, it is natural to 
think that the axes employed are the left/right, front/back axes, and the origin is the 
ambulance. When we say that the man is to the left of the ambulance, it is natural to 
think that the axes employed are the left/right, front/back axes, and the origin is the 
viewer9. 
With these notions introduced, we can move on to a more elaborate 
characterisation of the different kinds of FoR. Unfortunately there are several 
competing views on how to distinguish between different kinds of FoR. Instead of 
reviewing the literature on frames of reference, I will simply outline the view that 
seems, to me, to make most sense of the debate. This is the framework proposed by 
Levinson, 1996. This framework is described at the level of linguistic representation, 
so we must briefly turn to language. We'll return to perception later. 
Levinson distinguishes between three kinds of FoR: intrinsic, absolute and 
relative. Let me work through each in turn. An intrinsic FoR is an object centred set of 
axes, with co-ordinates determined by the intrinsic features of the object. A spatial 
relation described by an intrinsic FoR can be called an intrinsic spatial relation. 
Intrinsic spatial relations are two-place relations, holding between the object upon 
which the axes are centred (ground) and the object who's position is determined 
relative to it (figure). For instance, in the above example, the sentence `the man is in 
front of the ambulance' employs an intrinsic FoR. The set of axes are centred on the 
9 According to the framework proposed below, these intuitive analyses turn out to be slightly 
misleading. 
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ambulance (ground), and co-ordinates are determined by its intrinsic features, i. e. its 
front and back, and its left and right-hand sides. Any object which has intrinsic 
features suitable for defining such co-ordinates can act as the origin of an intrinsic 
FoR. For instance, concerning fig. 4, `the cube is behind the dog' employs an intrinsic 
FoR who's origin is the dog. This is because the dog has an intrinsic front, back, left 
and right. However, `the dog is behind the cube' does not employ an intrinsic FoR 
who's origin is the cube. This is for the simple reason that the cube doesn't have the 
intrinsic features required to specify its back1°. If it could ever be true to say that the 
dog is behind the cube, there must be some other (non-intrinsic) FoR in play. 
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Next we can turn to absolute FoRs. There is a sense in which spatial 
representations which employ an absolute FoR are more simple than those which 
employ an intrinsic FoR since we don't have to concern ourselves with the intrinsic 
features of objects. An absolute FoR makes use of some fixed set of co-ordinates. An 
example is the up/down axes determined by the force of gravity, another is the set of 
axes comprising north/south/east/west. Absolute FoRs specify the spatial relation that 
holds between two objects (figure and ground) in terms of these `external' fixed co- 
ordinates. For instance, if we consider fig. 5, we might say that `the weightlifter is to 
the east of the car'. Here we are employing an absolute FoR. The axes used are the 
north/southleast/west axes, and the origin is the car. The sentence `the car is to the 
west of the weightlifter' employs the same set of axes, but with its origin on the 
weightlifter. 
10 Whether a given object is regarded as having such intrinsic features varies across different cultures. 
This is made clear in Levinson, 1996. For instance, the English language does not recognize an 
intrinsic front or back for objects such as trees. This differs from some Nilotic cultures, who say that 
the front of a tree is the opposite of whichever way it leans. See Levinson, 1996, n. 43. To this extent it 
might be regarded as infelicitous to call such features intrinsic, since we do not usually think of an 
object's intrinsic features as relative in this way. In what follows I shall ignore this worry. 
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A spatial relation described by an absolute FoR can be called an absolute spatial 
relation. Absolute spatial relations are two-place relations holding between figure and 
ground. As with intrinsic FoRs, the origin of the axes is always centred on the object 
which is the ground. 
Spatial representations which employ relative FoRs display the most 
complexity. Relative FoRs differ from both the intrinsic and absolute in that the 
spatial relations they describe are three-place relations. They involve, not only a 
figure and ground, but also a viewpoint. They use axes centred on the viewpoint to 
assign positions to both figure and ground. For example, the sentence `the man is to 
the left of the ambulance' is true offig. 3. But this clearly is not employing an absolute 
FoR, neither is it employing an intrinsic FoR, since the man is to the intrinsic front of 
the ambulance. Rather, it employs a relative FoR. It is true that the man is to the right 
of the ambulance, but only relative to the viewpoint of the speaker. 
The viewpoint which is the origin of the axes of a relative FoR need not be 
that of the speaker. If we look at fig. 6, and imagine A uttering `from B's point of 
view, the cat is to the right of the fish', he is employing a relative FoR who's axes are 
centred on the viewpoint of an individual other than himself. 
B 
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fig. 6 
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Levinson's suggestion is that every linguistic spatial representation can be 
analysed in terms of these three kinds of FoR. All that is required is grasp of the 
notions of a set of axes, an origin, a figure, a ground and a viewpoint. It seems to me 
that Levinson's framework is both clear and useful. It will become obvious, however, 
as we return to discuss FoRs in perception, that there are other distinctions that must 
be brought into play. 
Assuming that perceptual states represent the world as being a certain way 
spatially, and that these representations employ FoRs, we can ask what kind of FoRs 
are used". Is the full range of kinds of FoR employed in perceptual spatial 
representation? Let us go through each in turn. It seems reasonably plausible to 
suggest that perception can employ intrinsic FoRs. In fig. 3 we see that the man is 
standing in front of the ambulance. Surely `the man is in front of the ambulance' is 
part of the representational content of the perceptual state. If this is the case, 
perception employs intrinsic FoRs. 
What about absolute FoRs? It seems pretty clear that we can see that an object 
is above another. This representational content uses an absolute FoR. `Above' is 
rarely used in any FoR other than an absolute one with axes determined by the force 
of gravity. `Above' can be used to mean `above from my point of view' (relative), or 
`to the intrinsic top' (intrinsic), but such uses are rare. For instance, it is very natural 
to say that, no matter what angle it is viewed from, the bird in fig. 7 is above the radio. 
Even if the radio were upside down, we would still say that the bird was above it. 
I 
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" The points I make about frames of reference in this chapter are made in terms of a representational 
theory of perception. I assume, however, that the proponent of a non-representational theory can 
translate this talk into his or her favourite idiom. 
156 
Gravity is perceptually detectable. We feel its pull, and see it in action. This gives 
credence to the claim that perceptual content can employ absolute FoRs. But it might 
seem that there is no perceptual representation of absolute spatial relations on the 
horizontal plane. In English it is the north/south/east/west directional system that is 
most widely used as the external, fixed set of co-ordinates. And we don't see that 
some object is, for instance, to the west of another. But this view becomes less 
obviously correct when we consider the particular characteristics of some other 
languages. Levinson points out that Tzeltal (the relevant dialect of which is spoken by 
about 15,000 people in the Tenejapa community in Chiapas, Mexico) employs an 
uphill/downhill/across system. The community lives on the side of a mountain range, 
and these fixed axes, which are used in absolute FoRs, are readily perceptually 
detectable. Does it not seem plausible to say that a native Tzeltal speaker can see that 
a tree, say, is `downhill' of a house? I see no obvious reason for denying that the 
representational content of such a person's perceptual state might be expressible by 
`the tree is downhill of the house'. So, it seems likely that spatial perception can and 
does employ absolute FoRs. 
It seems obvious enough that perception employs relative FoRs. It is the most 
natural thing in the world to say that we see a to the left of b, or in front of b, where 
this is not employing an intrinsic FoR. Looking at fig. 3, it is part of the 
representational content of my perceptual state that the ambulance is to the right of the 
man. Furthermore, one might even argue that, concerning fig. 6, the following can be 
represented in A's perceptual state, `from B's point of view, the cat is to the right of 
the fish'. Of course it will be controversial whether perceptual representations can 
have such rich content (involving points of view etc. ). 
The conclusion seems to be that the perceptual representation of spatial 
relations employs intrinsic, absolute and relative FoRs. But things are not quite so 
simple. Consider the perceptual state I am in when I stand, facing forward with my 
eyes open, looking at a tree. In reporting the content of my state, I can say either 
`there is a tree in front of me' or `I am in front of a tree'. The first of these sentences 
employs an intrinsic FoR, with the set of axes centred on me. But the second does not. 
The FoR is not intrinsic, since the tree has no intrinsic front. The FoR must be 
relative, with myself as both viewpoint and figure. That is, I am in front of a tree, 
relative to my own point of view. 
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But it is unclear that this distinction should, or even can, be made when it 
comes to specifying the content of the perceptual state. It would seem to be an 
obvious case of double counting to say that my perceptual state has, as part of its 
content, both that I am in front of a tree, and that there is a tree in front of me. Thus, a 
note of caution is raised. Perhaps perceptual representation is at a more basic level 
than linguistic representation, in the sense that the intrinsic/absolute/relative 
distinctions don't easily apply. Of course, some philosophers will say that this 
phenomenon is simply a consequence of the fact that perceptual content is non- 
conceptual, and can be conceptualised in a number of equivalent ways. And, of 
course, this may very well be the right answer. I don't think that this view is forced 
upon us, however, for it is perfectly open for the conceptualist to claim that perceptual 
content is conceptual, but at a level which doesn't always respect the distinction 
between relative and intrinsic ways of representing spatial relations. 
If perceptual representations employ all three kinds of FoR, are we any closer 
to saying in virtue of what it is that perception self-locating? It is intuitive to think that 
we are. For it is tempting to think that the perceptual representation of space is special 
in that it employs FoRs that are relative. Perception provides one with information 
about the spatial location of objects around one relative to one's own point of view. 
Unfortunately, we cannot be satisfied with this answer. To see this consider a map, 
the paradigm of a spatial representation which is not self-locating. Think of this map 
as a photograph taken by a satellite positioned directly above you. The photograph 
contains you as an element, as it does the various things around you including, say, 
other people. This map represents the spatial relations between different objects in 
your environment and also between those objects and yourself. Furthermore, it 
conveys information in intrinsic, absolute and relative FoRs. Yet this map is not self- 
locating. It does not, of itself, tell you where you are. Pointing out that perception uses 
FoRs which are relative (as well as intrinsic and absolute) does not tell us what it is in 
virtue of which perception is self-locating. 
8.3 Viewer-Centred Frames of Reference 
The phrase `egocentric frame of reference' is often used to mean `frame of reference 
centred on the viewer/speaker'. I want to stay away from this use of the term 
`egocentric. Hence I shall use the phrase `viewer-centred frame of reference'. It is 
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sometimes claimed that perceptual states necessarily represent spatial relations in a 
viewer-centred FoR12. A viewer-centred FoR is any FoR who's origin is, or is a part 
of 3, the speaker/thinker/perceiver. A non-viewer-centred FoR is any FoR who's 
origin is not (any part of) the speaker/thinker/perceiver. 
According to this method of classifying FoRs any kind of FoR (intrinsic, 
absolute, or relative) can be viewer-centred. Linguistic examples (see fig. 8) are `the 
tree is in front of me', `the tree is north of me', and `the tree is to the right of the 
wigwam' respectively. Similarly, all three kinds of FoR can be non-viewer-centred. 
Linguistic examples are `the tree is in front of Bill', `the tree is to the south of Bill', 
and `from Bill's point of view, the tree is to the left of the wigwam'. 
Bill 
Me 
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Is it correct to claim that perception necessarily employs viewer-centred FoRs? There 
are two ways of understanding this claim. On one understanding I take it to be almost 
certainly false, on the other it is very close to being an important truth. The first 
(almost certainly false) of these is to understand the claim as meaning that every 
perceptual representation of space employs a viewer-centred FoR. If this were true, it 
would entail that we cannot see that the tree is in front of Bill. For that employs a non- 
viewer-centred FoR. Similarly, consider fig. 3 again, it would have the consequence 
1Z See, for instance, Bryant, 1997, pp. 247-8. Although he uses the term `egocentric' I think it is clear 
that he means what I mean by `viewer centred'. 
13 The general consensus is that in order to give an adequate explanation of the way in which spatial 
representations feed into action, it is necessary to employ a variety of viewer-centred 
FoRs centred on 
different parts of the body. See the various papers in Paillard, 1991. 
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that we cannot see that the man is in front of the ambulance. I take these 
consequences to be highly counterintuitive and suggest that, on this way of 
understanding it, the claim that perception necessarily employs viewer-centred FoRs 
is false. 
But there is another way of understanding the claim. We could understand it as 
the claim that every perceptual state must have at least some content which employs a 
viewer-centred FoR. Typically, every perceptual state has a vast amount of 
representational detail. So, for example, if presented with fig. 3, we see that the man is 
in front of the ambulance, and that the ambulance is to the right of the man, and that 
the ambulance has a cross on it, and so on. On this second way of understanding the 
claim, although some of the content of a perceptual state may employ non-viewer- 
centred FoRs, not all of it can. There must be some part of the content which employs 
a set of axes who's origin is the perceiver. This seems plausible. It stems from the fact 
that perception is necessarily perspectival. To perceive something is to perceive it 
from somewhere. Thus, some of the content of any perceptual state will represent the 
spatial relations which hold between the perceiver and the objects perceived. As was 
pointed out earlier, if perception is always perception from somewhere, it seems 
inconceivable that the content of a perceptual state could fail to include some 
information as to the position (point of view) of the perceiver. 
True as this may be, it does not help us to understand what is so special about 
the way in which perception represents spatial relations. To see this we need to 
consider, what might be called, Perry cases 14. A Perry case is a case of someone who 
perceives or refers to himself without realising it. The most famous example is that of 
Oedipus. If Oedipus were to utter the words `Jocasta is standing behind the slayer of 
Laius', he would be referring to (or designating) himself but without realising it. 
Indeed, he would be employing an intrinsic, viewer-centred FoR, but without realising 
it. Turning to the perceptual case, we can imagine someone who doesn't realise that 
he is looking into a mirror, seeing that the bogeyman is behind the rather good 
looking fellow. Here his perceptual state employs an intrinsic, viewer-centred FoR, 
but he doesn't realise it. 
These cases show us that the current proposal, that all perceptual states contain 
some viewer-centred content, cannot fully account for what is special about the 
14 See Perry, 1979. 
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perceptual representation of spatial relations. For it is entirely consistent with this 
proposal that all the viewer-centred content of a perceptual state be like a Perry case. 
But surely this is inconceivable. Unlike the map we considered in the last section, 
perception just isn't like this. The idea that a subject might have a perceptual 
awareness of the world and yet be unable, on the basis of that perceptual awareness, 
to locate him or herself is not conceivable. It would not be spatial perception in the 
sense that we are familiar with. Indeed, even if it were possible, it would be 
insufficient to satisfy the demands of the self-location argument, for that argument 
required that the subject be able to locate him or herself in space. So, in order to 
capture what is special about the self-locating perceptual representation of space, we 
are going to have to say more than simply that it necessarily employs viewer-centred 
FoRs. 
8.4 Egocentric Frames of Reference 
For an FoR to be egocentric doesn't seem to be a matter of the kind of axes used, or a 
matter of where they are centred. Thus, Campbell's claim, that the `extensional' 
approach is misguided, is vindicated. But what is it for an FoR to be egocentric? The 
answer, according to the action argument, lies in the intimate connection between the 
content of spatial perception and action. Egocentric FoRs are those which contain 
information that can be used immediately in action. Consider a fact, noted by Evans' 5, 
that, "egocentric spatial terms are the terms in which the content of our spatial 
experiences would be formulated, and those in which our immediate behavioural 
plans would be expressed" (Evans, 1982, p. 154). 
Suppose I see a glass on a table in front of me. The part of the content of this 
perceptual state which specifies the spatial relation between me and the glass16 is 
immediately usable by me in action, i. e. picking up the glass. For an intention to pick 
up the glass will involve exactly that content. This clearly seems to be the case. The 
next move is to use this fact in a definition of egocentric FoRs. For this fact leads 
naturally to the suggestion that an egocentric FoR is one which provides the subject 
with information that can be used immediately in the direction of action. As Campbell 
15 Also see, Peacocke, 1992, §4. 
16 Or maybe, my hand and the glass. 
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writes, "the axes that are distinctive of an egocentric frame are those which are 
immediately used by the subject in the direction of action. " (Campbell, 1993, p. 75). 
This marks a clear difference between the way in which perception represents 
the perceived environment, and the way in which a map does. The spatial relations 
between myself and my environment represented in the satellite photograph map 
mentioned earlier, cannot be used immediately in the direction of action. For, I need 
also to know which thing on the map is me. Suppose the map is of Trafalgar square, 
from above. I cannot, just on the basis of the information given (without knowing 
which of the things represented is me), move towards Nelson's column. However, this 
is not the case with perception. Nothing more is required than that I see which 
direction Nelson's column is in. This, of course, is because perception is self-locating. 
And, the suggestion is, what it is in virtue of which perception is self-locating, is that 
it can be used immediately in the direction of action' 7. 
We want this to be a necessary and sufficient condition. It seems reasonable to 
say that for an FoR to be egocentric, nothing more is required that that it is 
immediately usable in the direction of action. For if it is immediately so usable, then it 
really does seem to have `placed us in the perceived world'. Those sceptical of the 
account will argue that the condition is not necessary; that a FoR can be egocentric 
without it being immediately usable in the direction of action. To put some flesh on 
this objection it would be necessary to give a plausible example of a perceptual state, 
employing an egocentric FoR, but which is not immediately usable in the direction of 
action. For the time being I am content to conjecture that no such example will be 
forthcoming. Of course part of the reason for this is that we lack a plausible 
alternative account of what it is for an FoR to be egocentric. But, speaking intuitively, 
it seems that any representational state which succeeds in `placing the subject in the 
world' will certainly be usable in the direction of action for, by definition, 
information is given relating the subject to his surroundings, and it is that information 
which guides action. 
I have argued that there is a link between the perceptual field's having an 
oriented structure and the capacity for spatial action. But this is not yet complete as a 
defence of Act. For Act claims that spatial perception would not be available to a 
" Eilan, 1995, p. 348, makes the connection between the claim that perception is egocentric, in the 
present sense, and Gibson's claim that we perceive affordances for action. 
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subject in the absence of any capacity for (spatial or bodily) action. All we have said 
so far is that spatial perception necessarily provides the subject with information 
which is usable in the direction of action. But the fact that some perceptual 
information is usable in the direction of action, does not entail that the subject of such 
perceptual states is capable of action. We might think that there could be a subject 
who has egocentric perception, which would be usable by it in the direction of action 
were it capable of such action, but which is itself incapable. And presumably this is 
the position of someone whose entire body is paralysed. 
But, generally speaking, a subject with entire body paralysis was not always 
like that. Quite obviously, such a subject's capacity for spatial perception can outlast 
his or her capacity for bodily action. Of course some story will have to be told, but we 
might think it plausible that such a case is compatible with a liberal reading of Act. A 
better test case is a subject who is constitutively incapable of spatial action. Even 
better, in my opinion, is a subject who has no grasp of the possibility of acting in the 
space which it perceives. 
Consider four subjects: A, B, C, and D. A is fully capable of spatial action; B 
used to be capable of such action but is now entirely paralysed; C has never been 
capable of spatial action but has some grasp of the notion of spatial action and that it 
is not a possibility for him; D is constitutively incapable of spatial action, and has no 
grasp of the possibility of its spatially acting'8. 
According to no reading of Act is there any reason for thinking that A could 
not enjoy spatial perception. Similarly, it would be an implausibly strict reading of 
Act that entailed that B was not capable of spatial perception. C and D are much more 
difficult cases. One worry is that it is not immediately clear that C and D really do 
represent alternative possibilities. It is not clear that a subject could have a full grasp 
of the possibility of spatial action if it were constitutively incapable of such action. 
Let us ignore this worry. More pressing, I think, is that it is very difficult to see upon 
what grounds we could argue that C could not enjoy spatial perception. For even if we 
agree that there is a link between spatial perception and the capacity for spatial action, 
such that (i) spatial perception is necessarily egocentric, and (ii) egocentricity is a 
matter of being immediately usable in the direction of action, there is still a plausible 
18 De Gaynesford, 2002, argues against Act. However, he fails to adequately distinguish between B, C, 
and D. His arguments have no force against the minimal version of Act endorsed below. 
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reading upon which C is perfectly able to enjoy spatial perception. For having 
allowed B spatial perception (as we must) it seems a small step to allow it to C. It 
seems to make perfect sense to say that C grasps that his perceptual information 
would be immediately usable in the direction of action, if only he could move. 
It seems to me, then, that we need a minimal reading of Act, such that spatial 
perception would not be available to a subject in the absence of any grasp of the 
possibility of its spatially acting. Anything stronger looks implausible. But now we 
owe some answers to some difficult questions: What does it mean to say that a 
creature does, or does not, grasp the possibility of its acting? Further, why think that 
(i) and (ii) lead to this minimal version of Act? 
The answers to these questions come as a package. I shall argue that 
egocentric representations cannot be attributed to a subject for whom they do not 
`have a meaning', and that an egocentric content's having a meaning for a subject is a 
matter of his grasping the possibility of his acting on that content. Thus, we can lend 
our support to this minimal version of Act. The language used here refers back to that 
of Taylor. For, as I reconstructed it, Taylor's argument claimed that it is only `as a 
bodily agent functioning in a gravitational field' that the structure of the perceptual 
field has `meaning for the subject'. It remains to explain what these things mean. 
8.5 Having a Meaning for the Subject 
Let's summarise where we are so far: Spatial perception necessarily gives us 
egocentric spatial content (employs egocentric FoRs). Egocentric content is spatial 
content that is immediately usable in action. Taylor claims that it is only as an agent 
that this kind of content has a meaning for the subject. The implication being that in 
order to ascribe the content to a subject, it must have a meaning for that subject. But 
what does this mean? And why should we think it true? In an attempt to answer these 
questions, I shall return to his example of the up/down dimension. 
Taylor's use of the notion of meaning in his argument suggests that he 
considers it a transcendental condition on my having a perceptual field with the 
up/down dimension, that `up' and `down' `have a meaning for me'. But surely this 
does not mean that in order to have a perceptual field, I must understand the words 
`up' and `down'. For this would be to deny spatial perception to children and animals. 
And this just isn't an option. So what can we interpret Taylor as claiming? I suggest 
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that we take Taylor as suggesting that the space of the visual field is necessarily 
intelligible to me. This means that the up/down dimension is necessarily intelligible to 
me. Taylor's claim can then be reformulated as the claim that the up/down dimension 
is only intelligible to me given my status as a bodily agent. 
But what does this mean? What is it for the up/down dimension to be 
intelligible to me? Or, more generally, what does it mean to say that the space of the 
visual field is necessarily intelligible to me? One thing this can't mean is that I must 
be in possession of the concepts with which the space of the visual field would be 
specified (i. e. `up', `down' etc). For this would, again, be to deny spatial perception to 
animals, and maybe children. The relevant sense of `intelligible' is as follows: to find 
the space of the visual field intelligible is to be able to respond appropriately to 
differences in the content of spatial perception. Responding appropriately is not just a 
matter of registering different spatial contents as different' 9. Responding appropriately 
means registering different spatial contents as different in the very way in which they 
are different. This means that being able to appropriately register differences on the 
up/down dimension requires some grasp, however primitive, of the up/down 
dimension. This grasp is, without a doubt, not a matter of possessing certain concepts. 
It is the sort of grasp that lower animals have of the up/down axis. Such animals find 
the space of their perceptual field intelligible. That is, they are able to respond to 
differences on the up/down dimension as differences on the up/down dimension. This 
means that they have some rudimentary grasp of up and down. And since such 
egocentric content is content that is immediately usable in the direction of action, this 
means having a grasp of the possibility of acting on that content. 
So, when Taylor says that `it is only as a bodily agent functioning in a 
gravitational field that `up' and `down' have meaning for me', I interpret him to mean 
that it is only as a (bodily) agent that I have a rudimentary grasp of the up/down 
dimension. Such a grasp is required if I am to find the space of my perceptual field 
intelligible. `Up' and `down' (or any other egocentric terms) are directions of possible 
action. So, finding my perceptual field intelligible is a matter of experiencing it as a 
field of potential action. And finding the space of my perceptual field intelligible is 
indispensable to having such a field at all. 
19 See Evans, 1982, pp. 154-5. 
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But what reason do we have for thinking that this final claim is true? Why 
must spatial perception be intelligible? The reason is that the egocentric nature of 
spatial perception means that we hear a sound as coming from such-and-such a 
direction, or we see an object in such-and-such a direction. That the object is in such- 
and-such a direction is part of the content of those perceptual states. The thought is 
that if I were unable to respond appropriately to such contents, I could not be ascribed 
those representations. A creature might be able to discriminate differences in visual 
information on the up/down axis, but if it were not disposed to look up when it 
registered information from an object coming from above, what sense can we make of 
the supposition that it really did see the object as above it? It seems that perceiving 
spatial relations requires being disposed to respond appropriately to differences in 
content. Such appropriate response requires a primitive grasp of the space as 
egocentrically presented, and this means experiencing it as a possible field of action. 
This is what it means to say that spatial perception is intelligible. 
The defence of Act that emerges from these considerations is as follows: 
Spatial perception necessarily has an orientational structure. This orientational 
structure can be thought of as a matter of perception being self-locating, or employing 
egocentric FoRs. An FoR is egocentric if it is immediately usable in the direction of 
(spatial) action. But perceptual space must be intelligible to the subject of perception. 
This means that a subject must be able to respond appropriately to differences in 
spatial information. This entails that a subject of spatial perception must have some, 
however primitive, grasp of its egocentric space as a space which is immediately 
usable in the direction of action. Therefore, spatial perception necessarily gives us 
content which must be grasped by the subject as immediately usable in action. This is 
tantamount to saying that the perceptual field in necessarily experienced as a field of 
potential action. This constitutes my defence of a minimal version of Act, the claim 
that spatial perception would not be available to a subject in the absence of any grasp 
of the possibility of its spatially acting. 
8.6 Spatial Action and Bodily-Awareness 
There is both an experience-directed and a belief-directed version of the action 
argument. In this and the following section I look at each in turn. The experience- 
directed version of the argument rests on the claim that one can only possess the 
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capacity for spatial action, or grasp that it is a possibility for one, if one experiences a 
body as one's own. I shall be arguing against this claim. My view is that bodily- 
awareness is not even a transcendental condition of the capacity for spatial action, let 
alone a condition of the ability to grasp the possibility of spatial action. As such, the 
experience directed argument is a failure. 
One philosopher who appears to endorse this step of the action argument is 
O' Shaughnessy, 1980, and, 2000. He writes, 
intentional bodily movings require awareness of the animal's body: more, an attentively immediate 
awareness of the primitive variety that obtains in us all [bodily-awareness]. The following makes this 
clear. Consider a situation in which a man's right arm does not in this primitive way seem to its owner 
to be postured in any way, indeed does not in this way even seem there. Then irrespective of whether 
he vividly sees his arm, and knows exactly how it is spatially disposed, such a man is not in a position 
to immediately move it. Although he is not paralysed, in these circumstances his bodily will is simply 
unavailable for use upon his right arm. Thus he can instrumentally move his right arm with his left arm, 
he may even be able to instrumentally move it via a mental act like visualising, but he will not be able 
to immediately move it. This is because the bodily will takes an immediately given bodily object. What 
else? (O' Shaughnessy, 2000, p. 659) 
The idea is that intentional action (of the spatial variety) is only possible 
because the body-part to be moved is there for one. In the words of O'Shaughnessy's 
earlier book, it is immediately present. 
I suggest, then, that a necessary condition, though not of course a sufficient, of willing a phenomenon cp 
in a limb L, is that in some sense of the expression cp and L be `immediately present' to one. 
(O'Shaughnessy, 1980, p. 145) 
If, as in the case of O' Shaughnessy's example, one's arm was not immediately 
present to one, one would not be in a position to immediately move it; to will a 
movement in it. The conclusion being that without bodily-awareness, no spatial action 
would be possible. Since bodily-awareness is, centrally, a way of experiencing a body 
as one's own, this last step of the action argument is secured relatively easily. 
All this seems rather plausible, but notice a complication concerning the 
distinction between basic and non-basic (instrumental) actions. A basic action is an 
action a that one must perform in order to perform any other action, and for which 
there is no action that is performed in order to do a. An instrumental action is an 
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action a* for which there is a basic action which was performed in order to do a*20. 
For example (assuming, as O' Shaughnessy does, that bodily movements are basic 
actions), moving one's fingers is a basic action, turning the key, and opening the door 
are both instrumental actions. Basic actions are things that we do immediately, non- 
basic actions are things that we do non-immediately or instrumentally. 
Now, it should be noted that both of the quotations from O' Shaughnessy, 
above, concern basic actions. The first quote contrasts moving an arm immediately, 
with moving it instrumentally. The second claims that bodily awareness is a necessary 
condition of willing a limb to move. And, according to O'Shaughnessy's usage, one 
can only will basic actions. Thus, it is not being claimed that a limb's being 
immediately present to one is a necessary condition of one's moving it, but that its 
being immediately present is a necessary condition of one's immediately moving it, 
i. e. one's performing a basic action with it. 
Now consider the following passage concerning the man who's arm is not 
immediately present, "he can instrumentally move his right arm with his left arm, he 
may even be able to instrumentally move it via a mental act like visualising, but he 
will not be able to immediately move it". This is of utmost importance. For 
O' Shaughnessy is claiming that bodily-awareness is a transcendental condition of 
action, yet these remarks suggest that this might not be so. Clearly, if it is true that 
immediate presence is required for immediately moving a limb, then a creature 
entirely lacking bodily-awareness would not be able to partake in the first kind of 
instrumental action. It would not be able to move its right arm with its left arm since it 
would not be able to move its left arm. But might not such a creature be able to 
instrumentally move its limbs via `a mental act like visualising'? Maybe the following 
is a possible situation: the creature lacks bodily-awareness but is capable of engaging 
in the basic (non-spatial) act of `visualising'. By doing this the creature can effect 
instrumental movements of its limbs. Thus, this creature whilst lacking bodily- 
awareness is nevertheless capable of intentional action. 
Not only does this seem perfectly conceivable, there actually exist people who 
are like this. As mentioned in chapter seven, there have been several well documented 
cases of people who have gone `body-blind'. These are, effectively, people who lack 
bodily-awareness as we know it. They are, however, still capable of intentional 
20 See Danto, 1965. 
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bodily-actions. Although, in all cases, bodily-action was not possible immediately 
after the onsets of their various neuropathies, they gradually learned to perform quite 
advanced movements including, for example, walking. 
This appears to be a straightforward counterexample to the claim that bodily- 
awareness is a transcendental condition of spatial action. Whilst bodily-awareness is, 
in normal subjects, very intimately involved in the ability to perform spatial actions, it 
is not strictly necessary. It is clear that when a normal subject raises their right arm, 
say, they do so partly on the basis of their awareness of where their arm is. This is so 
natural as to be frequently overlooked. But, as the cases of body-blindness show, 
spatial actions can be performed in the absence of this awareness. But how do body- 
blind patients manage to act? Apparently, it seems that vision (and maybe hearing) 
and intense concentration replace bodily-awareness as the basis for action, 
Constant visual vigilance is required for any purposeful movement.... this visual feedback can only be 
used with concentration and intellectual effort. (Cole & Paillard, 1995, p. 250) 
This suggests that body-blind patients manage to perform spatial actions via 
something akin to O' Shaughnessy's `mental act like visualising'. If this is correct, 
then such movements could hardly be classed as basic actions, but they are actions 
nevertheless. It seems, then, that bodily-awareness is not a transcendental condition of 
spatial action. And this means that the experience-directed argument fails21. We have 
been given no reason to think it impossible for a subject, who has never had 
experience of a body as his, to engage in spatial action. For we have been given, in the 
case of body-blindness, a model upon which to base our understanding of how such a 
subject might go about this. Such a subject would be in a situation radically unlike our 
22 own, but we should not doubt its coherence. 
21 Another reason for doubting O'Shaughnessy's claim concerning bodily-awareness and spatial action 
comes in the form of certain experimental data. In an experiment described in Marcel, 2003, pp. 62-7, 
subject's right arms were occluded under a surface which had a light on it. Due to the muscle tendon of 
the arm being vibrated, subjects experienced their arm to be left of the light when it was actually to the 
right. That is, they suffered a `vibro-tactile illusion'. The subjects were then asked to move their hand 
to underneath the light. Despite the illusion, they had no difficulty doing this, their arm moving 
leftwards. However, subjects reported that they felt that they had moved their arms to the right. Here, 
whilst the subjects awareness of their action is illusory, their execution of the action is unimpaired. 
This is relevant to the current discussion in that it would appear to drive a wedge between feeling a 
limb to be present and positioned in a certain way, and being able to act intentionally with it. 
22 Such a subject would, perhaps, be like Descartes reminds me that l am not, "present in my body as a 
sailor is present in a ship" (Descartes, 1996, p. 56). 
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8.7 Having a Body 
Recall that the action argument is attempting to show that Cassam's second grade of 
apparent presence in the world is a transcendental condition of self-consciousness. 
This grade supposedly involves an awareness of oneself as `having' a body. There are 
two ways in which this might be interpreted. The first is that one must experience 
oneself as having a body. The considerations in the previous section tell against this. 
But there is another possible interpretation. Think again of body-blind people. People 
suffering from body-blindness can see their bodies (they manage to act via visual 
monitoring). They still make bodily self-ascriptions. Such people can look at their arm 
and make the visually-based judgement that their arm is bent, or whatever. Body blind 
people still have bodies which they continue to regard as theirs. Although they do not 
feel their bodies as theirs, they still think of their bodies as theirs. Maybe this is the 
key. We can now state the main contention of the belief-directed action argument. It is 
this: if a subject neither felt, nor thought of, a body as theirs they would not be able to 
engage in intentional spatial action. Here, the second grade of apparent presence in 
the world is being read as regarding oneself as having a body. 
We all `have' bodies, no non-sceptic will deny this. Even the most ardent 
dualist will allow that we bear a relation to our bodies that we bear to nothing else. 
My body is mine, not like my record player is mine, but in some far more primitive 
sense. This sense of mineness, or ownership, is most obviously apparent in bodily- 
awareness. For, as was claimed in chapter four, in bodily-awareness we feel this sense 
of ownership. As Martin has put it, 
When I feel an ache in my ankle, the ankle that feels hurt to me does not just feel like an ankle 
belonging to some body or other. Rather the ankle feels to me to be part of my body (Martin, 1995, 
p. 269) 
Cases of body-blindness show that such a felt sense of ownership is not a necessary 
condition of spatial action, for body-blind subjects lack such a sense. But there is a 
cognitive parallel. As well as feeling our bodies to be ours, we consider, or regard, our 
bodies to be ours. And body-blind subjects continue to do so. We can understand this 
`regarding a body to be one's own' as being closely related to the disposition to self- 
ascribe bodily predicates. 
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If a subject no longer felt or regarded his body as his, could he perform spatial 
actions? It is not obvious how. For such a subject would have no reason to try to move 
his arm rather than, say, a nearby table. If an already body-blind person were to suffer 
another neuropathy, the consequence of which was that he no longer regarded his 
body as any more part of him than any other physical object he would, on this 
suggestion, be incapable to spatial action. 
To this claim it will be objected that if a body-blind subject can instrumentally 
move his arm by some kind of mental act, then the currently envisaged subject could 
do much the same thing. So, the body-blind subject performs a mental act of 
visualising his arm moving, and by doing this he can move his arm. Mightn't it be 
that, in a similar way, a subject who does not regard his body as his could perform the 
mental act of visualising that arm as moving and thereby move it? After all, we can 
perform instrumental actions with objects which we do not consider `ours' -I open 
the can with the can opener. If such a case is coherent, haven't we described a subject 
who is capable of spatial action (albeit only instrumentally) but who does not satisfy 
the conditions of the second grade of apparent presence in the world? Two responses 
suggest themselves to this objection. The first is to claim that, despite first 
appearances, this does not represent a real possibility. The second is to claim that 
although the envisaged situation is possible, it is not true to say that such a subject 
does not think of a body as his. I shall discuss these in turn. 
One reason for thinking that a subject who did not feel, or even regard, their 
body as theirs would be incapable of (instrumental) spatial action is that such a 
subject would not understand the request `Move that arm'. Consider for a moment an 
ordinary subject. If we say to him `Move that table' he will walk over to it and push. 
If we say `No, move the table in the same way as you move your arm', he will be at a 
loss23. For if we are asked to will a movement in an extra-bodily object we don't even 
know where to begin. Do we think `Move! ', or mutter it under our breath? It is 
plausible to think that it just doesn't make sense to ask this of someone. But isn't our 
subject in much the same position with regards to his limbs? Since he does not regard 
them as his, he is in the same position regarding them as we are to tables. Thus the 
envisaged situation is not, in fact, possible. 
23 This is in line with the general thrust of O'Shaughnessy, 1980, Chs. 2-4. 
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But this line of thought is flawed. For what we (arguably) don't understand is 
how to move a table immediately; as a basic action. We can perfectly well move it as 
an instrumental action. We have already allowed that the subject in our example 
cannot move his limbs immediately; as basic actions. The question is whether he can 
move them instrumentally. Since it is perfectly easy for us to understand how it is 
possible for us to move extra-bodily objects instrumentally, we have no reason to 
think that the subject who did not feel, or even regard, their body as theirs would be 
incapable of moving their limbs instrumentally. 
What about the other response? The claim that although the envisaged 
situation is possible, it is not true to say that such a subject fails to think of a body as 
his? Let's review the situation. We have a subject who has no feeling in, or sense of 
his own body; he is body-blind. Furthermore, he does not regard his body to be his. 
That is, he does not self-ascribe any bodily predicates. He can see, what is in fact, his 
arm before him but does not think of this arm as `his', any more than he thinks of this 
chair before him as `his'. Now we add that this subject can perform mental actions of 
visualisation, via which he can instrumentally move what is in fact his arm. Imagine 
that the subject does this, and begins to instrumentally act with his body. Now after a 
while the subject is bound to notice that it is much easier to move one object than it is 
to move any others. For one object (his body) can be moved simply by visualising it. 
Whereas other objects can only be moved by visualising that one object as moving 
them. Thus, he will notice that he bears some sort of special relationship to that 
object. So, any subject in this situation has the capacity to come to realise that he 
bears a special relationship to one physical object, viz. it is the only object which he 
can move simply by visualising it. Isn't that subject now thinking of that object which 
is in fact his body as `his'? Since this subject is ex hypothesi a self-ascriber, isn't he 
now in a position to self-ascribe bodily predicates? 
He may well be, but that doesn't mean that he will. The test that we should use 
for whether a subject regards a body as his is whether or not he is disposed to make 
bodily self-ascriptions. But the fact, if it is one, that the subject currently under 
discussion is in a position to make such self-ascriptions does not show that he would 
be disposed to do so. It is still perfectly conceivable that this subject regard the object 
with which he has this special relationship as just that. That is, as just some object 
with which he has a special relationship as regards spatial action. 
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Once we are in this position, it becomes difficult to find a convincing reason 
to reject an even more extreme possibility. The possibility of Barny the angel. If the 
following is a possibility, then the belief-directed version of the action argument must 
be rejected. Barry is an angel. As far as he can tell he has no body, but is a purely 
spiritual entity24. Barry is a `point of view' on the world25. We might think of Barny 
on the model of an invisible man, suffering from congenital body-blindness. But 
Barry can perform spatial actions. These action take the form of moving backwards 
and forwards, left and right, up and down, and of rotating clockwise or anti- 
clockwise. He simply wills the movement of his point of view, and it occurs. Or 
maybe, he performs a mental action of visualising the movement, and then it occurs as 
a result. 
In this example Barny does not have some hidden disposition to self-ascribe 
bodily predicates. It looks as though the defender of the action argument is going to 
have to bite the bullet here and argue that Barny is not a possibility. How might this 
be done? Maybe it could be argued that the example is altogether too magical. It 
might be argued that for a spatial action to occur, there must be some sort of physical 
mechanism in place which partially explains the occurrence of the movement26. In the 
case of Barny, there is no such mechanism and therefore no action. But why assume 
that there is no mechanism? Perhaps Barny sits on an invisible, or glass platform. This 
cannot be perceived by Barny, but it is surely there. Further, there is an intricate 
mechanism linking Barny's (invisible) brain with his movable glass platform, such 
that willing it to move forward makes it move forward. Now we have a mechanism, 
but Barny still will not be disposed to self-ascribe any bodily predicates. The absence 
of mechanism doesn't seem to get us where we want to go. It doesn't show the 
impossibility of Barny's performing spatial actions. 
Some philosophers think that the situation I have described concerning Barny 
and his willed movements is, in fact, incoherent. For instance, McDowell suggests 
that when we consider Barny, we are considering "a self that recedes inward to the 
point of vanishing. With bodily agency in the picture, that bodily thing becomes 
something one can identify as oneself, now there is plainly something present in the 
24 This is consistent with him actually having a body. The point is that if he does have a body, he can 
neither feel, see, smell, hear or taste it. 
25 This possibility is akin to what Cassam calls `geometrical self-location', Cassam, 1997, pp. 44-51. 
Also, see McDowell, 1994, pp. 99-104. 
26 See, O'Shaughnessy, 1980, Ch. 4. 
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world for oneself to be" (McDowell, 1998, p. 143)27. It is true that there is something 
difficult to grasp about the possibility of the will being exercised on something as 
insubstantial as a point of view. But the fact that it is difficult to grasp does not show 
that it is strictly inconceivable. Indeed, the point of the present section has been to 
suggest that we can, in fact, conceive of such a situation. That considerations of the 
nature of spatial perception, and spatial action do not serve to show that Barny is 
impossible (that a self-conscious subject must satisfy the second grade of apparent 
presence in the world). So, on the basis of the action argument, we cannot conclude 
that embodied experience is a transcendental condition of self-consciousness. 
Z' Also see, McDowell, 1994, pp. 99-104. 
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9. Conclusions 
My official position towards the Body Claim is agnostic, and I hope to have shown that 
influential arguments in its favour are wanting. Whilst this conclusion is a negative one, 
we should not lose sight of the many positive claims that have been defended in the 
process. Although the Body Claim has not been substantiated, much has been learned 
along the way about both self-consciousness and embodied experience. 
In the first three chapters I defended the claim that central cases of self- 
consciousness necessarily involve self-reference. It was pointed out that arguments in 
favour of the Body Claim in fact tend to offer transcendental conditions on self-reference. 
For this to be relevant to self-consciousness, it must to be shown that self-consciousness 
necessarily involved self-reference. I argued against the two most serious objections to this 
view. Both the no reference view and Evans' theory of singular thought pose prima facie 
challenges to the connection between self-consciousness and self-reference. Those 
challenges, however, are not successful. The chapters that followed have been an 
examination of some of the consequences that might be thought to follow from the idea 
that self-consciousness necessarily involves self-reference. 
First, I argued against the view that an introspective awareness of oneself as a 
bodily subject is a transcendental condition on self-consciousness. We ourselves are 
counterexamples to this claim, since we are self-conscious, and yet do not have an 
introspective awareness of ourselves as bodily-subjects. Second, I argued that experiencing 
oneself or thinking of oneself as having a body was not, strictly speaking, a transcendental 
condition of self-consciousness either. This denial is different, since we evidently do (in 
the usual case) both experience ourselves and think of ourselves as having bodies. I have 
defended the view that self-consciousness requires that one think of oneself, and 
experience oneself, as spatially located. From the solidity argument I have concluded that 
(given certain empirical assumptions) spatial experience requires one to be able to think 
about internally causally connected things. From the action argument, I concluded that a 
self-conscious subject must also have some grasp of the possibility of its spatially acting. 
These are, of themselves, philosophically interesting conclusions, even though they do not 
achieve what the solidity and action arguments intended. 
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Central to the thesis has been the denial of Russell's Principle. One of the most 
important morals is that the defender of the Body Claim via the notion of self-reference 
needs to pay especial notice of his or her relation to Russell's principle. If Russell's 
Principle is accepted, it is difficult to forge the necessary connection between self- 
consciousness and self-reference. If Russell's Principle is rejected, many of the most 
popular arguments for the Body Claim are undermined. 
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10. Appendix 
Pryor, 1999, defines immunity to error in the following way (he refers to it as 
`immunity to de re misidentification'), 
a proposition is immune to de re misidentification when justified by grounds G just in case, 
whenever that proposition is believed on grounds G, then the resulting belief can not be in error 
through de re misidentification (Pryor, 1999, p. 279) 
Of course, we now need a definition of de re misidentification. Pryor says that we 
have a case of de re misidentification whenever the following three conditions are 
satisfied: 
i. There is some singular proposition about x, to the effect that it is F, that a 
subject believes or attempts to express. 
ii. The subject's justification for believing this singular proposition rests on his 
justification for believing, of some y, and of x, that y is F and that y is identical 
to x. 
iii. Unbeknownst to the subject, y-. 6x. 
Given this account of errors of misidentification, we can formulate a definition of 
immunity to error as follows: 
A belief of the form `a is F is de re immune when based on grounds G iff the 
following is not possible: 
(1) S's justification for believing that a is F rests on his justification for believing 
of some b that it is F and his justification for believing that a is identical to b. 
(2) a is not identical to b. 
Notice that this definition does not require S to believe either that b is F or that a is 
identical to b. So, it cannot require S's belief that a is F to be based on these two 
beliefs. Rather, the justification for S's belief that a is F rests on his justification for 
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believing these two propositions. However, it does seem to follow that S is justified in 
believing that b is F and that a is identical to b, for assuming that S is justified in 
believing that a is F, this justification could not rest on his justification for believing 
that b is F and that a is identical to b, unless he were justified in believing the second 
two propositions. On the other hand, if S is not justified in believing that a is F, his 
non-existent justification cannot rest on anything. 
Therefore, in one respect, Pryor's definition of de re misidentification (not de 
re immunity) is weaker than that implicit in the standard version (see chapter two), in 
that S need not actually believe that b is F or that a is identical to b. 
I have two objections to Pryor's way of formulating IEM, one technical and 
one rather more general. The first, technical, problem is this'. The right-hand side of 
the biconditional can be formalized as, `-*(1 A 2)', which is equivalent to, `-Q, (l A 
2)'. But that is equivalent to, `0-'(1 A 2)', which is equivalent to, `Q(-l v -2). 
However, since `a=b F Q(a=b)' is true, it follows that `-2 F Q-2' is true. 
So, the RHS will be true whenever a=b. But, this is the wrong result. It entails 
that a proposition is IEM whenever it can be based on a true identity judgement. So 
that `Hesperus is a star' will be IEM since it can be based on the judgements 
`Phosphorus is a star', and 'Hesperus=Phosphorus'. 
This difficulty can be circumvented, however, by altering the definition. I 
suggest that the notion Pryor is after can be captured in the following, 
The proposition `a is F' is immune to error relative to grounds G iff the 
justification for every possible judgement that a is F (based on grounds G) 
either: 
(1 *) does not rest on the justification for two judgements of the form `b is F and 
`a=b'. 
or, 
(2*) rests on the justification for two judgements of the form `b is F' and `a=b', 
but `a=b' is true a priori. 
'I thank Nick Shackel for pointing out and patiently explaining to me, a similar problem with an earlier 
definition of IEM I myself offered. 
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Like Pryor's definition, this definition does not require S to believe either that b is F 
or that a is identical to b. So, again, there is a sense in which the notion of 
misidentification employed in this definition is weaker than that employed in the 
definition of IEM given in chapter two. This point is important when it comes to my 
second, more general, objection to Pryor. 
Since there is a respect in which Pryor's definition (of misidentification) is 
weaker that the standard definition, there should be some cases which qualify as 
instances of de re misidentification under Pryor's definition but not under the standard 
account. That is, we should be able to give an example of a subject who believes that 
a is F and who, whilst he is justified in believing both that some b is F and that a is 
identical to b, he doesn't actually hold these two beliefs. Further, his justification for 
believing that a is F rests on his justification for believing these two propositions. 
However, unbeknownst to the subject, a is not identical to b. Unfortunately, none of 
the six examples of de re misidentification Pryor gives in his paper help us here, since 
in all of them the subject does actually believe that b is F and that a is identical to b. 
Neither have I managed to come with an example. In fact, I'm not entirely sure an 
example is there to be thought of. To see why consider the following case. 
Someone who looks just like Bert is standing in front of me. He's wearing 
blue socks. Since I can see this person I am justified in believing that the person in 
front of me is wearing blue socks and that the person in front of me is Bert. I am also 
justified in believing that Bert is wearing blue socks and this justification rests on my 
justification for believing that the person in front of me is wearing blue socks and that 
the person in front of me is Bert. However, I have the groundless belief that I am 
hallucinating and so I never actually form the belief that the person in front of me is 
wearing blue socks or the belief that the person in front of me is Bert. But, of course, 
it is not Bert in front of me, it's Ernie. Importantly, this is not yet a case of de re 
misidentification. In order for it to be so, it must be the case that I do actually believe 
that Bert is wearing blue socks. But it seems to me wholly implausible to suggest that 
this can simply be added to the example. Why do I believe that Bert is wearing blue 
socks? Surely not because of my visual perceptions, since I consider them to be 
illusory. Some other reason then, say a reliable source tells me that Bert is wearing 
blue socks. But then it seems unlikely that (ii) will continue to hold. If I believe that 
Bert is wearing blue socks on this new evidence, it seems likely that my justification 
for believing it will rest upon my justification for believing the testimony not upon my 
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justification for believing that the person standing in front of me is wearing blue socks 
and that the person standing in front of me is Bert. But if this is right, Pryor's 
definition will collapse into a version of the standard account. Any belief which 
qualifies as an instance of de re misidentification in Pryor's sense, will qualify as an 
instance of misidentification in the standard sense. As a result, I favour the definition 
of IEM given in chapter two. 
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